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ABSTRACT 
A study of the policing of six shopping centres in the north 
west of England using non-participatory observations, a 
Likert Scale survey and anecdotal data as a means of 
examining the changing division of pol icing labour. The 
study draws on research carried out in Bri tain and North 
America which suggests that although there are strong 
negative perceptions of the average security officer, the 
security industry continues to expand. 
The study examines some of the theoretical concepts used to 
explain the continuing development and expansion of the 
pri vate securi ty industry by focusing on one particular 
sector of the contract guarding division of the industry. 
Whilst it is accepted that the examination of such a small 
part of such a large industry can do no more than provide a 
snap-shot of how policing provision is changing, the 
concl usions drawn are used to make recommendations wi th 
respect to the regulation of the industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the changing 
policing labour wi th particular emphasis on 
policing of shopping centres. 
division of 
the private 
Chapter One consists of a review of the literature, tracing 
a brief sketch of the historical background of private 
securi ty in Bri tain and North America. Attention is drawn to 
the fact that al though the bulk of the Ii terature on the 
subject is either American or Canadian, private security in 
North America, unl ike publ ic pol icing, began and grew in 
direct relationship to the needs of North American society. 
It examines contemporary studies of private securi ty in 
Britain focusing on the works of Johnston and South. It also 
examines contemporary studies conducted in the United States 
such as the Rand and Hallcrest Reports, raising questions 
about public perceptions of private policing and examines 
some of the theoretical concepts used to explain the 
continuing development and expansion of the industry. 
Chapter Two examines theories such as the Junior Partner 
Theory, Economic 
Hypothesis (as 
Theories, 
formulated 
Radical 
by the 
Theories and Consumer 
researcher). The 
public/private police relationship is examined by contrasting 
and comparing these theories and examining the five stage 
relationship identified by Stenning (1989). The increasing 
interface between public and private police is considered, 
particularly in relation to the policing of shopping centres. 
The design of the research is discussed in Chapter Three 
which states the objects of the research, populations to be 
covered and information sought. The construction of a 
battery of instruments is described with an explanation of 
factors influencing the final choice of research tools. 
Chapter Four describes the implementation of the research 
highlighting problems encountered and discusses their 
probable influence on the final results of the research. 
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Chapter Five analyses and discusses the resul ts of the 
research drawing some rather controversial conclusions not 
only in respect of this particular project but in respect of 
much of the controversy that surrounds the private security 
industry. Not least of these conclusions is that over 
reliance on the wealth of material provided by North American 
research leads to the formulation of inappropriate questions 
about the British security industry. British research is 
largely unco-ordinated and fragmented and therefore 
ineffecti ve and this can only be countered by government 
sponsored and directed research. An extensive review of the 
security industry should be carried out in order to answer a 
host of questions about the industry before any consideration 
is given to the concept of licencing and regulation. 
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C HAP T E R 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Historical Background of Private Security 
According to Johnston (1992) histories of policing are 
dominated by what might be called the "Anglo American 
Model.(l) This model concentrates on the development of 
social control in England and the United States of America. 
The model predicates similar reasons for the emergence of 
policing both private and public in these countries, basing 
its arguments on the fact that until the American War of 
Independence (1776) England's dominance and influence over 
the American colonies was indisputable. Even after achieving 
independence many of the practices and traditions of the 
colonists were English born. It is argued that for the most 
part America's law enforcement and justice system was 
fashioned after the English system. Evidence of this can be 
seen in the adversarial court systems employed in both 
England and North America which contrast sharply with the 
inquisitional system of most European nations. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why this model has held such sway 
over histories of policing is that it can accommodate both 
conservative orthodox perspectives posited by commentators 
such as Reith (1952), Critchley (1979) and Ascoli (1987) and 
radical revisionist arguments posi ted by conunentators such as 
Storch (1981). Both perspectives accept the validity of 
historical arguments that municipal police systems in both 
England and America were born out of a mix of public and 
private provision of social control and that even after the 
institution of municipal police forces, private provision 
continued to flourish. They differ in the reasons they put 
forward for the demise of some aspects of social control 
which existed prior to the emergence of municipal pol ice 
forces. 
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The conservative-orthodox perspective tends to suggest that 
modern policing in England emerged as a simple effect of a 
number of causes. These causes included the fact that the 
office of parish constable had fallen into contempt. 
Justices of the Peace were similarly held in contempt and 
considered to be corrupt. The Industrial Revolution brought 
about the expansion of towns, growth of population and 
increasing wealth. This state of affairs was exploited by 
notorious providers of private policing such as Jonathan 
Wilde. His basic method was to order his men to commit a 
burglary and then in his self appointed capacity as IIThief 
Taker General II he would receive the victim in his office 
where he would take particulars of the missing goods, shortly 
afterwards he would return the goods to the grateful owner on 
payment of commission. 
The urbani sing effects of the Industrial Revolution are also 
seen as undermining the stability which had been enjoyed by 
rural society, destroying the principle of the universal 
obligation to serve as parish constable. Critchley (1967) 
maintains that when the principle of personal service died 
out, the office of constable sank to its lowest grade and men 
paid deputies who were IIscarcely removed from idiotismll . 
Coatman (1959) tells us that in the towns constables were 
reinforced by watchmen, who had some of the powers or 
authority of the constable, the majority of whom gradually 
came to consist of poor illiterate men who were glad of the 
small pay and a share of any fees which came their way. 
Whilst Critchley and Coatman may be correct about the 
intellectual capacity of some of the people performing the 
duties of constable or watchmen, Draper (1978) suggests that 
some of those deputised by wealthy tradesmen or town's folk 
were astute enough to IIsub-contractll the job. 
This is why it eventually fell to the otherwise unemployable 
to carry out the task of upholding the law and maintaining 
the King's peace. 
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It could be argued that immediately prior to the emergence of 
municipal police forces, policing was entirely in the hands 
of private security since what little public provision 
existed had been sub-contracted to such an extent that it 
virtually ceased to be public provision. 
A state of affairs existed where the policing of England was 
in the hands of people appointed and paid by individuals 
rather than the state or local authority. These persons for 
the greater part had no legal appointment or authority to 
enforce the law other than that they were prepared to carry 
out the responsibility of others for small remuneration. The 
avoidance of the duty of policing was not in itself illegal, 
in fact the law made provision for it. Whilst distaste for 
the publ ic duty of maintaining the King's Peace created 
commercial opportuni ty it prompted people such as Henry 
Fielding to say of those who performed a policing function. 
"They are chosen out of those poor decrepit people 
who are from their want of bodily strength rendered 
incapable of getting a living by work. These men 
armed only with a pole which some are scarcely 
able to lift, are to secure the persons and houses 
of his Majesty's subjects" 
The wealthy were able to avoid carrying out the duties of 
constable not merely by paying deputies, they could escape 
service by paying a fine to parish funds or alternatively by 
acquiring a "Tyburn Ticket". Whilst the Statute of 
Westminster 1285 required a watch to be stationed in every 
town, made up of men of the town who would work on a rota 
basis, an Act of 1699 provided exemption from such duty. Any 
person who prosecuted a felon to conviction enjoyed lifelong 
exemption from all parish duties and the relevant certificate 
(Tyburn Ticket) changed hands for substantial sums of money. 
Critchley (1967) maintains that those who were contracted (or 
sub-contracted) to perform the office of constable were "at 
best illiterate fools and at worst as corrupt as the criminal 
classes from which not a few sprang". 
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In contrast the radical revisionist argument posi ted by 
commentators such as Storch (1981) suggests that it was not 
so much the increasing opportunities for crime but rather the 
need for a disciplined working class that prompted the 
emergence of modern pol iCing. He argues that capi tal ism, 
having subjected the work force to factory discipline, and 
cash having replaced social ties as the important factor in 
people's lives generated inevitable social tensions. Storch 
maintains that the system of parish constables was unable to 
deal with these tensions not so much because of defects in 
the efficiency of the office itself but rather because the 
holders of that office may have shown more loyalty to the 
local community than to the state. He sees the formation of 
a professional, bureaucratic police organisation guaranteeing 
consistent standards of policing under state jurisdiction as 
the solution. Storch's views are not incompatible with the 
facts. By the year 1700 disciplined industrial capitalism 
was already becoming fami liar in certain parts of England 
with the time keeper, the time sheet and a system of fines. 
South (1987) informs us that the Law Book of Crowley's Iron 
Works represented an entire civil and penal code running to 
more than 100,000 words to govern and regulate the labour 
force. To enforce such a code, Crowley employed a warden and 
a moni tor who were to act as timekeepers and detect and 
report upon all breaches of workplace discipline. South 
notes that the parallels with modern private security are 
self evident. 
Parallels with modern private security are not only evident 
within factory walls, Rock (1983) suggests that as the formal 
system of parish constable and Justice of the Peace declined 
provision by private self interest flourished. This private 
provision was strongly encouraged by legislation that from 
1691 had offered substantial rewards to those who brought the 
prosecution of certain offences. A whole range of crimes of 
theft and robbery was encompassed by this system of 
"prosecution as private enterprise". 
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" The sources of rewards reflected the nature of the prevailing 
mixed economy, coming from the state in the shape of the 
courts and the excise as well as insurance companies and 
voluntary associations. 
Pri vate provision was not only concerned wi th recovering 
stolen property and apprehending miscreants, it was active in 
crime prevention wi th stage coach companies and private 
owners trying to overcome the threat of highway men and 
thieves by carrying armed guards on their vehicles. A marine 
police establishment set up in 1798 to police the port of 
London had four fifths of its 
Merchants operating in the port. 
costs paid by West Indian 
The establishment of sixty 
officers was so successful that it became a public body in 
1800 preceding Peel's "New Police" by 29 years (Draper 
1978). 
Just as there are differing views for the emergence of modern 
policing in Britain the Anglo American Model supports 
differing views for the emergence of policing in America. 
Silver (1967) argues that fear of riot and disorder were 
paramount in the development of modern policing. Other 
commentators such as Lane (1967) and Richardson (1970) 
suggest that immigration and urbanisation led to increased 
crime and thus stimulated police development, whilst others 
such as Spitzer and Scull (1977) have concentrated on the 
relationship between society and industrial capitalism. 
Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter (1981) suggest that the 
development of public police in America finds its historical 
roots in the scope and range of events that shaped early 
England. They see English concepts of law, justice, social 
structure and securi ty being gradually assimi lated into early 
American life. They suggest that one merely has to look at 
the societal evolution of England to discover why and how 
certain changes occurred in America. Until 1776 the 
dominance and influence of England over the American colonies 
was indisputable and even after the War of Independence many 
prQctices and traditions of the colonists were English born. 
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Although they accept that America's law enforcement and its 
justice system was for the most part fashioned after the 
English system, Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter see security in 
the private sector beginning and growing in direct 
relationship to the needs of American society. Events such 
as the American Civil War, the development of the American 
rai lway system, two world wars, technological advances, 
rising crime rates, government regulations and many other 
factors have in the passage of time combined to initiate and 
nurture a growing demand for private security in the United 
States. The point made by Ricks is an important one because 
although there are many similarities between the British and 
North American security industries and indeed the security 
industries of many European countries there are also many 
subtle differences. Differences due to historical and social 
development of the various security industries of different 
nations mean that any comparisons should be made with 
circumspection. 
The conservative and radical standpoints together with other 
perspectives are still used to explain the continuing 
expansion of the private security industry but as McClintock 
and Wiles point out as far as England is concerned: 
"Compared with the birth pangs of the police reforms 
of 1829-30 and onwards, one might be forgiven for 
missing the event (the rapid expansion of private 
security). No savagely contested Act of Parliament 
in any way influenced it. By 1930 a quarter of a 
million uniformed men were operating in our society 
under the control of private companies" (1972 p 9). 
Johnston (1992) al so points to the fact that remarkably 
little has been written about the history of private security 
in comparison with the number of histories of public policing 
and he further suggests that what has been written tends to 
be from a radical standpoint. Johnston offers Spitzer and 
Scull and Shearing and Stenning as examples of writers of 
radical histories arguing that they attempt to trace the 
history of private security in North America to changes in 
capitalist property relations. 
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This review of the literature on private security in modern 
times will attempt to determine what other perspectives as 
well as the conservative and radical are currently used to 
account for the increasing growth of private security. It 
will also seek to compare the current public atti tudes 
towards those who are contracted to "secure the persons and 
property" of their clients with the views of security 
provisions prior to the emergence of modern policing as 
expressed by Cri tchley (1979), Coatman (1959) and Henry 
Fielding. 
2. Contemporary Studies of Private Security 
In comparison with North America private security in Britain 
has attracted limited analysis and scholarly attention.(2) 
South (1988) in his descriptive study of the British security 
industry traces its history and development examining what is 
currently happening in the industry and he suggests what 
might be proposed by way of response. He sees the post war 
expansion of the private security sector as having 
revolutionary implications for the nature of modern social 
control and the policing of society. It is argued that, such 
a significant increase in resort to private arrangements for 
ensuring security has fundamentally changed the division of 
policing labour. 
South notes that some commentators whom he sees as 
principally members of the police service are critical of the 
expansion of the private securi ty sector. As recently as 
Apri 1 1994 the Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset was 
addressing a conference on the "Changing Face of Policing" 
and warning of private security risks (Casey 1994). It is 
argued that this critical approach though understandable in 
some instances is not wholly justified in the light of the 
"symbiotic" relationship existing between police and private 
security. Just as Ricks, Tillet and Van Meter (1981) argued 
that the emergence and growth of private security in America 
was in direct relationship to the needs of American Society. 
South argues that the increasing complexity of the division 
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of policing labour in Britain, is a reflection of the 
complexity of British society. South examines this 
complexi ty in terms of the formal/commercial private/informal 
dimensions of social control and justice. The increasing 
expansion of the private Security Industry and the fact that 
it is today "policing" either private property to which large 
numbers of the public have access or large areas of "public" 
space, with little public debate, is regarded as being the 
consequence of social and economic changes, rather than 
political and legal ones. However, South argues that there 
is a political if not legal need for democratic 
accountability of the industry. 
Johnston (1992) in his study of private security asserts that 
unti 1 recently research had tended to concentrate on the 
activities of the public police, that is about the role of 
police forces now maintained under the Police Act 1964 and 
has tended to ignore the question of policing per se which he 
sees as including "hybrid" forces such as the Ministry of 
Defence Police, British Transport Police and United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary as well as the 
special ist forces employed by port authori ties or simi lar 
undertakings. In addi tion to the whole private securi ty 
industry which Johnston sees as playing an ever increasing 
role in the enforcement of the law, not only in private but 
in public space there exist many government agencies such as 
Customs and Excise, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
and the Heal th and Safety Executive which carry out law 
enforcement functions. It is argued by him that failure to 
include such agencies in any debate about policing tends to 
obscure the fact that throughout history policing is an 
activity which has been undertaken by a mixture of public, 
private and quasi-public agencies. 
He disagrees with many models of police history which see a 
complete break between private provision and the new police. 
He uses a review of the historical background of police 
history to support his argument that there was no clear break 
between the new and old forms of policing. 
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From a review of the history of private policing and an 
examination of the various ideologies of privatisation such 
as conservative, radical and marxist, Johnston goes on to 
look at the contemporary security industry. Johnston appears 
to agree with South (1988) with regard to the complexity of 
policing labour, seeing that complexity as being located in 
the connections between formal and substantive powers and 
between private and public activities. 
He argues that for no logical reason constabulary powers, 
that is full law enforcement powers with their associated 
privileges, can only be granted by or at least through the 
state apparatus. It has been held again for no logical 
reason, that Johnston can identify, that the policing of 
publ ic space can only be carried out by those holding 
constabulary powers. These beliefs have led to the 
misconception that private security do on private property 
what municipal police do in public. This simplistic notion 
ignores the complexity of social control and dismisses the 
fact that a whole range of control agencies exist alongside 
public police and private security. He criticises the 
sociology of policing for failing to address this issue. He 
suggests that researchers of private securi ty 1 ike 
researchers of the police have been preoccupied with 
functional questions tending to concentrate on two issues, 
the function of private security and its relationship with 
the public police in the overall division of policing labour. 
He examines the major theoretical concepts underpinning much 
of the research on private security, drawing heavily on the 
work of North American researchers in the process. 
Johnston raises questions not only about our concepts of 
policing but about what we consider as public and private. He 
illustrates the public-private dichotomy in terms of a 
strategic arena and suggests that active citizenship is a 
discourse about public-private provision. Government 
suggestions that active citizenship should exist alongside 
the "massive public services" (and policing is surely one of 
these) to fill the myriad of needs which are not best met by 
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creating or entering a bureaucratic scheme are seen as a 
double edged sword. Johnston maintains that such a strategy 
whilst ostensibly about social responsibility is 
simul taneously an agenda for reconstructing the boundaries of 
the public and the private. It is further argued that 
because the impact of such a strategy is not entirely 
predictable, active citizenship is a dangerous political game 
to play for it may well expose and politicise conflicts 
between different sets of "needs" and rights without offering 
any just means of resolving them. It is not just police 
commentators but also politicians such as Bruce George (1984) 
who have recognised this and called for government 
participation in and regulation of the Security Industry. 
Both South (1988) and Johnston (1992) touch on the subject of 
social control and Matthews (1989) suggests that 
privatisation does not si t comfortably wi th the theme of 
destructuring, that is decarceration, community care, 
deinstitutionalisation which began in the 1960's and 
subsequently failed. This was a complex and differentiated 
development which was implemented in many different ways, as 
a result some critics who attacked the "sinister state" now 
attack the "sinister market". The attribution of blame to 
pri vate agencies could not be other than acceptable to a 
government whose social control policies led to an 
acceleration of the process of centralisation of control of 
the public police (Johnston 1993) and the mobilisation of the 
active citizen. A government which Johnston saw as adopting 
a subtle mode of political intervention setting out a 
political agenda aimed at the reconstruction of sectoral and 
spatial boundaries in new forms whilst ostensibly speaking of 
social rights and responsibilities. 
2.1 North American Research 
Much of the Bri tish research into private securi ty draws 
inspiration from the extensive studies carried out in North 
America, both the United States and Canada. It is important 
to note once again that thers is far more overt government 
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intervention in the private security industry in North 
America wi th a good deal of research funding corning from 
government sources. The first major study focusing solely on 
pri vate securi ty in the Uni ted States was conducted by 
Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971). 
This study conducted for the Rand Corporation provided the 
first in depth look at the dimensions of private security, 
with an emphasis on contractual security. 
The Rand Report 1971 provided a glimpse of the size and 
growth trends of private security which were generally 
confirmed by the 1977 update based on the 1970 census data. 
The Rand Report 1971 was notable for two distinct 
impressions which it created. 
a) The vast resources and programmes of private 
security were overshadowed by characterisations 
of the "average security officer" as underscreened, 
undertrained, undersupervised and in need of 
licensing and regulation to upgrade the quality 
of personnel and services. 
b) Private securi ty was depicted as "private policing" 
and "policing for profit", to meet the needs of 
special interest groups, as opposed to public 
policing which serves the community at large. 
The growth of private security, its potential for interaction 
with law enforcement, and the problems listed by The Rand 
Report led to two other major study efforts. A Private 
Securi ty Advisory Council (PSAC) to the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration (LEAA) was established in 1972 and 
produced advisory reports until 1977. In 1975 a Private 
Security Task Force (PSTF) was added to the National Advisory 
cornrni ttee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The 
creation of these bodies arose from a recogni tion of the 
pervasi ve involvement of private securi ty in safety and 
protection. The membership of both these bodies was multi-
disciplinary and included members from the academic, law 
enforcement, business ~nd security communities. 
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Problems relating to the interaction and co-operation of law 
enforcement and securi ty resources were tangentially 
addressed by both groups. The general aim was to establish 
standards that would help upgrade the qual i ty of private 
security and prevent abuses and unethical practices. This, 
it was believed would increase the probability of a greater 
contribution by private security to crime prevention and 
control. The standards developed by the Task Force in 1976 
were designed, in part, to motivate private security to begin 
upgrading its various components (Cunningham, Strauchs and 
Van Meter 1990). 
In the early 80's Hallcrest Systems Inc., was selected by the 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to conduct a three year 
national study of the roles and resources of private security 
as well as the nature, extent and growth of security markets. 
This research also included a national assessment of law 
enforcement and private security relationships. The results 
were published in 1985 as The Hallcrest Report (Cunningham 
and Taylor 1985). 
The Hallcrest Report II - Private Security Trends 
1970-fOOO, presented the results of a descriptive research 
project carried out in 1989 and 1990. The major purposes of 
this project were to: 
a) profile the growth and changes in the private 
security industry over the past two decades 
b) identify emerging and continuing issues and 
trends in private security and its relationships 
with public law enforcement, and 
c) present recommendations and future research 
goals in the interests of greater co-operation 
between private security and law enforcement 
(Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter 1990) 
In spite of the not insubstantial body of academic research 
on the private security industry in the United States, one of 
the recommendations resulting from The Benchmark II Survey 
conducted by Toffelmire, Duncan and Gale (1992) for the 
American Society for Industrial Security was: 
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"In order to provide a stronger base of knowledge 
about security activities across industries, it is 
imperative to design better and more consistent 
research instruments and standards for the analysis 
of such instruments, to implement such projects on 
a regular basis and to devise strategies for 
aggregating findings and data across studies" 
(1992 p 51). 
After two decades of research in the United States, a number 
of areas of the private security industry were shown to be 
problematical or at least worthy of further research. 
a) Negative perceptions of the average security 
guard as underscreened, undertrained, 
undersupervised and underpaid and in need 
of licensing and regulation (The Rand Report 1971) 
b) Negative perceptions of a private policing system 
which existed: 
(i) to make profit 
(ii) to meet the needs of special interest groups 
and not the general public (The Rand Report 
1971) 
c) A growing industry with increasing potential 
for interaction with sworn or public law 
enforcement agencies (The Rand Report 1971) 
d) The pervasive involvement of private security 
in safety and protection (The Rand Report 1971) 
e) The need to establish standards which would 
help to upgrade the quality of private security 
and prevent abuses and unethical practices 
(The Hallcrest Report II 1990) 
f) The need to upgrade standards as a probable 
means of increasing the contribution of private 
security towards crime prevention and control 
(The Hallcrest Report II 1990) 
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g) The state of law enforcement and private security 
relationships nationally (The Hallcrest Report 
1985) 
h) The growth and changes in the private security 
industry over the past two decades (The Hallcrest 
Report II 1990) 
i) The merging and continuing issues and trends 
in private security (The Hallcrest Report II 1990) 
j) A need to provide a stronger base of knowledge 
about security activities across industries and 
a need for better and more consistent and 
co-ordinated research. (The Benchmark II Survey 
1992) 
In spite of the involvement of representatives of law 
enforcement, academia, commerce and the security industry, 
the industry as a whole in the United States has been slow to 
react to the research findings. 
In 1988 Chuvala and Gilmere reiterated some of the findings 
of the earl ier Rand Report. They suggested that careful 
vetting of applicants together with other simple screening 
methods would help the organisation ensure that only the best 
qualified applicants were selected. They suggested that 
private policing organisations face a number of problems when 
recruiting personnel which could lead to selection of less 
than the ideal candidate. Among the problems highlighted 
were: 
a) Hiring people who appear to have so much in common 
with their interviewers. 
b) Settling for mediocre candidates, because of 
pressure to fill the position, politics or the 
feeling that one just cannot afford the best. 
c) Not probing for limitations, lies or details. 
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d) Talking instead of listening while conducting 
pre-employment interviews. 
e) Overselling the job. 
f) Hiring friends or repaying favours. 
Layne (1988) had already suggested the following list of pre-
employment screening tools for in-house security which would 
have helped overcome these criticisms had they been 
universally adopted. 
a) Application form (very thorough and as long as 
needed) 
b) In depth interview 
c) Criminal history check 
d) Workers compensation check 
e) Physical examination 
f) Oral examination 
Layne goes on to suggest that the following types of check 
may also be appropriate: 
a) Drug screening 
b) Polygraph (lie detector test) 
c) Psychological tests such as the MMPI 
(personality test) 
As well as inadequate screening, inadequate training remains 
problematical for the securi ty industry in the Uni ted States, 
Chuvala and Gilmere (1992) recognising the need for quality 
training, maintain that: 
"The merits of good training are numerous, improved 
safety, compliance with regulations and standards, 
reduction of liability, higher productivity, 
efficiency, economy, improved quality, enhanced 
opportunities for advancement and greater effectiveness 
are some of the benefits. These and others contribute 
to a worker1s comprehension, growth and sense of value ll 
(1992 p 84). 
The argument that training would improve safety tends to 
suggest that what the Private Security Task Force (1975) had 
identified as a pervasive involvement had de-facto become an 
essential part of the security function. 
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Chuvala and Gilmere suggested a needs assessment study to 
determine how much and what type of training was necessary 
and that all training of an individual should be completed 
before going on the job. They also suggested that no person 
should be allowed on the job without a completed background 
investigation and that all personnel in security work should 
be required to be licensed or trained by a well critiqued 
programme. 
In 1991 Marsh was continuing to emphasise the need to upgrade 
the quality of education and training available to members of 
private securi ty organisations in the Uni ted States. He 
maintained: 
"Education and training have long been considered 
the primary methods of professionalising the security 
industry. However, to date, there has been more flash 
than substance to this issue. Security managers have 
become better educated (Moss 1989) but securi ty officers 
have tended to remain relatively untrained and under 
educated. The lack of education and training for 
security officers is due in part to low salaries 
and the employers' fear that if the officers are 
provided with better training and increased education 
they will seek a higher paying job. Thus a 
"Catch 22" process has permeated the security 
industry. Security officers continue to lack 
training and education and the industry continues 
to fight for professional recognition" (1991 p 180). 
Marsh calls for security firms to maximise the human resource 
potential of each employee and suggests that one method by 
which this objective can be achieved is through the 
establishment of co-operative corporate/university security 
education programmes. Almost fifteen years earlier the 
Report of the Task Force on Private Security (1977) 
recommended the establ ishment of co-operative programmes 
suggesting that private securi ty degree programmes would 
enhance the professionalisation of private security. 
Hertig (1989) suggested that the level of education should 
increase with the security position held. Specifically he 
suggested that security officers should have a certificate or 
associate degree and supervisors and managers should have a 
Bachelor's and Master's Degree respectively. 
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A great deal of the research carried out in the United States 
concentrates on the role of private policing and identifies 
at least eight main areas worthy of greater attention these 
are: 
a) Vetting 
b) Regulation 
c) Pay 
d) Supervision 
e) Provision of a private justice system. 
f) Interaction and co-operation with public police 
g) Training 
h) Loss prevention versus crime prevention. 
Conversely research in the Uni ted Kingdom and Canada has 
tended to centre on the debate about private policing and its 
relationship to the state, commerce and the public police. 
This research will examine the role of one small section of 
the private securi ty industry in Bri tain wi th particular 
emphasis on the above mentioned areas. 
3. Vetting of Security Personnel 
The Hallcrest Report's national surveys of contractual and 
corporate security managers in the early 1980's revealed that 
both groups used similar techniques for screening prospective 
employees. Contract securi ty managers reported the 
following: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Application review and interviewing 
Reference checks 
Criminal history checks 
Background investigation 
94% 
80% 
73% 
59% 
e) Fingerprints checks 58% 
Polygraph and psychological tests were used less frequently. 
The field and focus groups interviews conducted during 1989-
90 disclosed no dramatic changes in security screening 
practices except that fewer polygraph examinations are now 
administered as a result of restrictive federal legislation 
(The Hallcrest Report 1990). 
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Al though screening appears extensive, Chuvala and Gi Imere 
were already questioning the quality of vetting carried out 
by the industry. They suggested that the principal factor in 
selecting personnel for a specific client and assignment 
appeared to be the client's willingness to pay certain wages. 
Actual experience and education were rated the least 
important factors. 
3.1 Vetting in the British Security Industry 
Money also appears to be a major factor in the selection of 
personnel by some British companies. In an interview with Mr 
P W Rabbi tts of the International Professional Securi ty 
Association, he indicated that many companies in larger 
ci ties such as London offer £2.00 or £3.00 per hour for 
guarding staff. Such low remuneration tends to attract 
marginal personnel, that is newly arrived immigrants and 
those of the indigenous population who would have difficulty 
finding other work for reasons such as poor education or poor 
employment records. Not only do such personnel receive low 
salaries, they receive little or no training, have little or 
no promotional opportunities and tend to use the industry as 
a stepping stone to more rewarding employment as soon as it 
becomes available. 
This is by no means the picture for the whole of the 
industry, many of those companies submitting to voluntary 
regulation select, screen and train applicants to Bri tish 
Standard BS 7499 and the minimum requirements of either the 
British Security Industry Association or the International 
Professional Security Association, this would involve: 
a) Application review and interviewing 
b) Reference checks - initially a 5 year clearance 
with a 10/20 year security clearance obtained 
during the probation period 
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c) The British Security Industry does not have 
access to Criminal Record information but 
does attempt to verify gaps in an applicant's 
employment history 
d) Documentary proof of identity 
The processing of an application from initial contact with a 
company to the offer of a position can take up to six weeks 
as a result of checks carried out. 
One company, Securicor, has introduced psychometric 
questionnaires, referred to as Biodata Questionnaires, wi thin 
the company. In Britain, where vetting is carried out, it is 
claimed by reputable security companies to be of as high a 
quality as possible. The problem, it is claimed, lies with 
the unregulated companies of unspecified number who fail to 
vet personnel or carry out poor quality vetting. 
Letters from a number of companies contacted testify to the 
fact that operatives are vetted to B.S.I.A. or I.P.S.A. 
standards as a minimum (see Appendix B). However Johnston 
(1992) quotes incidents such as a company in the north of 
England which despi te membership of the Bri tish Securi ty 
Industry Association (BSIA) employed eight guards with 
criminal records; an incident when sixteen police officers 
were injured at an acid house party in Surrey during an 
altercation with sixty guards from Strikeforce Surveillance 
(London) who were armed with CS gas, baseball bats and knives 
and the case of a newspaper reporter who became a bodyguard 
to Ceci 1 Parkinson, then Secretary of State for Energy, 
wi thout any check having been made on his credentials. 
Perhaps muted official response to these incidents which 
reveal woeful inadequacies in vetting, may have something to 
do with the fact that the Home Office employed a security 
officer to protect one of its colleges who was found to have 
had six jail terms for arson, malicious wounding and 
burglary. 
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It would appear that the security industry sponsored British 
Security Registration Board set up in March 1990 and whose 
aims were reported by The Times (20.3.90) as being to screen 
job applicants for security firms by examining their 
qual ifications and employment history is ei ther not being 
fully utilised by security companies or is failing to meet 
its reported aims. 
Since vetting is closely related to regulation and regulation 
is considered by government to be a matter for the security 
industry i tsel f to address, many commentators wi thin the 
industry, the police, parliament and academia see no 
likelihood of improvement in standards of vetting until 
statutory regulation is introduced. 
4. Regulation of the Industry 
'The Rand Report 1971 highlighted the impreSSions which people 
had of private security in the United States of America. The 
vast resources and programmes of the industry were seen as 
being overshadowed by characterisations of the "average 
security officer" as underscreened, undertrained, 
undersupervised and in need of licensing and regulation to 
upgrade the quality of personnel and services. 
4.1 Regulation in Britain 
The British Security Industry without the benefit of such 
research has identified similar problems and the launch of 
the Inspectorate of the Security Industry (lSI) by the then 
Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke Q.C. M.P. on 20 October 1992 
represents an attempt by at least some sections of the 
industry to upgrade the quality of personnel and services. 
The lSI provides inspection of manned service companies to 
agreed industry standards and claims to ensure that 
requi rements for securi ty screening, training and other Codes 
of Practice are met. It offers certification to the quality 
management systems standard, BS 5750. 
BS 5750:1987 is a nationally accepted standard derived from 
proven quality management practice. 
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It is recognised worldwide as International Standard ISO 
9000: 1987 and clearly defines responsibilities and procedures 
to be followed, thus ensuring that a system operates at its 
optimum level. The principles of BS 5750 are applicable to 
all sizes of companies, from the smallest to the largest. 
The scheme is open to all companies who are capable of 
showing that the quality system they use for the supply of a 
service or product to their customers satisfies the 
requirements of BS 5750 and any relevant agreed 
interpretative documents. The approval of such a company 
will be signified by the issuing of a certificate of 
registration wi th the BS 5750 Assessed Companies Scheme, 
which will detail the appropriate BS 5750 standard for a 
particular type of service or product from a particular 
location. Where a particular type of service or product is 
in accordance with a recognised standard or Code of Practice, 
this will also be identified on the certificate. Where 
appropriate in conjunction with BS 5750 Quality Assessment 
Schedules (QAS) are prepared, defining in precise terms the 
special requirements relating to a specific service or 
product. These Quality Assessment Schedules have been, and 
are, developed by the Inspectorate in co-operation with the 
security industry and in consultation with companies, 
customers and associated interests and in many cases reflect 
the requirements of recognised Standards or Codes of Practice 
(Inspectorate of the Security Industry 1992). 
4.2 Registration in Britain 
The lSI recognises that manned security companies are and 
always will be, at different stages of development and as a 
result offers three different routes to full registration. 
a) Enroled Companies Scheme 
This scheme is suitable for companies who cannot 
satisfy the criteria of the Inspected Companies 
Scheme or the Assessed Companies Scheme. 
Certification is of a "probationary" nature 
and is valid for only twelve months. 
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This however, provides a level of credibility 
enabling companies to progress within that 
period. 
b) Inspected Companies Scheme 
Under this scheme companies will be lSI inspected 
against British Standard 7499 and other agreed 
Codes of Practice including minimum training 
levels. BS 7499 Manual Security Services is 
an essential element central to most of the 
activities conducted by a company. 
c) Assessed Companies Scheme 
This scheme, in addition to requirements under 
BS7499, provides companies with registration 
under the Quality Management Systems Standard 
BS 5750. Whilst this standard is already 
well established in other industries, it is 
still relatively new to the manned security 
sector (Inspectorate of the Security Industry 
1992) 
The Inspectorate of 
established in 1992 
the 
by 
Security Industry was jOintly 
the British Security Industry 
Association and the International Professional Security 
Association. It was born out of the National Inspectorate of 
Security Guard Patrol and Transport Services established by 
the British Security Industry Association. The Inspectorate 
of the Security Industry is governed by a Board of 
Management, which comprises representatives from registered 
companies, customers of the industry, security associations 
and independent security advisors as well as observers from 
the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Police. A 
Certification commi ttee oversees the Registration Schemes and 
has the authori ty to issue, re-issue, wi thdraw or cancel 
Certificates of Registration. The working procedures of the 
commi ttee are claimed to ensure that confidentiali ty is 
maintained, that no vested interests are involved in decision 
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making and that any reports to the Board do not break these 
confidential requirements (Inspectorate of the Security 
Industry 1992). 
Although such regulatory machinery is in position there is no 
legal requirement for companies to register and government 
appears to adopt a consistently favourable attitude to self 
regulation in spite of pressure from various groups including 
leading members of the industry itself to introduce 
legislation to regulate the industry. 
In 1977, the then Assistant Secretary at the Home Office 
Police Department, D. Hillary, argued strongly that his 
Department (F3) would support legislation only if a clear 
need could be shown to exist, which he argued had not been 
done. This appears to be the current Home Office stance 
(Butlin 1993). In 1979 the Labour Government published a 
discussion paper which outlined some of the arguments for 
control of the industry. Whilst the paper did not lead to 
any further action being taken, it did note that if the use 
of private firms in a way which brought their employees into 
contact wi th the public in public or quasi public places 
became widespread, the argument for some control, e.g. over 
the machinery for recording and investigating complaints from 
the public, would be strengthened. It is arguable that such 
use of private firms is occurring now with the attestation as 
constables of security officers employed by Protective 
Security Systems (Police Review 1991), firms such as Range 
Security patrolling the streets of Merseyside (Police Review 
1992) and security firms patrolling housing estates (Evening 
Standard 1986). The police service has well established 
methods of regulation and accountability which is right and 
proper considering the constabulary powers which they 
possess. Although a private security officer has no more 
power than the ordinary citizen it is increasingly likely 
that security officers will be exercising these not 
inconsiderable powers about as often as a police officer 
exercises his constabulary powers. The protection and powers 
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available to the security officer include those conferred by 
the following legislation. 
Section 51 of The Police Act 1964 which creates a 
number of offences, including: 
"assaulting, wilfully resisting or 
obstructing a constable in the execution 
of his duty or a person assisting a constable". 
Even when not acting in support of a constable, 
a security officer as, any person is empowered by 
Section 3 of The Criminal Law Act 1967. 
"to use such force as is reasonable in 
the circumstances in the prevention of 
crime, or in effecting or assisting in 
the lawful arrest of offenders or 
suspected offenders or of persons 
unlawfully at large." 
In addi tion to this power Section 117 of The Pol ice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gives a constable the power to use 
reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power 
conferred on him by the Act, except such powers as may only 
be exercised with the consent of some other person, other 
than a police officer. Security officers attested as 
constables under Section 79 of The Harbours, Docks and Piers 
(Clauses) Act 1847 enjoy this extra power to use force 
without application of the regulatory mechanisms such as the 
Police Discipline Regulations and the Police Complaints 
Authori ty which exist to prevent the public police from 
abusing their powers. 
The possibility of the use of physical violence by private 
police was highlighted by Radzinowicz at the 1972 Cropwood 
Round Table Conference when he remarked on problems 
concerning unregulated private security. He expressed 
disquiet about the possible use of dogs and guns, the 
collecting of intelligence, surveillance of workers, choice 
of officers and supervisors and the rights of suspects. 
Whilst such concerns have equal relevance where the public 
police are concerned, they at least, work to a statutory code 
of practice as defined by Section 66 of The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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The Codes of Practice cover contact between the police and 
public arising from the exercise of stop and search powers, 
the searching of premises and the seizure of property found 
by police officers on persons or premises, the detention, 
treatment and questioning of persons by police officers and 
the identification of persons by police officers. 
4.3 Powers and Responsibilities of Private Security 
Walters and O'Connell (1985) hold that the major provisions 
of the Act affect not only the police and the legal 
profession but all those involved in the criminal justice 
system. They maintain that anyone involved wi th the 
investigation and/or prosecution of offences will be affected 
by the changes in powers and procedures that resulted from 
the Act and they suggest that this affects security officers 
in a similar way to police officers. This view raises two 
interesting points, firstly Walters and O'Connell clearly 
define private police in Britain in terms of crime 
investigation and as part of the criminal justice system, and 
secondly if private police remain unregulated how can 
compliance with Section 66 of The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 be ensured? 
It could be argued that the police have wider ranging powers 
of stop and search than security officers who would usually 
only be empowered to search either as a result of conditions 
of service of employees or conditions of entry to any private 
place. Similarly security officers are unlikely to be 
involved in the search of premises other than those of their 
employer or in the identification of persons ei ther by 
wi tnesses, fingerprints, photographs and intimate or non-
intimate samples. However, a security officer is liable to 
arrest persons and to detain such persons until handed over 
to the police. It would seem almost impossible to argue 
against Walters and O'Connell particularly in respect of Code 
C of the Codes of Practice concerning the detention treatment 
and questioning of persons when one considers the powers of 
arrest available to the security officer as any person. 
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The powers of arrest available to the security officer, other 
than those attested as constables under various Acts such as 
The Harbours, Docks and Pier Clause Act 1847 are the same as 
those available to any citizen, however the security officer 
is likely to use these powers to such an extent that it is 
arguable that some from of accountability is necessary. 
Powers of arrest available to the security officer include: 
Section 24(4) The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 which allows any person to arrest 
without a warrant: 
a) Anyone who is in the act of committing an 
arrestable offence. 
b) Anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting to be committing such an offence. 
Section 24(5) The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 which allows that where an arrestable 
offence has been committed any person may arrest 
without a warrant: 
a) Anyone who is guilty of the offence. 
b) Anyone whom he has reasonable grounds 
for suspecting to be guilty of it. 
The term arrestable offence is defined by Section 24(1) of 
the Act. Arrestable offences are basically offences carrying 
a sentence of at least five years imprisonment, plus certain 
other offences under The Customs and Exci se Act and The 
Official Secrets Acts, the causing of prostitution of women, 
procuration of a girl under 21, taking a conveyance without 
authority and going equipped for stealing. 
In addi tion any ci tizen and thus a securi ty officer can 
arrest for offences under: 
a) The Theft Act 1978 Section 3 Making off 
without payment 
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b) The Criminal Justice Act 1967 Section 91 
Drunkenness in a public place 
c) The Vagrancy Act 1824 Section 6 
(i) Peddlers trading without a licence 
(ii) Common prostitutes behaving in a 
riotous or indecent manner 
(iii) A male wilfully, lewdly and 
obscenely exposing the person 
with intent to insult a female 
(iv) Any person gathering alms or 
procuring charitable contributions 
under any false or fraudulent 
pretence 
-(v) Any person found on enclosed premises 
(vi) Any person escaping from any place of legal 
confinement 
There is also a common law power of arrest available to the 
citizen where anyone commits a breach of the peace in his 
presence, or where he reasonably bel ieves a person wi 11 
commit such a breach in the immediate future, or where a 
breach of the peace has been committed and it is reasonably 
believed that a renewal of it is threatened. 
Clearly such powers of arrest together with the power to use 
as much force as is reasonably necessary in effecting them or 
in preventing a crime, allows private security a great deal 
of control over those who come wi thin their sphere of 
influence. Research has indicated that in Canada, security 
organisations shunned police powers because the regulation 
that would come with them would hamper their operations, it 
was reported that: 
"It became increasingly clear to us that the 
rights traditionally associated with property 
ownership and common sense actions of what 
property ownership authorises in the way of 
protective action are the corner stones of 
modern security practices. Ownership of 
property, we found, makes legitimate many 
forms of security activity, including 
instances of invasive security behaviour 
(such as the searching of personal belongings 
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and vehicles, and of persons), at the same 
time that it renders unnecessary the exercise 
of physical coercion or force" (Shearing, Stenning 
and Addario 1985 p 370). 
The fact that security officers are using powers available to 
any citizen would appear to be at least one of the reasons 
why the British government has opted for encouraging self 
regulation of the securi ty industry. This is in stark 
contrast to the majority of signatories of the 1987 agreement 
reached by the Commi ttee of Mini sters of the Counci I of 
Europe who opted for regulations governing initial 
authorization, periodical licensing and regular inspection of 
security and surveillance companies. 
4.4 Regulation in European Community 
Greece, Eire and the United Kingdom are the only European 
Community countries with no specific regulatory legislation 
in force or in preparation. Thi s appears all the more 
strange in the United Kingdom when such regulatory machinery 
does exist in Northern Ireland where it is an offence to 
offer, provide or advertise security guard services without 
a certificate or to pay money for such services to a person 
who does not possess such a certificate. 
Regulation in Northern Ireland is controlled by the police 
and is aimed at preventing paramilitary groups from engaging 
in illegal fund raising acti vi ties. Johnston (1992) sees 
this statutory regulation as being interesting for three 
reason. First, though the principle of self regulation was 
conceded by the very act of passing legislation, that 
concession has had no impact on Horne Office attitudes, the 
principle of self regulation being strictly adhered to in the 
remainder of Britain. 
Secondly the Act legislating for regulation, The Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 focuses on terrorism 
and although the legislation formally recognises the problems 
of companies providing fronts for criminals, in practice the 
vetting procedure carried out by the Royal Ulster 
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Constabulary has been concerned primarily wi th terrorism. As 
a result there is reason to believe that criminals still 
manage to gain employment with security companies. Thirdly 
the legislation applies only to guard services and not to 
security services in general excluding those areas of private 
security which are undergoing' the most rapid expansion 
(alarms, CCTV, etc). Johnston also claims that the limited 
scope of the legislation provides loopholes which companies 
can exploi t to their advantage e. g. designating cash in 
transi t personnel as securi ty rather than guarding personnel. 
4.5 British Initiatives Concerning Regulation 
It is interesting to note that whilst The Rand Report 1971 
highlighted the impression that security guards in the U.S.A. 
were in need of licensing and regulation, during the 1970's 
British politicians were also raising the issue of 
regulation. Private Members Bills sponsored by Norman Fowler 
and Bruce George failed to gain Parliamentary assent for 
registration. 
Although academic involvement in the debate was surprisingly 
little, with Draper (1978) being one noticeable commentator, 
publ ic concern was such that the then Labour government 
issued a green paper on the industry and its state of 
regulation. A discussion paper was produced by the Home 
Office in 1979. Consultation and consideration followed 
these documents and continued under the incoming Conservative 
government which in 1980 announced its decision that self 
regulation was the way ahead. The policy of self regulation 
according to South (1988) saw the foreclosure of the debate 
on regulation for much of the next decade. 
Politicians such as Bruce George (1984) continued to call for 
government regulation suggesting that whilst the BSIA 
(British Security Industries Association) is a professional 
body, originally established to protect the interests of its 
members, independent lay members on its governing body may 
help - but may be merely window dressing (South 1988). 
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Where arguments based on the cost of implementing regulation 
are raised George argues that whatever costs are incurred are 
necessary and that these costs should be born by the 
applicants. 
In March 1989 Douglas Hurd, then Horne Secretary seemed to 
lend weight to George's arguments when he said that he wanted 
to see many more firms within the industry's own regulatory 
framework and that if this did not occur then government 
would consider passing regulation to ensure what it did 
(Mason 1991). 
On closer examination Mr Hurd's statement raises a number of 
questions not least of which is whether government is more 
concerned about the number of companies or the number of 
personnel submitting to regulation. It follows from the lack 
of statutory regulation of the industry that government does 
not keep records of the number of people employed in the 
industry. What records are kept hardly produce an accurate 
figure from which to argue. Pilkington (1989) reports that 
140 of the largest security companies are BSIA members and 
IPSA estimates it has 340 or so, companies as members at the 
last count, whilst there are up to 1,000 smaller firms that 
do not corne under any regulatory body_ In an interview with 
Mr Patrick Rabbitts of IPSA he put the figure of unregistered 
firms at anything between 1,000-2,000 but admitted that this 
was only guesswork. Jordan's Survey (1992) quoted Mr Roy 
Hattersley speaking at a Labour local government conference 
in Blackpool as informing delegates that there are about 
26,000 security companies in Britain with only 4,000 of them 
party to the voluntary Code of Conduct and Supervision. Mr 
Hattersley found it particularly worrying that even without 
licensing, private security companies were being used in 
roles formerly carried out by public police and he indicated 
that a Labour government would be in favour of legislation to 
regulate the industry_ 
The Labour party perspective on regulation appears to reflect 
that of ACPO which tends to be taking an increasingly 
critical stance highlighted by a particularly damning report 
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in which 609 companies were said to be giving II cause for 
concern
ll 
and in which the Association demanded some form of 
statutory regulation (ACPO 1988). 
Although members of parliament, ACPO and indeed some members 
of the security industry itself have called for regulation 
these calls have tended to be somewhat vague in respect to 
the sort of ini tiative which should be taken. Broadly 
speaking, past legislative initiatives have been of two 
types, one proposing statutory licensing whilst keeping the 
present system of regulation and the other proposing 
statutory regulation by some independent body (Johnston 
1992) . 
Perhaps the vagueness of attempts to regulate the industry 
may reasonably be linked to the vagueness of what it is that 
requires regulating. As already identified there are no 
accurate figures as to the number of companies let alone 
personnel engaged in the provision of private policing and 
South (1989) identifies this as one of the major problems of 
the Green Paper (1979) suggesting that it had no conception 
of the significance of the breadth of the activities that 
private security organisation, agents and related bodies deal 
in. He also sees this failure to recognise the extent of the 
influence of private security as a major problem, suggesting 
that if private security personnel are in reality no 
different from ordinary citizens, a law which treats them 
alike seems most appropriate. But if in reality they are 
not, and the law still treats them as if they are, it becomes 
inappropriate. 
He suggests that in reality the personnel of modern private 
security organisations are growing increasingly less like 
ordinary citizens. 
It is this suggestion that this research seeks to examine by 
focusing on one small sector of the industry, but a sector 
which has daily interaction with the public in quasi public 
space. 
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5. Pay within the Security Industry 
Unions such as MATSA (Managerial, Administrative, Technical 
and Supervisory Association) representing security officers 
also favour licensing and regulation but not so much because 
they see their members becoming less like the ordinary 
citizen in terms of legal powers but because they see their 
members becoming less like ordinary citizens in terms of pay 
levels, status, benefits and other conditions (South 1988) 
Like much else about the security industry hard facts about 
pay are difficult to establish, but it appears to be the case 
that the difference in pay rates between companies appear to 
be as extreme as the differences in importance attached to 
selection training and supervision. 
Jordan's Survey 1992 shows the manufacturing and installation 
of security devices to be reasonably well paid but it shows 
that the average wage for security patrolmen in 1990 varied 
between £4,500 up to £9,000 plus paid by firms such as Chubb, 
Securicor and Group 4. However, Jordan's Survey does not 
catch every security company in its net and there is ample 
evidence to indicate that pay rates lower than those quoted 
by Jordan are not uncommon. A letter from the West Yorkshire 
Low pay Unit (The Independent 30 Sept. 1989) described a 
group of 12 securi ty guards earning £1.50p per hour and 
working sixty to seventy hours per week (including public 
holidays) without overtime payments. 
King (1988) surveyed advertisements for nineteen contract 
companies in the London Evening Standard over a two week 
period and found average wage rates to be £2.73p per hour. 
He calculated that this would produce gross earning of 
£177.40p for a sixty hour week of twelve hour shifts 
including nights and weekends. 
This sort of pay is not uncommon. Private security officers 
protecting 56 military establishments in the United Kingdom 
were employed by 21 different private security firms paying 
between £1.81 and £2.20 per hour who expected officers to 
work twelve hour shifts with no breaks. 
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Training lasted two days and was unpaid. (The Times 25 Sept. 
1989) . 
A report by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
(1990) confirmed these reports finding that military bases 
were guarded by poorly paid people some of whom were afraid 
of the dark, physically feeble or prone to commit acts of 
vandalism whilst on duty (Mason 1991). It would seem that in 
some respects things have not changed drastically since Henry 
Fielding described the town watch in similar terms (Draper 
1978). 
Roy Hattersley described the si tuation in stronger terms 
suggesting that the last thing this country needs is cut-
price, second rate crime prevention, provided by security 
guards, many of whom have had no training at all and most of 
whom exist on near starvation wages. 
Whilst it is difficult to arrive at an accurate average wage 
for a contract security patrolman it is fair to suggest that 
media reports certainly help to form public perceptions of a 
low paid occupation. 
Perceptions of pay rates for securi ty guards appear to 
coincide in Britain and America. 
There is evidence to suggest that pay rates for securi ty 
officers are much lower than the pay rates for public police 
or government security operatives. For instance in Britain 
it was estimated that Sealink saved £10,000 per annum for 
every British Transport police officer that they replaced 
with a security officer (Police Review 29 Nov. 1991). The 
Hallcrest Report 1985 found that the United States government 
is required to contract with the private sector for goods and 
services whenever a cost saving of 10% or more can be 
realised. The Federal Protective Service employs 2, 600 
Federal protective officers to protect selected government 
buildings but 2,000 dollars per officer is allegedly saved 
annually by contracting with guard firms. 
The American research not only suggested that security 
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officers were poorly paid but as the Defence Select Committee 
(1990) had found in Britain poor supervision was also a cause 
for concern. 
6. Supervision 
Within the British security industry there is a recognition 
that quality supervision and management is a key factor and 
training courses are available through the regulatory bodies, 
BSIA and IPSA. However, security firms who are not 
registered with either of these bodies are less likely than 
member companies to avail themselves of these training 
courses since they are an additional expense to the running 
of a company. If companies are unwilling to spend heavily on 
the training of senior personnel then the suggestion put 
forward by South (1988) that licensing, if and when 
introduced, must ensure that companies are responsible for 
providing or sponsoring at least basic (and opportunities for 
more advanced) training appear to have some merit. South 
goes on to suggest that a situation may arise where companies 
which have for years relied upon and encouraged recruitment 
of a low-qualified workforce, prepared to accept low wages 
and poor condi tions, will say that staff are so poorly 
qualified that they do not merit better. 
Little information relating to direct supervision of security 
staff in the United Kingdom is readily available but certain 
pOints may be extrapolated from information that is 
available. 
Many security guards are poorly paid, receive low salaries 
and there is little scope for personal development leading to 
high turn over of staff. Good supervision would encourage 
personal development which should merit higher salaries 
leading to retention of staff. 
Whilst it would be unfair to lay the blame for continuing low 
salaries at the feet of supervisors since there are obvious 
1 inks wi th inadequate training and the prof i t margins of 
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security companies, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
the factors that affect recruitment, training and retention 
are also likely to affect supervision. 
Studies in the United States notably The Hallcrest Report II 
1990 suggested that when serious incidents develop in the 
communi ty which require assistance, the police officer can 
radio for help from another patrol unit or field supervisor. 
The security guard may be at a fixed post with no means of 
direct communication or may be dependent upon a moving field 
supervisor who makes contact once or twice during a shift. 
The Hallcrest study revealed that inadequate communications 
equipment and poor supervision were frequent complaints of 
contract security users. Good supervision and good 
communications and electronic equipment are an added expense, 
and The Hallcrest Report concluded that the successful 
securi ty guard company, must balance a need for adequate 
training, supervision and management with the need to 
minimi se overhead expenses in an industry wi th intense 
competition and low profit margins. It is interesting that 
The Hallcrest Report should link training, supervision and 
management because the better the training that management 
provides the less likely it is that personnel will require 
direct and constant supervision. 
7. Training 
The Rand Report 1971 created an impression that securi ty 
staff in the United States were undertrained. However, it 
should be noted that the Rand study was conducted with 
a small sample and 
California), and it 
studied by Kakalik 
in one geographic location (Southern 
is generally agreed that the sample 
and Wi Idhorn is not typical of the 
American industry as a whole. Nevertheless poor training is 
constantly cited as a problem within the security industry. 
Anthony Potter (1975) provided valuable insight into the 
subject of ineffective security personnel with the "Private 
Security Vicious Circle" (see Fig. 1) (Ricks, Tillet, Van 
Meter 1994). 
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In 1988 Chuvala and Gilmere were still pOinting to the 
inadequacies of training in the security industry. More than 
fifteen years after Potter had identified the "Private 
Security Vicious Circle" Marsh (1991) was still calling for 
improved training and pOinting to the unwillingness of 
employers to spend money in order to improve the education of 
their staff for fear that they would move on to better paid 
jobs. 
PRIVATE SECURITY VICIOUS CIRCLE 
Fig. 1 
7.1 Training in Britain 
There are indications that the "vicious circle" is not a 
uniquely American phenomenon. In a cost cutting exercise in 
the United Kingdom Sealink disposed of the services of the 
British Transport Police at Parkeston Quay Harwich and 
replaced them with security guards employed by Protective 
Securi ty Systems whose officers were attested constables 
under Section 79 of The Harbour, Docks and Pier (Clauses) Act 
1847. Under the Act these officers were given all the powers 
of a constable wi thin the port area and up to one mi Ie 
outside it. 
According to the Police Federation of England and Wales the 
officers had undergone a two weeks "crash course" in The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in order to fit them 
for the office of constable. In comparison an officer of the 
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Transport Police undergoes a two year modular training 
programme. 
It was estimated that Sealink would save £10,000 per year for 
each officer employed since the capitation rate per security 
officer was estimated at £15,000 as against 
£25,000 for each British Transport police officer. Michael 
Shersby, the Police Federation Parliamentary Advisor 
supported by seven other Members of Parliament introduced a 
bill to curb the use of The Harbours, Docks and Pier 
(Clauses) Act 1847 to appoint special constables. He said 
"The job of policing harbours and docks should, 
in my view be carried out by regular police 
officers who undergo proper training and who 
are fully accountable to the public" 
(Police Review Feb. 1990). 
The Shersby Bill failed to reach the statute books. 
Research in the United States has tended to show that where 
salaries are low, training is poor. 
Concern over the training of security patrols was also voiced 
by Merseyside Police when Range Security planned to begin 
uniformed patrols of the Hightown area. A Merseyside Police 
spokesman was reported as saying: 
"The policing of public places is the sole 
responsibility of the police who are accountable 
to a locally elected police authority. Range 
Security employees would not be subject to checks 
on training, employment or integrity" (Police Review 
Feb. 1992) 
Some companies within the industry are well aware of the need 
for improved training and the National Council for Vocational 
Qualifications (NCVQ) which was set up in 1986 to reform the 
system of vocational qualifications in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland provides a comprehensive framework based on 
high quality occupational standards set by the industry. 
Two industry Lead Bodies have been set up for the security 
industry. 
Lead Bodies are groups made up of representatives of 
employers, trade unions, trade associations, professional 
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bodies, training providers and other interested organisations 
within industries. 
Two Lead Bodies were necessary for the securi ty industry, one 
to represent the security and emergency systems and one the 
guarding sectors of the industry. 
The purpose of these Lead Bodies is to find out from 
employers in the industry what functions need to be carried 
out and to what standard. 
The information thus obtained forms the standards of 
competence for the industry. These standards are then 
grouped into qualifications and decisions are made about the 
necessary performance required to obtain the relevant 
qualifications. The qualifications include national 
Vocational Qualifications and the Scottish Vocational 
Qualifications which are accredited by the National Council 
for Vocational qualifications and the Scottish Vocational 
Education Council respectively. The awarding bodies include 
City and Guilds, the British Technical Education Council, 
Royal Society of Arts and the Scottish Vocational Education 
Council. These qualifications are claimed to have the full 
backing of the government, the Trades Union Congress and the 
Confederation of British Industry. 
National Vocational Qualifications differ from the academic 
qualifications advocated by American researchers such as 
Marsh in that they are awarded on the basis of competence in 
the work place, rather than academic ability. They make 
definite statements of a person's ability to do their job to 
an industry defined standard. 
Each NVQ or SVQ is made up of units of competence which set 
out the standard that the industry, through its Lead Body has 
indicated as the minimum standard. Each unit of competence 
is a stand alone measurement recognised by employers and can 
be obtained separately, leading towards a full qualification. 
Candidates are assessed ei ther in the work place or at a 
recognised assessment centre. 
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NVQs and SVQs fit into a framework covering five levels from 
basic routine work to management level. Under a European 
Communi ty Directive NVQs and SVQs are formally recognised 
throughout the European Community thus opening up areas of 
employment previously restricted by the labour laws of other 
member states. 
Conversely equivalent qualifications possessed by a national 
of a member state must be recognised by the British security 
industry. 
The potential for industrial espionage is obvious and would 
appear to make serious vetting crucial for those 
organisations employing contract security companies. 
In Bri tain assessment of candidates is undertaken by a 
1 icensed assessor who has been trained by the Securi ty 
Industry Training Organisation or a training establishment 
authorised by that organisation to standards defined by the 
Training and Development Lead Body. (Security Industry Lead 
Body 1992). 
Al though NVQs and SVQs are not achieved as a resul t of 
attendance at a course of formal training, the industry does 
offer courses to provide candidates with the relevant 
knowledge to reach the required standard for attainment of 
the vocational qualification. Providers of such training 
include the Securi ty Industry Training Organisation, the 
International Professional Security Association and Group 4 
Security (SITO 1992). 
In an attempt to assist companies in the provision of basic 
job training and in order to develop a uniform standard 
across the industry, training courses are organised annually 
by the Securi ty Industry Training Organisation. Al though the 
level of training offered is not as demanding as that 
advocated by American researchers, the cost of such training 
in terms of time and finance are not prohibitive, yet such 
schemes are not used to their full potential by all companies 
within the industry. 
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One reason for reluctance to train is offered by Inspector 
Lund-Lack, who spent a year as Deputy Chief Officer of the 
Port of Felixstowe Police, when he suggests that the problem 
lies with government expecting a private company to ensure 
that enough money is made available for training and 
resources (McCarthy 1992). 
Of all the problems besetting the American security industry 
training appeared to be a major problem, being related 
however tenuously to: 
a) Supervision - poor training means poor supervisors 
b) Pay - well trained staff would seek higher pay 
c) Regulation - lack of regulation meant lack of 
consistency of training throughout the industry 
d) Interaction and lack of training contributed to the 
poor image of the industry held by public police 
e) Vetting - where little or no vetting took 
place there was little training as employers 
did not regard employees as a long term asset 
worthy of development. 
In Bri tain the industry has made determined efforts to 
address the training problem and these efforts are readily 
accessible to further research and evaluation. It is 
however, 
Britain 
generally accepted 
will not be fully 
regulation. 
that training ini tiatives in 
utilised without government 
Lack of regulation and the question of how much knowledge 
securi ty officers have of the powers they mayor may not 
exercise have serious implications for the rights of the 
citizen. Behind the factory gates in a desperate economic 
climate research has shown that the rights and liberties of 
the citizen take second place to profit and that a private 
justice system prevails. 
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This research seeks to establish if and how the rights and 
liberties of the citizen are affected by the private policing 
of shopping malls. 
8. Provision of Private Justice System 
In 1976, The Private Security Council (PIAC) to the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration in the United States 
published a report on sources of conflict between law 
enforcement and private security. The report appeared to 
show law enforcement to be quite critical of the motives of 
private security in not pursuing criminal prosecutions of all 
criminal incidents. 
However, the 1981 Hallcrest Survey reported law enforcement 
executives as rating private security good or very good at 
reporting criminal incidents. However, the national survey 
revealed that for some crimes private organisations commonly 
avoid the public justice system altogether. It found that 
the overriding concern of the corporate entity was the impact 
of a particular loss incident on the overall operations of 
the company. 
When a loss occurred, private security, in conjunction with 
other internal controls within the organisation was focused 
on preventing and deterring future losses resul ting from 
similar incidents rather than on the offender involved in the 
incident. The Hallcrest Report cited this emphasis on loss 
prevention, in private sector criminal incident responses as 
a distinguishing characteristic of private security. Since 
the focus is on management practices of the company and not 
on the "offender", the treatment of the offender was found to 
vary greatly, from suspension without pay, dismissal, 
transfer, job reassignment, job redesign (elimination of some 
jobs duties) civil restitution agreements or criminal 
prosecution (Cunningham and Taylor 1985). 
If not only management practice but security operative 
practice becomes the focus rather than the behaviour of the 
"offender" the question then arises as to whether what is 
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being examined is a justice system or an economic system. 
Shearing, Stenning and Addario (1985) discovered that 
security directors in Canada did not see their organisations 
as policing organisations and did not want any police powers 
seeing such powers as a handicap to the securi ty system 
within an organisation. If employees do not abide by the 
conditions of service demanded by the employer they will be 
affected financially. 
The fact that a person is engaged in a paying occupation 
indicates that money is a strong incentive to them and 
therefore a means of affecting their behaviour. 
8.1 This Focus on Loss Rather than Crime 
The acceptance by a corporate organisation that the 
importance of economic considerations is of as much concern 
to the employee as it is to them (the degree of wealth and 
therefore the importance attached to it may vary) leads to a 
focus on loss instead of crime. The focus on loss means that 
the framework of security is economic rather than criminal. 
Shearing and Stenning suggest that this change in terminology 
expresses a fundamental shift in the conception of social 
control and order maintenance in the private sector. They, 
in agreement wi th The Hal1crest Report suggest that the 
implications of defining a problem as a "loss" rather than as 
a "crime" highlight the differences in the systems of public 
and private policing. The behaviour which occurs in the 
private sector is seen as an injury to a private rather than 
a public interest. The problem is not defined in moral terms 
but in instrumental ones. The activity is characterised as 
a lessening of profit or as the opportunity for loss, rather 
than as a moral wrong. Such conceptional differences are 
significant. Guilt and sanctioning become items for 
negotiation and these negotiations are determined largely by 
~conomic circumstances. For instance who suffers most from 
the dismissal of someone with twenty years service the person 
dismissed or the employer who looses a wealth of experience? 
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The focus on loss (or on the opportunity for loss) entails a 
redefinition of the scope of order maintenance and social 
control. 
Consequently, securi ty acti vi ty is extended beyond those 
problems captured by the criminal justice system category of 
"crime" to include aspects of loss such as breaches of 
confidentiality, alcoholism, and absenteeism, worker injury 
and labour unrest, extended coffee or washroom breaks, health 
and safety hazards in the work place and waste of materials. 
Thus "corporate justice systems" tend to include in their 
jurisdiction any corporate "troubles" which would threaten 
profit or risk of loss. The traditional distinctions between 
civil and criminal law, so carefully maintained in the public 
system, are consequently, frequently blurred within corporate 
justice systems. 
The question of blame is also defined differently focusing as 
much on those who create opportunities for loss as much as on 
those who actually cause losses. 
Mr Rabbi tts of the International Pri vate Securi ty Association 
would tend to support the findings of The Hallcrest Report 
and the views of Shearing, Stenning and Addario. He agrees 
that the main aim of the Security Industry in Britain is to 
minimise loss, and that such minimisation takes precedence 
over enforcing the law. He goes so far as to suggest that 
within a company, company policy takes precedence above the 
law of the land. He also agrees that the role of private 
security embraces the prevention of loss due to many causes 
other than crime. In spi te of the breadth of a securi ty 
officers duties from this economic rather than moral focus, 
in Britain at least many firms are reluctant to invest larger 
sums in the training of staff. 
Management and operative practices have a single aim to 
maximise profits. Public and private policing differs not 
only in the type of justice they serve but also to the extent 
in which they have contact wi th the victims of social 
injustice. Behind factory gates and the shutters of shopping 
malls secured in the early evening, private police have 
46 
little or no contact with the homeless, the unemployed or the 
mentally ill.(3) 
It is little wonder then that the two forms of policing have 
different perceptions of their role orientations and status 
and that co-operation is not as full as that advocated by 
Mason (1991). 
9. Interaction and Co-operation with Public Police 
As a result of survey and interview data The Hallcrest Report 
suggested that police and securi ty organisations in the 
United States of America function largely as mutually 
exclusive organisations with relatively little interaction or 
co-operation between them. It was suggested that obstacles 
to interaction and co-operation included: 
a) different role orientations 
b) different perceptions of status 
c) lack of knowledge by law enforcement agencies 
about private security 
Private securi ty in the Uni ted States of America was not 
perceived by law enforcement agencies as an equal partner in 
crime prevention and control but rather as a junior or silent 
partner. There was, however, no open acknowledgement of any 
form of partnership. It was also found that negative 
stereotypes of private security are often generalised to all 
security personnel. Law enforcement officers with superior 
levels of education, training and pay tend to regard 
themselves as "professionals" and private security as non-
professionals. 
One Private Security Advisory Council Report quoted in The 
Hallcrest Report, states that the percei ved status 
differential between law enforcement and private securi ty 
created a lack of respect and communication which, in turn, 
precluded effective co-operation. Whilst some communication 
and exchange of information does occur it does not occur 
uniformly. 
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Five measures were ci ted by not only law enforcement officers 
but by proprietary and contract security managers as a means 
of improving private security. These in rank order were: 
a) more and better training 
b) mandated training 
c) improved selection processes 
d) higher wages 
e) establishment or improvement of licensing and 
regulation (Cunningham and Taylor 1985) 
Shearing, Stenning and Addario suggest that the relationships 
between police and private security are not as clear cut as 
The Hallcrest Report would appear to indicate. They suggest 
that research in Bri tain, Canada and the Uni ted States showed 
that a sizeable number of positions within private security, 
particularly the more senior posts are filled by ex-police 
officers. It is suggested that from the point of view of 
public policing there are two consequences of particular 
relevance. Firstly the loss of resources by the public 
policing sector to the private sector. It is suggested that 
the inevitable consequence of this loss is that substantial 
public investment in the training and experience of public 
pol ice officers is increasingly benefi ting private rather 
than public interest. However in Britain at least the cross-
over from police to private security usually occurs after 
retirement so that benefit to private security is not 
necessarily a loss to the public service. 
The second policy issue concerns the possible sharing of 
information made possible by the "old boy networks" that have 
been developed through the movement of police personnel into 
private security positions. 
Shearing, Stenning and Addario admit the difficultly of 
obtaining incontrovertible evidence that these networks 
enable private security persons to obtain confidential 
information available to police officers, as unauthorised 
divulgence of such information constitutes an offence in 
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Britain under The Official Secrets Acts and The Police 
Discipline Regulations and in Canada under Section 11 of The 
Criminal Code, Provisional Police Acts and Police Discipline 
Regulations (Shearing and Stenning 1980). 
In contrast Lineman far from acknowledging the recruitment of 
ex-senior police officers as a benefi t to the securi ty 
industry for either of the reasons suggested by Shearing and 
Stenning sees them as having an adverse effect on the 
industry. He states: 
"The industry is suffering from too many "second 
career" executives - ex-policemen or ex-military -
installed in often senior management positions 
within security companies and security departments 
of client organisations. 
Since such types are probably already receiving 
a fair sized pension, their salaries are often 
not commensurate with the job. This then has 
a serious deterrent effect, not only on any 
ambitious middle ranking executives inside the 
industry, but also on talented outsiders from 
other industries. 
Few organisations seem to have woken up to the 
fact that the "club" atmosphere pervading 
security management is inappropriate to cope 
with an ever increasing rate of change and 
diversity of operations in the industry" 
(1986 pp 16-18). 
He suggests that the implementation of a concerted, co-
ordinated training effort for management and the cultivation 
of a career structure that embraces the whole industry would 
do more to improve the image and performance of the industry 
than the recruiting of ex-police officers (Ashworth 1986). 
David Fletcher, Chief Executive of the British Security 
Industry Association frustrated at lack of government 
initiatives for regulation of the industry has called for 
meetings with the Association of Chief Police Officers to 
establish a Code of Practice for the industry, he believes 
that such a code should stipulate that police screen security 
staff. He believes that it is not good enough for the police 
to demand statutory regulation for the industry because with 
a conservative government it will not happen. (Police Review 
20 Aug. 1993) 
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The industry itself appears to favour greater co-operation 
and interaction wi th the police on terms dictated by the 
police. It appears to want improved vetting of staff and has 
made firm strides towards providing the means for improving 
the education and training of personnel. 
10. Conclusion 
Historically British and American policing is argued to have 
developed as a response to similar needs and this holds true 
whether the argument is founded on a conservative or radical 
view point. The conservative view that population growth, 
increasing wealth and expanding towns resulting from 
increasing industrialisation led to increased crime and to 
the development of a new system of policing is argued on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Equally, radical commentators argue 
that industrialisation meant the need for a disciplined 
working class rather than tighter crime control. The review 
of the literature clearly shows that although the initial 
reasons for the development of a new policing system may have 
been similar in Bri tain and the Uni ted States any later 
development in both these countries was in response to the 
specific economic, political, industrial and social needs of 
each country, and this is especially true of private policing 
provision. This point is important because the bulk of 
research into private policing has been carried out in the 
United States and has not surprisingly had some influence on 
British research. 
British research has tended to examine private policing in 
its wider context as a part of the social control and justice 
system and Johnston argues that this is not unreasonable as 
the history of policing in Britain shows that policing has 
always been undertaken by a mixture of public, private and 
quasi public agents with no clear break between the new and 
old forms of policing. 
Research in both Britain and the North America suggests that 
there are strong negative perceptions of the average 
security officer particularly with respect to vetting, 
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regulation, training, supervision and pay. Private security 
tends to be seen as serving the private needs of special 
interest groups rather than the general public. The post war 
growth of the industry together with its increasing 
involvement in areas of public safety and protection and 
continuing expansion into areas of crime control causes grave 
concern to some senior police officers, politicians and 
academics. 
The following chapter will examine in more depth some of the 
theoretical concepts used to explain the continuing 
development and expansion of the private security industry 
and will focus these concepts on one particular sector of the 
contract guarding division of the industry, that is the 
private policing of shopping centres. 
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NOTES 
(1) Johnston (1992) maintain that histories of policing 
are dominated by what is termed the Anglo American 
Model. since this model predicates similar reason 
for emergence of policing both private and public 
in England and North America, the model is used as 
a basis for examining contemporary studies of 
policing and security in England, North America and 
Canada. (page 3) 
(2) The study claims that there is an over reliance on 
the wealth of information produced by North 
American research. Due to the paucity of research 
into the English Security Industry the inclusion of 
North American research findings for historical and 
comparative reasons was a necessity that could not 
be avoided. (page 9) 
(3) In general private security patrols have less 
contact with the socially disenfranchised and the 
deprived. However as private security encroaches 
further into the public policing arena this contact 
is increasing particularly with respect to those 
security firms who are now patrolling public space 
such as bus stations, parks, streets, etc. 
(page 44) 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTS OF PRIVATE SECURITY 
This chapter will examine a number of theoretical concepts 
wi th a view to arriving at an understanding of how the 
private security industry continues to expand and develop in 
spite of the criticisms levelled against it. Any conclusions 
drawn will then be focused on one particular sector of the 
industry, that is the provision of private policing in 
shopping centres. 
1. The Junior Partner Theory 
Much research in the past has focused on the relationship 
between private security organisations and police personnel. 
The result has been that descriptions of the police/security 
relationship have tended to assume either overlapping 
interests between police and security forces or a similarity 
of policing styles. In other words security personnel have 
been thought to do on private property what public police do 
on public property. Given this concept, it is not surprising 
that the theoretical perspective that has received most 
currency is the idea that these two policing systems work 
together as partners in the fight against crime. That is 
police and private security forces have been thought to share 
common objectives, in particular the protection of society 
and to co-operate with each other to aChieve these ends. The 
critical difference between police and private security, in 
this view, is the fact that they are supported and directed 
by different sectors of the economy. Both police and 
security spokespersons who support this view agree that the 
police occupy the senior and leadership role in this 
partnership. Private security personnel are viewed as junior 
partners in the business of maintaining order, assisting the 
police in their activities and deferring to them as they go 
about their duties. This view of private security clearly 
implies that its development does not in any way challenge or 
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threaten the establ ished order and consequently deserves 
little attention (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985). 
South (1989) argues that it was this notion of assisting the 
pol ice that provided some of the context for the serious 
take-off of private security in the post-war years of the 
1940's and 1950's. The diverse nature of sources of problems 
facing the police in those years reflected social and 
economic change, not least increased geographic mobility. A 
police service that was seen by the sympathetic as suffering 
from poor pay and poor working conditions with a declining 
establishment of officers was also seen by critics and some 
senior pol ice spokespersons as "losing the war against 
crime". Private security emerged out of this atmosphere of 
crisis making strong claims to be able to help wi th the 
control of crime, but stressing an emphasis on, and 
orientation to, prevention. 
It would appear that this junior and preventative stance was 
politically acceptable at the level of basic functions 
ancillary to those of the police, since it has enabled 
pri vate securi ty in Bri tain to operate wi thout government 
regulation of vetting, training payor supervision. 
Furthermore the fact that private security was presented in 
a junior partner role implied that standards of pay, 
supervision and training were not required to be of as high 
a standard as those required of the public police. 
It would appear that the social and economic trends of the 
1990's are similarly maintaining and perhaps accelerating the 
encroachment of private securi ty into the public policing 
arena. The Police Foundation and Policy Studies Insti tute 
research into police functions set up by Michael Howard, Home 
Secretary in 1993 was to examine core police services and to 
assess the scope for reI inqui shing anci llary tasks. 
Increasing the involvement of private security in what has 
hitherto been seen as the public policing role is likely to 
increase oemands for regulation of the industry and would 
logically require improvements in training. 
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At present security officers may exercise a citizen's power 
of arrest, they do not have powers of stop and search under 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 they would not be 
involved in the search of premises or the seizure of property 
found on persons or premises to a like extent as the public 
police. If private security detain a person, the junior 
partner stance stresses that such persons would be handed 
over to the public police as soon as possible. This means 
that there is little requirement for security officers to be 
trained in the detention, treatment and questioning of 
persons and there wi 11 be no requi rement for training in 
identification procedures as laid down in the Codes of 
Practice to The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
Not only does the Junior Partner theory imply a lower level 
of policing based on prevention and therefore requiring a 
lower level of vetting, supervision, pay, regulation and 
training, it implies and enjoys a high degree of interaction 
and co-operation with the public police upon whom private 
security relies for a comprehensive back-up service. Public 
provision of this extensive back-up service at public cost 
may be one reason why the securi ty industry stresses its 
subservient role to the public police. R. Bacon, a director 
of Securicor Ltd stated: 
"It cannot be stressed too often that industrial 
security has never attempted to usurp the functions 
of the police. It is an entirely utopian theory 
that security in its broadest sense is a police 
responsibility. No police force has ever 
achieved, or is ever likely to achieve, such a 
predominance in manpower that it can answer all the 
calls of individuals for protection" (1972 p 39) 
Often cited as further evidence of the junior role is the 
fact that many security forces (both in-house and contract) 
maintain policies under which securi ty employees are required 
to call in the public police to take over a "case" as soon as 
any significant law enforcement powers are considered 
necessary, Qespite the fact that in many cases, the security 
~mployees have quite adequate powers in law (Shearing and 
Stenning 1980). 
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The law enforcement powers available to security employees in 
England and Wales were detailed in Chapter 1. 
What has to be considered is the fact that misuse of these 
powers could result in litigation and if the employer is 
found to be vicariously liable, costs could lie with him. 
Obviously where securi ty officers are poorly trained and 
poorly supervised the back-up service provided by the public 
pol ice becomes an economic necessi ty. Since the Junior 
Partner role is not only politically acceptable but 
operationally economic it has always been in the interests of 
private security not to mount any direct challenge in the 
area of what are seen as "core" policing functions. 
At present there is considerable muddle and concern about the 
role of the police, in public opinion as well as official 
documents. Current Home Office models of policing depart 
from much previous thinking in the matter, this departure is 
likely to down grade some current police functions to the 
ancillary level suitable to provision by private enterprise. 
Evidence of government intent to hive off public police 
functions is provided by some of the key questions which the 
Independent Commi ttee of the Police Foundation and the Policy 
Studies Institute have examined. These included. 
1. What police services do the public want and need? 
2. What are the core tasks of the police? How and by 
whom should those core tasks be defined? What 
systems are most appropriate for accomplishing 
these tasks? 
3. What should be the role of other agencies -
voluntary, private and statutory in delivering 
what might be termed policing services? 
4. Are the boundaries and the division of labour 
between these agencies and the police properly 
drawn and regulated? 
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5. What works, how for example, can crime best be 
prevented and what role should the police play 
in its prevention? 
The Committee recognised that the causes of crime are complex 
and deep rooted and they echo Bacon's (1972) statement that 
it is totally unrealistic to imagine that crime prevention 
might be tackled by the police alone. They also recognised 
that there is an ever-growing demand on the part of the 
public for more policing, one consequence of which, has been 
the largely unregulated growth of private security (Newburn 
and Morgan 1994). 
According to the conservative-orthodox view the emergence of 
the modern public police in England in the early 19th century 
was due to widespread dissatisfaction with the post crime 
apprehension policies of private initiatives in force at that 
time (Shearing and Stenning 1980). It is ironic that today 
this same cry of dissatisfaction is laid at the feet of the 
public police. Implicit in the Junior Partner stance is a 
preventative before - the - fact approach which is seen in 
sharp contrast to the after - the - fact approach that 
economic and poli tical circumstances often force on the 
public police. Thus it is under the very banner that the 
public police once marched that security and in particular 
contract security now sells its services. 
Two crucial points are developed from the above observation, 
firstly, that private security is no longer selling itself as 
an additional service to the public police but as an 
alternative. Secondly, that whilst purporting to be a 
preventati ve before - the - fact force it does have an 
extensive after - the fact effect, albeit indirectly by 
making use of the after - the - fact facilities of the public 
police. 
This apparent vol te-face by private securi ty is not as 
startl ing as it may seem. Phi lips (1989) comments that 
privately run security services and other forms of private 
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police are the modern analogy of the felons associations of 
the 18th century. Although some associations did operate 
their own uniformed patrols with a view to preventing crime, 
these private institutions made up of local property owners 
who came together to form organisations and raise funds 
existed for the prime purpose of finding, arresting and 
prosecuting offenders against themselves and their property, 
that is, they exercised a substantial after - the - fact 
function. 
The similarities between felons associations and modern 
private security do not end with what the former did and the 
latter appear to be moving towards now but are also evident 
in the paucity of reliable information about private 
security. A parliamentary enquiry (1836) listed 189 
associations active in the period 1830-1834 whilst The Report 
of the Royal commission on a Constabulary Force for England 
and Wales 1893 stated: 
"It appears that there are upwards of 500 
voluntary associations for promoting the 
apprehension and prosecution of felons." 
(Philips 1989 p 120) 
Whilst Johnston (1992) stresses that there was no clear break 
between the demise of private provision and the emergence of 
the "New police", Philips (1989) describes the relationship 
between prosecution associations and the "New Police" as 
complex. London associations by and large supported police 
reforms whilst individual members especially those in rural 
associations saw no reason why they should have to pay rates 
to support the protection of other people's property. He 
maintains that there is no simple connection between the 
relationship of private associations and the emergent public 
police. Parallels can be drawn with the relationship between 
today's private security and public police. Whilst some 
companies are happy to retain the Junior Partner role and 
invite regulation and public police advice, other companies 
see no reason for regulation and are now mounting a direct 
challenge presenting themselves as an alternative, and what 
\ 
some leading politicians have described as a cut price police 
force (Police Review 1992). 
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South (1989) saw little complexity in his explanation of the 
changing police/securi ty relationship 
1950 1 s. 
in the 1940 l s and 
He cites social and economic change as having a major impact 
on the relationship, and as giving rise to the junior partner 
perspective. However, it should not be surprising that the 
accelerated socio-economic changes of the past fifty years 
have had a profound effect on the police/securi ty 
relationship. It is not sufficient to merely examine the 
relationship itself, for as critical criminologists suggest 
about crime, the forces which have brought it into being and 
which have transformed it over time should be examined. This 
must, then surely apply to the private police/public police 
relationship. 
The acceptance of the idea of external forces acting on the 
police/securi ty relationship implies acceptance of a 
relationship in a permanent state of flux. The following 
perspectives are predicated on the concept of a relationship 
in flux. 
2. Economic Theory 
Historians generally accepted that prosecution associations 
came into being because of the difficulty and cost of 
detection and arrest and the cost of prosecution for the 
individual. With the emergence and development of the "New 
Police" the prosecution of offenders eventually became a part 
of their remit and the main "raison d1etre" for the 
prosecution associations ceased to exist. Schubert (1981) 
has argued that the large numbers of people who founded and 
joined associations were attacking the inadequacies of the 
existing system and demanding its substantial reform, this 
argument suggests that the prosecution associations were 
forerunners of the public police rather than private 
securi ty. It is suggested that some association members 
favoured replacing the old lax system of parish constables 
with a stricter Beccarian - Benthamite criminal law, in which 
detection of an offence woulq be followed by certainty of 
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prosecution and punishment, in order to deter others from 
transgressing. A criminal law that promised protection from 
danger, safety, and freedom from doubt, care and anxiety 
(Philips 1989). 
It has been observed that Chadwick and his utilitarian 
associates ultimately aimed to replace the system of parish 
constables and prosecution associations with the 
establishment of a national police force (Philips 1989). 
Utili tarianism predicated on the 
Principle" promised that: 
"Greatest Happiness 
"the ultimate end, with reference to and for 
the sake of which all other things are desirable 
(whether we are considering our own good or that 
of other people), is an existence exempt as far as 
possible from pain, and as rich as possible in 
enjoyment, both in point of quantity and quality; 
the test of quality and the rule for measuring it 
against quantity being the preference felt by those who 
in their opportunities of experience, to which must be 
added their habits of self consciousness and self 
observation, are best furnished with the means of 
comparison. 
This ...... is necessarily the standard of morality; 
which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts 
for human conduct, by the observance of which an 
existence such as has been described might be to 
the greatest extent possible secured by all mankind." 
(8 Mill 1861) 
The public police were born out of such promises, promises 
that they could never realistically hope to fulfil no matter 
how hard they tried, to the point where: 
"the service has become the victim of an unreal middle 
class expectation of the universally benevolent 
policeman an expectation impossible to sustain. 
Policy and methods of policing will be determined by the 
nature of the community to be policed and the resources 
available to carry out the task" (Griffiths 1984). 
This fact has not been lost on the providers of securi ty 
services and those who expound economic theories to explain 
the expansion of the industry. 
In essence economic theories view security as a commodity to 
be bought and sold in the market place. Different 
commentators emphasise different aspects of "the packaging" 
of this product and its appeal to the consumer. 
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The Oxford English dictionary defines the condition of 
securi ty in terms of protection from danger, safety, and 
freedom from doubt, care, anxiety or apprehension. Spitzer 
(1989) has questioned how this condition and the feelings 
that surround it are turned into a commodi ty that can be 
purchased in the market place. The first thing that became 
apparent to Spitzer was that security involves much more than 
the "rules and precepts for human conduct", because the 
boundaries around security products and services are not as 
clear as they may seem. Efforts to achieve safety, freedom 
from danger, assurance and confidence are essential features 
of everyday life under capitalist as well as other kinds of 
social arrangements. Thus, argues Spitzer, there is a need to 
distinguish between those aspects of the "security market" 
which have emerged to address directly the safety of persons 
and property and those in which the connection to security is 
less tangible and direct. The attractiveness and market 
value of a broad range of commodities is enhanced precisely 
because they promise a greater degree of safety which is a 
social need that can be acti vated in a wide range of 
decisions to consume. Virtually all commodities can be 
presented or promoted and ul timately consumed because of 
their claim to free the consumer from worry, trouble or harm. 
Examples of this interpenetration between specialised 
securi ty products and services which are more attracti ve 
because they make us feel more secure are the purchase of 
private houses in good neighbourhoods rather than living in 
public housing estates, purchase of private cars as opposed 
to the use of risky public transport. Whilst such products 
may be marketed as enhancing security it is suggested that in 
actual fact they increase the opportunities for predacious 
activities. 
"Cars, motor cycles, hi-fi equipment, etc., have 
become standard property and are poorly protected. 
Popularity of second homes, cars parked on streets, 
more and more people insured against theft with 
reporting becoming a requisite to being refu~ded 
or exonerated from civil liability. By lodgIng 
a com~laint the victim& are looki~g f~r the state 
to f~ce up to a massive demand wh1ch In most, 
cases remains largely unsatisfied. The publ1c's 
attitudes and expectations clearly reveal 
61 
a generally held belief that state control means 
that the police and the law are responsible for 
~inding. the solution. In practice the police are 
1ncreas1ngly unable to fulfil these expectations 
and public dissatisfaction increases" 
(Levy and Ocqetau 1987 p 253). 
The Benthamite principles on which not just the police but 
the other branches of the welfare state were founded probably 
never were 
attainable. 
physically, economically or politically 
The police never have been or are never likely 
to be in a position to please all the nation, all the time, 
so long as their remit is perceived as bringing about an 
"existence free from pain and as rich as possible in 
enjoyment for all mankind." Private security make much more 
modest claims and to smaller sectors of the populace. The 
public police foot patrol officer has for economic and 
organisational reasons given way to a motorised patrol 
officer whose primary job involves reacting to citizens' 
requests for service. These requests for service are met by 
an organisation whose performance is measured primarily in 
terms of detection and punishment. Private security forces, 
on the other hand, have selected foot patrol as their 
principle means of surveillance (Shearing and Stenning 1981). 
Research has shown that the patrolling officer is not 
necessarily the most effective and efficient way of reducing 
crime levels (Elliot 1973, Bright 1969). However, foot 
patrols have been found to reduce fear of crime. Not 
surprisingly research has confirmed what private security had 
long since identified, that is, that people are willing to 
pay for security patrols (Johnston 1994). 
Many commentators have linked dissatisfaction wi th the public 
police to the expansion of private security whilst 
recognising that such dissatisfaction is part of a wider 
fiscal crises in many nation states. In this view private 
security is see~ as filling the vacuum that has been created 
by the public police for budgetary or organisational reasons. 
A prime example of this is Sealink's decision to dispense 
witb the service of the British Transport police at Harwich 
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and replace them with officers employed by Protective 
Security Systems. This decision was defended not only on the 
grounds that Sealink saved £10,000 for each British Transport 
Police Officer replaced by a security officer but Sir John 
Wheeler commenting on the decision remarked: 
Sealink is right to sack them ...... . 
Senior management has become complacent and 
probably inefficient" (Police Review 24.2.89) 
The reference to the "probable inefficiency" of senior 
management emphasises how strongly perceptions rather than 
facts underpin choices of security provision. 
However, police forces such as the British Transport Police 
and the Ministry of Defence Police are not seen by some 
commentators as public or civil police forces. Lidstone 
(1980) draws a three fold distinction between the forty three 
forces in England and Wales, forces created by statute such 
as the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence 
Police and uniformed private security officers with citizens 
powers. Such distinctions can be expanded (Johnston 1992) to 
take in regulatory bodies, governmental and quasi 
governmental agencies. Johnston refers to the British 
Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police as hybrid 
police forces in recognition of their dual policing/security 
role. 
Whilst such distinctions may have some relevance in terms of 
jurisdiction, they are increasingly becoming irrelevant in 
terms of vetting, pay, regulation, interaction and co-
operation and most certainly training. Forces such as the 
Ministry of Defence Police, British Transport Police, Port of 
Liverpool Police, Dover Harbour Board Police, the Port of 
London Police and the Royal Parks Police all take the 
nationally recognised Objective Structured, Performance 
Related Promotion Examination which in theory means that 
successful candidates are qualified to apply for the relevant 
post in any police force. The Port of Liverpool Police have 
excellent liaison with Merseyside Police on training matters, 
as does Dover Harbour Board Police with Kent Constabulary. 
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The Port of London Police are trained to the same standards 
as the Metropolitan Police, whilst the Royal Parks Police 
carry out their ini tial training at Home Office district 
training centres at Ashford and Cwmbrn. The British Transport 
Police also use Home Office district training centres for 
initial training and whilst maintaining their own training 
centre, they, like the Ministry of Defence Police make 
extensive use of Home Office training facilities such as the 
Central Planning and Training Uni t and the Police Staff 
College (Hannon and Murphy 1992). 
Two important issues are raised here, firstly that as the 
forty three forces of England and Wales and the "Hybrid 
Forces" converge in terms of those areas arousing greatest 
criticism of private security, the hybrid forces appear to be 
at greatest risk from the incursions of private security. 
Some private security operations appear to be threatened by 
an even cheaper and historically older participant in the 
policing function. Secondly the selling of spare training 
capacity by Home Office forces is indicative of the fact that 
economic forces are acting on the public police. Whilst the 
British Transport Police have lost posts to contract 
securi ty, who have secured constabulary powers under The 
Harbour, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, Ministry of 
Defence Police officers are concerned that they will be 
replaced by the in-house security officers of the Ministry of 
Defence Guard Service who themselves now appear to be under 
threat from the mili tary option of Mili tary Home Service 
Engagement or Local Service Engagement Personnel. That such 
military options for the provision of some policing functions 
is now under serious consideration as an alternative to a 
statutory police force and indeed private police services 
should come as no surprise. The use of military personnel in 
the policing function was very much a part of the 
"unsatisfactory system" that led to the emergence of the "New 
Pol ice". Peel himsel f used the army in small detachments, as 
a de-facto rural police during the last years of the 
Napoleonic Wars, which Hay and Snyder (1989) suggest was an 
evident source of his original idea for policing. What is 
fascinating here is that as the public police move further 
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and further away from Peel's original policing concept, and 
private security move to take on more and more of what were 
once seen as ncore n police functions, the military are now 
set to enter the policing arena in the Junior Partner role. 
At the moment the military option is being suggested for a 
clearly defined and limited sphere but just as social and 
economic changes have drastically affected the 
police/security relationship over the past fifty years, 
changing international and strategic relationships are now 
driving the military to find new markets for its expertise. 
Al though parallels can be drawn wi th significant changes 
throughout the history of pol icing it would be wrong to 
assert that what is now happening is a return to the past. 
The trends that are occurring now are occurring within a new 
and different social, political and economic climate. What is 
now being experienced is a departure whose significance 
cannot be grasped by examining previous epochs but rather 
needs to be understood within the network of contemporary 
social relations, both nationally and internationally. The 
change in the nature of privatisation in recent years is 
characterised by a change from specialised to generalised 
provision, from backdrop services to front line provision, 
from local authority based schemes of contracting out to the 
decentralisation and erosion of state monopolies (Ascher 
1987). Whilst the general public may have corne to terms with 
the idea that the state is no longer the natural provider of 
such services as health care, education, transport and 
communications thereby accepting a major transformation in 
the nature of contemporary social and political relations, 
proposals to privatise parts of the criminal justice system 
have elicited a peculiar set of responses (Matthews 1989). 
It is widely assumed that whatever may have been implemented 
in other areas of social life, the provision of laws, 
punishment and crime control constitute a unique and 
privileged realm of activity that should be provided by the 
state. It is argued that one of the essential 
characteristics of the state is its claim to exercise a 
monopoly over the use of legitimate force. 
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The exercise of coercive power and the distribution of 
punishment are held to have profound social and symbolic 
implications which cannot be safely discharged to private and 
particular interests (Matthews 1989) 
The validity of such an assumption is questionable, and as 
Shearing and Stenning (1981) point out even a cursory 
examination of the principal agencies involved reveals that 
they already incorporate personnel who are not directly in 
the employment of the state. The number of private security 
police in Britain, America and Canada is estimated to exceed 
the number of public police. 
Economic theories of policing do not see the privatisation of 
certain criminal justice functions as having such profound 
severe and symbolic associations. It is argued that there is 
an important distinction between the provision and the 
adminstration of goods and services. Whilst it has been 
assumed that wherever possible, the state should both supply 
and take responsibility for the implementation of criminal 
justice and that its failure to perform ei ther of these 
functions would undermine its legi timacy, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that many services can be readily 
provided by a range of non state agencies. The contracting 
out of youth services has not destabilised the juvenile 
justice system, on the contrary the incorporation and 
expansion of these semi autonomous agencies appear to have 
extended both the range and depth of state authority. Thus 
it appears that as long as the state exercises ul timate 
responsibility, it can effectively disengage from the 
immediate provision of certain services without necessarily 
incurring any significant disadvantages (South 1988). 
The argument from public police and private security alike is 
that the state is failing to exercise this ultimate 
responsibility. The lack of regulation, adequate vetting and 
an insistence on a minimum level of training are quoted as 
instances of state failure to accept its responsibi Ii ty. 
(Police Review 8.4.94) (Police Review 20.8.93). The watching 
brief of F3 Department of the Home Office in respect of 
private security is unlikely to be expanded when the 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer sees one of the purposes of the 
government's Fundamental Expenditure Reviews as identifying 
activities from which the state might withdraw altogether 
(The Guardian 2.8.94). The exercise of increased 
governmental responsibility for private policing is directly 
opposed to stated government aims. As long as government 
focuses on the "limited" and junior partner role of private 
security they can continue to argue that self regulation is 
both politically and economically acceptable. However, if 
the proposed Mili tary Home Service Engagement and Local 
Service Engagement options become reality, an organisation 
that is highly regulated, well supervised and trained re-
enters the policing arena. Al though the use of such 
policing/security agencies is envisaged as being restricted 
to certain Defence Establishments, there is a precedent for 
its use beyond these boundaries. If the military seek to 
assume the Junior Partner mantle, private security will be 
forced to bid for other pol icing functions wherever they 
arise. 
As a result of government police reforms it is likely that 
further policing opportunities will be opened up to private 
securi ty. Reiner (1994) claims that the whole package of 
recent police reforms is predicated upon a single premise 
stated in the White Paper (1993) preceding The Police and 
Magistrates Courts Bill. 
"The main job of the Police is to catch criminals 
(para 2.2) 
It is claimed that the paragraph ignores inconvenient facts 
such as, only 18 per cent of calls to the police are about 
crime and only 40 per cent of police officers' time is spent 
dealing directly with crime. Reiner goes on to suggest that 
the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks undertaken by the 
Independent Commi ttee of the Home Office Review team was 
launched to flesh out what had already been decided by 
government. The Home Office team was asked to examine the 
services provided by the police, to make recommendations 
about the most cost effecti ve way of del i vering anci llary 
tasks. 
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In other words the inquiry started from a taken for granted 
concept of core versus ancillary services, and was charged 
only wi th ascertaining which concrete acti vi ties fallon 
ei ther side of the line, and which would be most "cost 
effective" for the police to jettison (Reiner 1994). 
In redefining the role of the police, government were 
ignoring the fact that the police were peace-keepers rather 
than law-enforcers because the public called upon them to 
help in many situations not involving any crime. Even where 
the legal ingredients of an offence were potentially 
involved, with the consent of the parties and the community 
the police routinely handled trouble without involving the 
criminal process, except as a last resort or where the 
offence was generally regarded as serious (Banton 1964). 
The exercise of such discretion and the service role of the 
police gave valuable opportunities for non-coercive contact 
with the public, intelligence gathering and "bridge 
bui lding" . 
Redefining the police role as coercive, as the catching of 
criminals ignores the fact that it is rarely clear from the 
nature of calls made initially to the police what type of 
incident is occurring (Waddington 1993). What may start out 
as a service call many eventually become a public disorder or 
even crime incident. 
Important issues are raised by the prospect of private 
security taking over the service role as Shearing and 
Stenning (1985) have identified, in their Canadian research 
what are considered offences in the criminal justice system 
are often considered opportunities for loss by private 
security and are dealt with differently. This would mean 
that incidents which the parties and the community consider 
should be dealt with by the courts do not in fact enter the 
criminal justice system. 
Incidents that have potential for serious disorder may have 
been resolved by the public police wi thout resource to 
coercion. Where violence does erupt out of an incident dealt 
with by private security the public police would be forced 
into a coercive response. 
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Reiner (1994) argues that policing is a scarce resource and 
how much of it a society can afford to provide is ultimately 
a political question. 
He suggests that in the face of conflicting demands for 
service, priorities must be decided upon. These priorities 
should be arrived at openly in an accountable way, but in the 
name of economy current police reforms in Britain are moving 
away from this position of accountability. 
Radical Theorists argue that coercive unaccountability always 
has been the true prerogative of the public police and that 
the role of private security is similar but hidden in the 
private arena. Both systems are seen as unfair, ineffectual 
and as far as the public police are concerned in a state of 
deterioration (Turk 1987). 
3. Radical Theories 
In general Radical Theories see policing as being about power 
and specifically about the power of the state and capitalist 
interests to regulate the populace and the labour force, 
since both treat the populace as a means to an end rather 
than as an end in themselves. Capitalism is regarded as the 
new ruling class and the state as its guardian. It is 
accepted that a complex society requires diverse sets of 
legitimation in order to be efficient, to convert power into 
authority. 
Like Junior Partner theories radical perspectives view the 
public police and private security as having the same goal, 
in this case the maintenance and protection of pri vate 
property and of the alliance between capital and the state. 
Radical theorists suggest that the structure of formal law 
under such circumstances is so constituted as to create two 
kinds of citizenship and responsibility. The labour forces 
of industrial society (whether employed or not, and at 
whatever level of qualification - so long as they are sellers 
of labour) will be bound by criminal law and penal sanction. 
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The state and the owners of labour will be bound only by a 
civil law which regulates their competition between each 
other. 
Some radical theorists suggest that there is not only 
different application of the law (private justice systems), 
but also that the state and the owners of capital and labour 
, 
irrespective of particular battles between interest groups at 
particular moments of historical development are "beyond 
incrimination" and most significantly, beyond "criminal 
sanction" (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973). 
Historians agree that between the middle of the 18th century 
and the middle of the 19th century the word police underwent 
a profound shift of connotation in Britain. Whereas it had 
originally meant broad social regulation, especially of those 
ancient concerns of governments about cities: supplying them 
wi th food, controlling nuisances and preventing popular 
disorders it came to be redefined as a uniformed 
bureaucratised agency of state law enforcement, with a much 
more emotive set of associated connotations. This definition 
of pol icing is the one that has remained to thi s time. 
Regular foot patrols, co-ordinated surveillance and the 
discriminating use of force were held to be the 
distinguishing marks of the new police (Hay and Snyder 1989). 
Storch (1989) suggests that this redefinition of the term 
policing came about because the ruling elites of the early 
19th century were not willing to tolerate the levels of petty 
crime, popular disturbance and festive tumult that had been 
acceptable to thei r forebears. He argues that The 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 was one of the major charters of 
an attempt to create a new basel ine of urban order and 
decorum. 
Whereas orthodox commentators such as Critchley (1979) and 
Reith (1952) tend to suggest that the emergence of the new 
police was uncontested and neutral in its social impact, more 
recent studies of police history tend to suggest that this 
was not the case (Emsley 1987) and (Jones 1982). 
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There were in fact deep consti tutional objections by the 
gentry in the 18th century and suspicions that lingered on 
into the 19th century. There was initial and often violent 
hostili ty by the labouring classes before the new police 
received a tentative and then enthusiastic welcome from the 
urban middle classes. These recent studies of police history 
have emphasised how political, how much concerned with the 
social and institutional bases of class power, both at 
national and local level, the new police were from their 
beginning. 
The new police are presented as being used in the attack on 
unregulated street trading, the control of vagrants and the 
enforcement of "middle class" morality and decorum in public 
places . Private pol ice are viewed as enforcing a "middle 
class" work ethic in private places. South (1987) quotes the 
Law Book of Cowley's Iron Works as representing an entire 
civil and penal code for the governance and regulation of the 
labour force. 
Shearing and Stenning (1987) also examine the relationship of 
the order maintaining institutions in Canada from a power 
perspective. They suggest that the post war expansion of the 
private policing sector has revolutionary implications for 
the nature of modern social control, arguing that it is 
unlikely that a decrease in demand for, and use of private 
policing services will occur. It is argued that there are 
many advantages to commercial customers in having security 
services directly answerable to themselves giving them the 
flexibility of a private justice system. That a definite 
move towards informal legal and order maintaining systems is 
occurring cannot be denied (South 1989). The fact that this 
shift in law enforcement has occurred almost unnoticed is 
according to Henry (1983) the fault of social theorists. 
Many social theorists develop analytical models of the legal 
system in order to determine the hallmark of the 
distinctively legal and to delineate clearly the lines of 
demarcation between the legal system and other subsystems of 
the social order. 
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By omitting to consider the body of informal behaviourial 
imperatives, norms and obligations they contribute to, rather 
than analyse, the very ideological processes that render 
formal law the dominating social control institution. 
Henry sees sociologists and anthropologists clearly and 
uncomfortably demonstrating that law is formulated in a 
socio-political context; that it serves some interests rather 
than others; that different social structures or forms of 
societal organisation display different forms of law and 
legal systems and that a combination of coercive and 
ideological processes are at work to ensure the continuation 
of existing systems of law and through these the perpetuation 
of existing social structures. Selznick (1968), Shearing and 
Stenning (1985) tend to argue in support of Henry's 
suggestion that law serves some interests rather than others 
and that the changes that are occurring in policing are of a 
qualitative nature reflecting the priorities of the "new 
feudalism" of the modern corporate community. 
Whilst radical theorists such as Foucault acknowledge that 
there are important differences between formal and informal 
justice systems, they nevertheless point to the fact that at 
the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal 
mechanism (Foucault 1977). From this point of view, although 
the particular "elite" influencing social control policies 
may change, the fundamental relationship highlighted by Henry 
remains the same, the powerful make the policy which controls 
the masses. In stark contrast to orthodox commentators 
radical theorists do not see power as being inevitably vested 
in the state, the sovereign or the law. Whilst they see 
important differences between judicial penalty and 
disciplinary penalty, "the former operates by referring to 
laws and judicial texts and the latter by referring to 
observable behaviour" (Hussein p 973), they see power "per 
se" as wielded by a minor elite. 
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Whether or not power is a negative conception it is exercised 
in different ways by publicly accountable and unaccountable 
law enforcement agents. Generally administrative law 
enforcement agents and privately employed pol ice have greater 
discretionary powers to intrude upon private space than do 
the public police. This greater discretion is partly due to 
the fact that compliance and deterrence forms of law 
enforcement have different objectives. 
The principle objective of compliance law enforcement is to 
ensure conformi ty by a demonstration that the means are 
avai lable to comply or that. actions have been taken to 
prevent infractions of rules or violations of laws (Reiss J 
1987). Deterrence law enforcement I s principal objective is to 
ensure conformi ty by detecting violations in the future. 
Compl iance systems are premoni tory and deterrence systems are 
post-monitory. Compl iance systems manipulate means that 
induce conformity, deterrence systems react to events after 
they occur. The public police are formally organised around 
the deterrence model of detection (arrest and punish) and 
informally organised around a peace-keeping model. Private 
policing is formally organised around maintaining private 
orders and preventing their disruption. Their role in 
enforcing the criminal law was seen as being limi ted to 
mobilising the public police (Shearing and Stenning 1981). 
The informal role of private police in Britain with their 
attestation as constables, their use in public streets and 
semi public places such as shopping centres is rapidly 
expanding so that they are now exercising their power not 
only in compliance systems but in deterrence systems which 
for them have no in-built accounting procedures. 
Because most private police cannot readily turn to a body of 
law or to legal roles and procedures to legi timate their 
actions, they normally justify their actions in terms of 
"management practice" rather than legal authority. Ericson 
and Shearing (1986) suggest that in everyday police work 
formal legal rules are used as an enabling device to justify 
the particular actions a police officer wishes to take rather 
than being a determinant of those actions. 
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If private police officers lacking the justification of 
constabulary powers can nevertheless feel justified by 
"management practice" they are in their own minds empowered 
to act. In either case law enforcement personnel are given 
authority to exercise power over others. This power 
exercised by state and capitalist interest often goes 
unquestioned because of fear, not so much fear of the state 
or commercial interests but fear which results quite often as 
an indirect result of their activities. 
Most environments not only abound with physical cues that 
indicate whether an individual's private space is threatened 
but with behaviourial ones that lead people to see their 
fellow human beings as menacing and threatening, for example 
loitering youths, intoxicated persons and beggars, some of 
whom threaten by actual contact. Whenever such people 
congregate in 1 arge numbers they may create a "cl imate of 
fear" . As acti vi ties such as shopping move off the open 
streets into semi public areas such as shopping centres the 
responsibility for tackling the "climate of fear" ceases to 
be the sole responsibility of the public police and is shared 
with private security agencies. In the case of both public 
and private police, enpowerement to act is attributable in 
some degree to collective feelings of insecurity (or lack of 
power) of the general public. 
4. Consumer Hypothesis 
Feelings of insecurity can be alleviated or reduced according 
to the wealth of an individual or group of individuals, since 
weal th can purchase products or services which generate 
l 
security effects. Commercial interests have not been slow to 
recognise the lucrative potential of endowing any product 
with security enhancing features and as a result security 
commodi ties can never be completely differentiated from 
commodities which are invested with security attributes or 
generate security effects. Once it is acknowledged that the 
commodification of security is intimately related to 
individual and collective feelings of insecurity it is clear 
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that any analysis of security provision must investigate the 
subjectivity of the consumer and understand the forces 
shaping his or her security needs (Spitzer 1989). 
The public police never have had or are unlikely ever to have 
the time or the resources to satisfy consumer subjectivity by 
protecting against the mere possibility of crime. Perhaps 
because of an unrealistic appreciation of what can be 
achieved they are perceived by the public as coping 
inadequately with actual problems. The police view is not 
necessarily that "the customer is always right." 
Sir Kenneth Newman in his report of 1984 stated: 
"It is important that members of the public 
should have a realistic appreciation of what 
police can or cannot achieve .... so too 
it is necessary that police officers expectations 
are shaped upon the reality of the present 
and not upon some imprecise aspirations of 
perfection based on either past or present 
fantasies" (1984 p 3). 
It is the duty of the public police to serve all sections of 
the public without fear or favour, it has made attempts in 
recent years to present i tsel f not so much as a force 
exerting the power of the state but as a service at the 
disposal of all. This view was neatly encapsulated by Oxford 
(1984) when he suggested that police forces are not an arm of 
the state but servants of the community whose confidence they 
must secure. He believed that success in this depended upon 
police officers understanding the fears and apprehensions of 
all groups of people within the community including ethnic 
minorities, and doing whatever was necessary to enable all 
citizens to go about their lawful business. 
Because the client base for individual security firms is much 
smaller than that of the publ ic pol ice and because the 
concerns I fear and apprehensions of cl ients tend to be 
similar the expectations of clients with regard to security 
firms are much more realistic than the expectations of the 
public with regard to the police. The fundamentally 
different orientation of security personnel also means that 
they are better able to satisfy client demand. 
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The orientation of securi ty personnel in respect of the 
resolution of security incidents is expressed in terms of 
"loss" to capi tal and the "risk" of future loss. The 
orientation of the public police is conceived of principally 
in terms of "crimes" against the public interest and the 
"guilt" of offenders. 
The result of defining a problem as a "loss" rather that a 
"crime" is to make apparent the di fferent demands on the 
systems of public and private policing. 
For pri vate pol icing the problem is not defined in moral 
terms but instrumental ones wi th a given acti vi ty being 
characterised as a lessening of profit or as the opportunity 
for loss, rather than a moral wrong. Guilt and sanctioning 
become i terns for negotiation, and these negotiations are 
determined largely by economic circumstances. It is felt by 
corporate entities that the criminal justice system takes too 
1 itt 1 e not i ce of the corporate vi ct ims ' perspect i ve and 
interest; restitution is easier to arrange privately rather 
than publicly (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985). 
For the consumer whose private interests are more important 
to him/her than the public interest, a form of policing that 
provides an alternative to the criminal justice system has to 
be an attractive proposition. Because of the duties of the 
office of constable the public police are at a disadvantage 
in competing in the alternative justice "market". 
"The duties of a constable derive from his 
office and have long been thought to be 
common law duties. However in George versus 
Garland (1980) it was held that the 
obligations of a police officer had become 
statutory duties because they are now 
expressed in the form of delegated 
legislation (Regulation 22 Police Regulations 
(1979) S. I. 1979 No. 1470) (Clayton and Tomlinson 
1987 p 25). 
Johnston (1994) recognises that many forms of private 
policing emerge at least in part, through user demand. In 
this respect they are by defini tion more "user friendly" than 
many public police services. 
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The very fact that private security is less concerned with 
the prosecution of offenders means that historically it has 
been oriented to the needs of victims. Johnston acknowledges 
that public police forces have begun to meet the challenge of 
victims' needs in recent years but argues that they are 
unlikely to match the private sector in this regard because 
of their responsibility for bringing offenders to justice. 
Corporate bodies will and do use the public police and the 
criminal justice system but in the resolution of "private" 
conflicts this is seen as a last resort. In dealing 
internally with security incidents the organisation retains 
control over the development and resolution of the case 
(Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985). 
In Houston and other urban areas throughout the United States 
a fundamental shift in the method of delivery of policing 
services is emerging, partly in response to fiscal 
constraints and partly in an attempt to make police services 
more "user friendly". The method has been identified as 
consumer - controlled or client - directed public police 
employed with private contracts. Two of the primary premises 
upon which consumer controlled policing is based are 
accountability and productivity. 
Typically, police officers who engage in off-duty employment 
are assigned to specific geographical areas wi th specific 
tasks. Collecti vely, the consumers who are funding such 
service evaluate the officer's performance, which is directly 
related to the continuation of employment of that officer. 
As a result, the officer recognises the importance of 
establishing positive relationships with consumers of the 
service and develops innovative approaches to community 
problems. In contrast the public police are paid through the 
compilation of taxes and are therefore, answerable to every 
business and citizen in the city resulting in the development 
of a massive bureaucratised citizen - police relationship 
(Vardalis 1992). The results of Vardalis's inquiry suggest 
that employment of public police may not only be extensive in 
Houston, Texas, but a developing trend of consumption of user 
fee police service. 
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What is increasingly becoming apparent not just in the United 
states but in most of the developed world including Britain 
is that those with the ability to pay can choose not only the 
policing services that they want but also the justice system 
that best suits their needs. Johnston highlights the fact 
that it is not just commercial interests and wealthy 
individuals who make use of the alternative justice system 
but the state as well. Government agencies such as the 
Ministry of Defence Police, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority Constabulary as well as exercising constabulary 
powers also process persons through internal administrative 
justice systems. Bodies such as the Inland Revenue, Customs 
and Excise, the Department of Trade, the Health and Safety 
Executi ve to mention but a few have a choice between the 
criminal justice system and administrative options. Even 
the military for offences other than serious offences such as 
murder have the option of an alternative policing and justice 
system which better suits its needs. 
This hypothesis centres on the economic attractions of 
alternative policing and justice systems but as long as the 
state subscribes to such alternatives the radical assertions 
that the structure of formal law is so consti tuted as to 
create two kinds of citizenship and responsibility is 
difficult to refute especially in view of the reluctance of 
government to regulate such policing and justice systems. 
Unlike the public police private security offers a 
"calculated strategy" tailored to the needs and requirements 
of each individual client. Consumer Hypothesis suggests that 
it is this ability of private security to give the client 
what he/she wants without the restrictions of regulation or 
accountability that has in no small part had a great effect 
on the expansion of private security. The public police have 
recognised the value of packaging their service as a consumer 
product but not only are they disadvantaged by their legal 
duty of impartiality, 
"their accountants (sitting in the Home Office) and the 
marketing directors (back in the Chief Constables 
of f ices) have separate agendas. There is no. common 
corporate interest, just separate goals; the fIrst to 
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cut the service offered and the second to protect the 
brand name". (The Guardian 12 July 1994). 
In the meantime private security goes on giving the customer 
the specific service required at an affordable price. 
One of the reasons why private security can afford to provide 
an attractively priced policing service is that it makes free 
use of many of the facilities of the public police, 
particularly where the criminal justice system is to be used 
as a means of sanction. 
By adopting a crime prevention, junior partner stance it has 
thus far avoided regulation and requires a lesser degree of 
training to fulfil its functions. 
This junior partner stance has not prevented private security 
from exploiting market opportunities when tasks have been 
off-loaded by the public police, e.g. cash in transit. The 
fact that private security can and does in many cases, step 
so readily into the gap left by the public police would tend 
to lend weight to the argument that police and private 
securi ty do perform simi lar functions in respect of the 
maintenance and protection of the insti tution of private 
property. However, as the role of private security increases 
the role of the criminal justice system becomes muted as 
formerly "criminal" incidents become "economic" incidents 
resolved in private justice systems. Consumer Hypothesis, 
draws on aspects of the Junior Partner Theory, Economic 
Theories and Radical Theories, seeing all as having relevance 
in explaining the expansion of the private security industry. 
Consumer Hypothesis also sees power as being an important 
factor in private policing and suggests that the greater the 
degree of power and control that private policing gives a 
client over his/her environment, the more likely he/she is to 
buy the product on offer. 
All of these perspectives on private security, to a greater 
or lesser extent touch on the public/private police 
relationship and as private security interacts ever more 
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frequently with the public police in areas such as shopping 
centres, consideration of that relationship becomes 
increasingly important. 
5. Public Police/Private Police Relationship 
Whichever theory for the explanation of the expansion of the 
private security industry is pre-eminent at any given time, 
appears to be dependent, to some extent, upon the prevailing 
socio-economic climate. It is evident that as socio-economic 
considerations change, then so too does the relationship 
between public police and private security. 
Johnston cites Stenning (1989) in offering evidence of this 
changing relationship. He points to Stenning's argument that 
the public police reaction to private security in Canada has 
passed through several distinct stages; these stages are: 
1. Denial: During this first stage public police officers 
refuse to acknowledge that private policing is a 
legitimate topic for discussion. 
2. Grudging Recognition: This stage was seen to occur 
when the increased involvement of private security 
in policing of such locations as shopping centres could 
no longer be ignored. 
Such recognition was coupled with an insistence that 
private security guards were engaged in mere property 
protection rather than in "real policing". 
3. Competition and Open Hostility: This stage was 
characterised by confusion and ambivalence. On 
the one hand, the growth of private policing posed 
a significant threat to the claim of public police 
to a monopoly over the provision of policing 
services. On the other hand, public police officers 
recognised that the private sector provided: 
(a) a source of post retirement employment 
and 
80 
(b) a potential solution to the problem of 
how to meet escalating public demand 
for policing services when budgets 
were tight. 
4. Demand for Controls: At this stage, public police 
officers and others were demanding stricter regulation 
of a private sector which was regarded either as 
a legitimate component of policing or as a 
necessary evil. 
5. Active Partnership: By this stage there was a tacit 
and sometimes overt recognition that the private 
sector had a significant role in policing. 
Johnston claims, with some justification, that in Britain, 
relations have not yet reached the Active Partnership stage. 
He warns that no assumption should be made that simply 
because the relationship in Britain tends to have followed 
the Canadian experience todate, it will automatically shadow 
it to the final stages. Johnston suggests that the emergence 
of what is effectively a "mixed economy" of policing has 
implications for the public police in Britain. The public 
police will have to decided whether they intend to co-operate 
with private providers, and if so under what conditions. If 
they decide to compete with the private sector, the question 
arises whether they can do so successfully. Will consumers 
buy the cheapest product or the one which is most heavily 
regulated and publ icly accountable? In other words wi 11 
consumers pay for the privilege of having an increasingly 
remote influence on a policing service that is in many cases 
perceived by the public as failing to meet their needs. When 
viewed from this perspective, far from being a junior 
partner, private security appears to be challenging for, if 
not actually being promoted to a senior role particularly in 
those service aspects of policing that were traditionally 
held to be the premise of the public police. 
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Economic and consumer considerations may well force the 
public police into a co-operative rather than a competitive 
relationship in the future. 
Commentators such as Mason (1991) urge the public police to 
opt for closer co-operation, seeing this as inevitable should 
an acceptable system of regulation for the private security 
industry ever be introduced. He suggests that the interests 
of the public can best be guarded if the police service has 
formal contacts wi th the private securi ty industry. The 
police service, it is argued, is in a unique position to 
moni tor the industry through programmes of co-operation 
whilst at the same time benefitting itself. 
He suggests that a co-ordinated policy towards the security 
industry could be formulated at ACPO level with individual 
forces being left to develop policies for implementation at 
local level. 
Mason posi ts three fold benefi ts from closer co-operation 
arising out of regulation of the private sector: 
1. The police service will gain from being aware 
of and having an influence on the total 
allocation of crime prevention and investigation 
resources, and efficiency will be increased by 
joint liaison. 
2. The private security industry will benefit not 
only from greater knowledge about crime prevention 
and investigation measures but also because the 
police service will be actively supporting it 
in its attempts to provide a better quality 
service. This would probably mean 
encouragement to improve such aspects as 
vetting, training and supervision. 
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3. The public will benefit as the public police 
will be in a much stronger position to prevent 
the private security industry from abusing 
its public position. 
Recent research by Hayman (1995) tends to support the stages 
in relationship forming identified by Stenning (1989) as well 
as some of the benefits suggested by Mason (1991). Studying 
police and private security working in shopping centres in 
Essex, Hayman discovered that: 
1. There were no significant differences in the work 
practices of both organisations, each dealing 
with the same policing issues and in the same 
proportion. 
2. Both the private and public sectors are performing 
similar functions with overlap. 
3. Both organisations consider guidance from the 
police a necessity. 
4. There was a lack of or poor vetting, physical or 
educational testing. 
5. There was a lack of or poor training for the 
majority of security guards. 
6. Both organisations agree that security does a 
good job filling a gap in policing. 
7. No significant indications of poor relationships 
between each organisation existed. 
8. A significant majority of private security 
view their own industry as appearing to 
be only interested in profit. 
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9. Both police and security support the introduction 
of regulation and licensing. 
One particular area of policing where co-operation in the 
United States has shown the benefits discussed by Mason is in 
Crime Trend Analysis. 
"New approaches to policing have created a great 
deal of debate and discussion in law enforcement. 
Along with these approaches are opportunities 
for prevention professionals and law enforcement. 
Crime analysis is an especially useful aspect 
of the newer policing approaches .... 
In addition to the emphasis on crime prevention l 
the newer approaches to policing value crime 
analysis and problem identification. As police 
organisations collect, collate and analyse 
more data and do it better, loss prevention and 
security professionals can and should take 
advantage of these developments. Too often 
police and loss prevention professionals 
fail to join forces" (Pelfrey 1992 pp 215-219). 
In Britain as Mason has identified the public police will 
always be reluctant to pass sensitive information to private 
security agencies until a satisfactory regulatory system has 
been established. Government will need to meet demands for 
controls and a central register for the 7,000 companies which 
ACPO believes controls 162,000 personnel (Police Review 
16.9.94). Johnston (1994) highlights the two most common 
responses of the public police which are the fear that police 
legitimacy will be undermined if the social service functions 
of the police are hived off to private security and that a 
two tier system of policing will arise in which those who can 
afford it will buy protection from the private sector leaving 
the poor to depend upon the services of a publ ic force 
denuded of its service role. To radical theorists who 
already see the rich as using their wealth to buy private 
justice and the public police exercising the power of the 
state to control the poor and the socially disenfranchised l 
such responses are seen as attempts to sustain what they 
regard as the "myth" of policing by consent. 
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This research sets out to examine which of the theoretical 
concepts discussed, is most relevant in Britain today, with 
particular relevance to the policing of shopping centres. In 
such areas there is not only substantial public contact but 
ever increasing opportunities for interface with the public 
police. The research also examines whether the previously 
identified negative perceptions of the average security guard 
in terms of vetting, regulation, training, supervision and 
pay sti 11 hold true and looks at how such personnel are 
involved in private justice systems. The next chapter 
discusses the design of a battery of instruments with which 
to conduct the research. 
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C HAP T E R 3 
DESIGNING THE RESEARCH 
1. Introduction 
A review of the literature on private policing raised a 
number of issues concerning: 
a) Vetting 
b) Supervision 
c) Pay 
d) Regulation 
e) Provision of a private justice system 
f) Interaction and co-operation between public and 
private police 
g) Training 
h) The precedence given to loss prevention 
The importance of these issues tends to vary depending on the 
conceptual and theoretical perspectives of the observer as 
suggested in Chapter 2, which contrasted and compared a 
number of conceptual and theoretical considerations in 
respect of private policing, these were: 
a) The Junior Partner Theory 
This theory focuses on the relationship between private 
securi ty organisations and police personnel and tends to 
assume either overlapping interests between public police and 
private security and/or a similarity of policing styles with 
shared common objectives and in particular the protection of 
society (Bacon R 1972). 
b) Economic Theory 
This theory links the expansion of private policing to the 
fiscal crises of states and sees private policing filling the 
vacuum that the public police have created for budgetary 
and/or organisational reasons. The functions of the police 
tend to be defined in the context of the criminal justice 
system and crime control. The functions of private security, 
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on the other hand, tend to be defined in the context of a 
private justice system founded on the prevention of loss and 
the necessity of ensuring that the means of production of the 
"capitalist machine" are not interrupted. (Shearing, Stenning 
and Addario 1985, 1987). 
c) Radical Theories 
These theories tend to be based on empirical assertions about 
the role of both the police and the private security 
industry, identifying both as providers of police services 
which not only have similar functions and objectives but 
which serve the same common goal, namely, the maintenance and 
protection of the institution of private property and the 
alliance between capital and the state. The radical 
perspective identifies two separate justice systems rather 
than two order maintenance systems. It sees one justice 
system to suppress the sellers of labour and another which 
acts as a regulatory mechanism between the state and the 
employers of labour. The researcher identified aspects of 
all these theories in the provision of present social control 
measures, which led to the formulation of consumer 
hypotheses. 
Consumer Hypotheses 
These hypotheses see the pol ice and private securi ty as 
service providers who vie with each other in the market place 
to provide their services to various groups within society. 
Hypothesis A 
"Consumer attitude towards a service provider will show a 
positive increase as his/her satisfaction with the service 
provided increases" 
This may appear so obvious as to be unworthy of statement but 
implicit in the hypothesis is the suggestion that issues such 
as vetting, regulation, and provision of a private justice 
system will have different salient values for different 
groups of consumers. These differing levels of saliency will 
I result O f differing semantic not occur simp y as a 
interpretations but are much more likely to occur as a result 
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of the differing degrees of control 
expectations of the service provider. 
to the formulation of Hypothesis B. 
Hypothesis B 
, involvement with and 
These implications led 
"Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over the 
service provider increases". 
The term consumer includes corporate owners of shopping 
centres, managers or owners of business within the shopping 
centres and members of the public using facilities within the 
shopping centres. 
The researcher sought to design an instrument that would test 
the hypothesis stated in relation to the private policing of 
shopping malls and would also test consumer attitudes to the 
issues raised in Chapter 2. 
A number of problems immediately became apparent not the 
least being that there were several unmeasured variables 
capable of affecting consumer attitudes to any or all of the 
issues raised by the literature review and restated at the 
beginning of this chapter. These variables were not mutually 
exclusive and may have interacted to affect attitude 
formation. Within the financial and temporal constraints 
under which the research was conducted it would have been 
extremely difficult if not impossible to identify all 
possible variables and hence to identify and manipulate the 
independent variable. It was for these reasons that an 
experimental approach to the research was rejected. 
Ratings as an instrument were also rejected because they are 
usually made on the basis of overall performance of the 
service provider. It was implicit in both hypotheses that the 
assessment of overall performance would differ according to 
the degree of consumer involvement with, expectations of and 
control over the service provider, such that ratings could be 
heavily biased.(l) 
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Checklists were also rejected, albei t that they can be 
constructed to test specific hypotheses, because they are 
time consuming and tend to cast the respondent in the role of 
observer rather than evaluator. Since the hypotheses were to 
be tested on the basis of attitudes it was preferable to cast 
the cOI1sumer in the role of evaluator in order to obtain 
opinions rather than reports of behaviour. Because of the 
links between opinions, evaluative judgment and behaviour 
(Tiffin and McCormick 1970), it was considered that any 
instrument having evaluative content was liable to be less 
bias prone. 
Having eliminated a number of research options it was 
necessary to address a number of questions in selecting the 
most practicable, if not the ideal research instrument, these 
questions were: 
a) What are the precise objects of the research? 
b) Does the research seek to explain or describe? 
c) How will the research obtain the required data? 
d) What questions does the research intend to cover? 
e) What kind of results are expected? 
2. Objectives of the Research 
In determining the precise objectives of the research 
consideration had to be given to a combination of technical 
and organisational decisions for such factors as: 
a) Definition of terms used in the hypotheses 
b) Populations to be covered 
c) Information sought 
a) Definition of Terms 
Hypothesis A 
"Consumer attitude towards a service provider will show a 
hl"s/her satisfaction with the service positive increase as 
provided increases". 
For the purposes of this research consumers were grouped into 
three specific categories on the basis of their perceived 
levels of: 
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(i) Control of a given private security 
organisation 
( i i ) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Degree and style of interaction with a given 
private security organisation 
Expectations of the private security organisation 
Funding of the security organisation 
The categories of consumer based on the foregoing criteria 
were: 
(i) Corporate owners of shopping centres 
( i i) 
(iii) 
Managers or Owners of businesses within the 
shopping centres 
Members of the public using facilities within the 
shopping centre 
The term service provider denotes anyone providing a service 
to the consumer but specifically in this research refers to 
the private security organisation providing a private 
pol icing service wi thin the shopping centres. However, since 
public police have access to the shopping centres, any effect 
that they may have on the policing of the centre environment 
cannot be ignored. 
The term satisfaction simply means that the service provider 
satisfies the consumer and by satisfy it is meant that the 
service provider gives what is wanted or needed and that the 
service he provides is accepted as adequate. 
Posi ti ve increase in atti tude was held to be an overall 
strengthening of the cognitive, affective and conative 
components of the attitude towards the service provider. The 
positive increase for each component of the attitude towards 
the service provider need not be equal. For example, if the 
consumer believed private security was doing a good job, and 
the securi ty organisation continued to provide what the 
consumer wanted the more strongly this belief was likely to 
be held. If the consumer was pleased as opposed to angry 
about the service provided the more positive the emotional 
loading was likely to be towards the service provider. 
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If the consumer held a positive attitude towards the service 
provider the more likely he was to help, reward, support or 
renew the contract of that service provider. 
Whereas it might be expected that a private security 
organisation would seek to generally influence all consumers 
positively, the organisation managers might be expected to 
attempt to influence the contract awarders specifically i.e. 
the shopping centre owners. It was this line of thought 
that led to the formulation of Hypothesis B. 
Hypothesis B 
"Consumer satisfaction will increase as control over "service 
provider increases" 
Control is held to mean the degree of influence that a 
consumer might have in respect to the service provider and 
how the consumer might exert this influence not only to 
direct what the service provider does but to veto what the 
service provider may have wished to do. 
It was expected that the shopping centre owners would have 
the power to "hire or fire" the security organisation which 
would give them a great deal of influence over the day to day 
running of the organisation, and that the shopping centre 
owners would play a large part in determining securi ty 
policy. 
Whereas business operators within the shopping centres were 
expected to have contributed indirectly to the costs of 
providing security, perhaps as a portion of site rents, they 
were not expected to have the same degree of control over the 
organisation providing security services within the centres. 
Members of the public may have contributed to the funding of 
private security services by some small fraction of the costs 
of their purchases. It was expected that there would be 
Ii ttle awareness of this and that the public would have 
little if any control over the activities of private security 
organisations operating within shopping centres. 
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The remaining terms of the Hypothesis are as defined for 
Hypothesis A. 
Defini tion of the terms 1" n Hyp th " A o eS1S and B and the 
expectations arising from those definitions led to the 
formulation of a further hypothesis. 
Hypothesis C 
IIShopping centre owners, business operators and members of 
the public would exhibit different attitudes towards service 
providers operating in shopping centres ll • 
The terms in this hypothesis are as previously defined. 
b) Populations to be covered 
Having defined the terms used in the hypotheses it was then 
necessary to define the populations on whom they would be 
tested. Within the constraints of the resources available to 
the researcher full coverage of a population was not 
possible. This meant coverage would be partial which in 
itself raised a number of questions. 
(i) How would respondents be selected? 
Before answering this question it was necessary to 
distinguish between the II target populations" and the 
populations actually covered by the "survey". Ideally the 
two should be the same, but because the target populations, 
certainly as far as business operators and general public 
were concerned, were so large and so widely dispersed 
complete coverage was ruled out. Moser and Kalton(1971) 
suggest that a survey should be considered incomplete if a 
substantial number of the target populations are excluded. 
They further suggest that the term sample survey (or census) 
should ideally be used only if the part of the population 
studied was selected by accepted statistical methods. 
From the outset it was accepted that the survey would be 
incomplete and that the selection of populations covered 
could not practicably be achieved by accepted statistical 
methods. The researcher would have little control over what 
information was supplied by the corporate owners of shopping 
centres or indeed by whom such information would be supplied. 
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Some attempt might have been made to select a random sample 
of businesses operating wi thin a shopping centre on the basis 
of stratifying them into butchers, grocers, tailors and 
electrical goods, etc., but some businesses would be single 
outlets whilst others would be part of a retail chain. 
Businesses might vary in floor space, turnover and public 
access to goods, for instance meat in butchers shops is not 
usually as accessible to a thief as is a coat in a tailors 
shop. Equally a joint of meat is unlikely to be security 
tagged whereas an expensive jacket might well be tagged. 
Such variables made it extremely difficult to arrive at a 
means of selecting a representative sample of traders in one 
shopping centre let alone a number of centres. 
Accepted statistical methods of selecting respondents from 
the general public were also inappropriate. Normal sampling 
frames such as the electoral register or the telephone book 
were of little use as it was intended to poll respondents 
whilst they were actually using the facilities of the 
shopping centre. It had to be acknowledged that respondents 
polled on a given day may not have been representative of 
respondents polled on another day. For instance it might 
reasonably be expected that at weekends a higher proportion 
of families would be shopping together, or that peak periods 
of trading might vary from day to day. 
Since a IIstatistical ll sample was not used and as no 
appropriate sampling frame was available for use with all 
three groups of consumers the researcher was forced to accept 
any group of respondents that he could obtain. All three 
groups of respondents would be asked to complete the same 
attitude statement instrument. In the case of corporate 
owners the attitude statement instrument was accompanied by 
a letter detailing who the researcher was and the object of 
the research and asking for their co-operation. A total of 
six letters and instruments were despatched to corporate 
owners or thei r agents. The researcher considered thi s 
acceptable since only six sites were studied and of these two 
were managed by the same agents. Having despatched the 
instruments the researcher had relinquished all control over 
the information received. 
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He was not aware of the status of the person completing the 
instrument, that 
indeed whether 
attitude or the 
is senior management or junior clerk or 
the data obtained indicated the company 
attitude of the individual. In addition to 
the status of the person completing the instrument the 
researcher was aware that such issues as gender, personal 
experience, age, social status and ethnici ty could also 
affect the responses made and that he would have no awareness 
of these overt characteristics. 
It was decided to approach approximately twenty per cent of 
business operators in each shopping centre personally. The 
researcher considered that by doing this he would have the 
opportunity to explain the object of the research and answer 
any questions the respondent may have. He would be aware of 
any overt characteristics that might have affected the 
responses and might also obtain useful anecdotal data at the 
same time. Such a strategy would succeed in the smaller 
stores but in larger departmental stores the instrument would 
have to be left at the enquiry desk with a stamped addressed 
envelope ei ther for later collection or for onward 
transmission by post. Similar problems to those experienced 
with corporate owners occurred with the larger stores. 
It was planned to poll members of the public as they went 
about thei r shopping wi thin the centres. The researcher 
intended to poll a reasonable mix of male and female and 
different age groups. The researcher would obviously be 
unaware of how often respondents used a particular shopping 
centre, or what other shopping centres they may use which 
might affect their responses. Even by al ternating the 
approach to male/female respondents and varying age groups 
the researcher had no control over who would actually take 
time to complete the instrument and there was always the 
danger that the data obtained might be skewed as a result of 
age and/or sex. Having decided on this less than ideal 
selection of respondents it was necessary to define what 
information would be sought from each of the consumer groups. 
( 2 ) 
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c) Information Sought 
The information sought from each of the groups of consumers 
was the attitude to: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
the vetting of security guards 
the supervision of security guards 
the pay levels of security guards 
towards regulation of security guards 
towards the provision of a private justice system 
towards private security interaction with the 
public police 
towards the training received by security guards 
(viii) towards security guards making loss prevention 
as opposed to crime prevention a priority. 
Thus the preci se object i ves of the research were to test 
consumer attitudes to the above topics and to obtain 
information in support or otherwise of the three hypotheses, 
that is, 
a) positive consumer atti tudes would increase wi th 
increased satisfaction of the service provided by 
private security. 
b) that consumer satisfaction would be dependent on the 
degree of control exercised over private security. 
c) that there would be a difference in the attitudes of 
the three groups of consumer. 
3. Description versus Explanation 
The sample to be studied was an unrepresentative sample and 
as such any data obtained could not be used to make accurate 
predictions about public attitudes towards other areas of the 
securi ty industry. However, if the research instruments 
chosen measured what they were supposed to measure and the 
subjects under observation were adequate to be representative 
of the traits, behaviours or attitudes being measured then 
valuable information could be collected in respect of a less 
than statistically perfect sample of attitudes towards one 
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sector of the security industry. The information thus gained 
about the effects of the behaviour of private securi ty 
patrols on the attitudes of consumers could be used in 
conjunction with information gained from observational study 
of the behaviour of private securi ty patrols in shopping 
centres, to provide a "snapshot" of perceptions of private 
policing in parts of Britain today. 
Temporal and financial restraints had forced compromise in 
the choice of subjects and the information that might 
usefully be obtained from such subjects, which in turn meant 
that the research design adopted was also a compromise. 
The research sought to establ ish as preCisely and 
comprehensively as possible, within the given constraints, 
the attitudes of three groups of consumers towards a small 
number of operatives wi thin a specialised section of the 
security industry. It sought to do this by using anecdotal 
and observational data as well as attitude scales. In using 
such a battery of instruments the researcher sought to 
collect descriptive evidence to test the hypotheses already 
formulated. 
It was considered that descriptive evidence could be used in 
conjunction wi th statistical data obtained from atti tude 
scales. The inclusion of contradictory features in the 
research design is supported to some extent by Hyman when he 
suggests: 
"the better the initial approximation to the 
laboratory experiment in a research 
design, the less effective is the inquiry as 
a descriptive one, and this choice is 
irreversible and irremediable. Using a 
descriptive design permits the later test of 
a hypothesis by "an approximation after ~h~ . 
fact" to an explanatory design, but the 1n1t1al 
choice of an explanatory design precludes 
any later approximation to the design needed 
for a descriptive survey" (1967 p 85). 
The distinction between descriptive and explanatory research 
is often very blurred, any explanation requires description, 
and it is difficult or perhaps impossible to describe 
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something wi thout at the same time explaining it (McNeil 
1990) . Due to financial and temporal restraints it was 
considered not only methodologically acceptable but essential 
to concentrate limited resources on achieving understanding 
through a combination of anecdotal and observed data together 
with data obtained from a Likert type attitude scale. The 
use of observation and description as a research tool has a 
lengthy history not only in the social sciences but in the 
physical and life sciences too. Most of biology until about 
1900 was concerned primarily wi th description and Charles 
Darwin proposed his theory of evolution ,based on previous 
observations by other biologists as well as many of his own. 
Emil Kraepelin in the latter half of the 19th century, 
classified mental illnesses into two major groupings based on 
a study of case histories, his system with relatively few 
changes has been in use by psychiatrists up to the present 
day. Similarly Jean Piaget used observation and description 
in formulating a number of hypotheses and interpretations 
concerning the language and thought of the child, his work 
has had considerable influence on subsequent research using 
alternative methodology (Plutchik 1974). 
In addi tion to the reasons already stated a descriptive 
approach was considered more practicable than an explanatory 
approach for the following theoretical reasons. If the 
phenomenon under observation, the behaviour of securi ty 
guards is considered the measurable independent variable and 
the measurable dependent variable is considered the response 
of consumers then the attitudes not only of the consumers but 
of securi ty guards as well will become an immeasurable 
intervening variable 
attitude and action. 
allowing for a mis-match between 
Rosenberg and Hovland 1960 neatly 
described this effect in diagrammatic form as shown overleaf 
(Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993). 
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Measurable 
independent 
variables 
Fig. 2 
Intervening 
variables 
AFFECT 
ATTITUDES COGNITION 
BEHAVIOUR 
Measurable dependent variables 
Sympathetic nervous responses. 
Verbal statements of affect 
Perceptual responses. 
Verbal statements of belief 
Overt actions. 
Verbal statements concerning' 
behaviour 
The three-component view or attitudes (adapkd from R~senberg and Hovland, 1960) 
The work of Weiner (1985) and Wong and Weiner (1981) 
indicates that "causal search" is stimulated primari ly by 
unexpected events, particularly those involving loss or 
failure (Eiser and Van der P1igt 1993). In view of the 
anticipated differing degrees of control, intervention and 
expectation that consumers have with the security providers 
the level of "causal search" is likely to be different. 
Thefts from shops would be likely to stimulate "causal 
search" and attribution of blame by traders wi thin the 
shopping centre. It mayor may not stimulate IIcausal search" 
and attribution of blame in corporate owners but would be 
unl ikely to have any di rect effect on shoppers. I f the 
security provider seriously failed in his duty of protecting 
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the property of the corporate owners of the shopping centre, 
for example allowing a fire or flooding to Occur due to 
negligence this would be highly likely to stimulate "causal 
search" and attribution of blame by the corporate owners. If 
the blame resulted in increased supervision, imposition of 
penalties or the threat of non renewal of contract this could 
have effects on the atti tudes of the securi ty operatives 
which might in turn affect their behaviour. The changed 
behaviour of the security guards might have effects on the 
responses of all the consumers which would in turn affect 
their attitudes. In short the data from attitude surveys was 
seen as being more relevant if supported by as much 
descriptive data as possible. 
The adoption of a descriptive survey is not unusual where the 
phenomenon under observation is complex or ambiguous, however 
if a descriptive approach is to have any relevance then a 
clear conceptualisation of the phenomenon being observed is 
an absolute necessity. Hyman (1967) points to Ackoff and 
Pritzer as providing a clear illustration of how deceptive is 
the apparent simplicity of the dependent variables that might 
be the subject of a functional descriptive survey. They 
ci ted the hypothetical survey in which the problem is to 
determine how many chairs people have in their living room. 
To make such a determination chair has to be defined. If a 
chair is defined in terms of physical properties, such as 
size, shape, weight, etc., a chair can always be found which 
does not satisfy these conditions. For example if one or 
more legs is taken as a necessary property of chairs this 
would exclude chairs built into a wall or built on a solid 
base and hence having no legs. A chair is of course a 
functional concept; its essence is its use not its structure. 
In virtually every descriptive survey there is considerable 
theoretical difficulty in the conceptualisation of the very 
phenomenon that is described. This difficulty is compounded 
where the concept is as abstract as atti tudes wi th thei r 
close association to attributions, beliefs, behaviour and 
feelings. 
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Since the relationship each group of consumers was likely to 
enjoy wi th private securi ty was expected to be different, 
different attributions were expected from each group, hence 
di fferent bel iefs, behaviours and feel ings were expected. 
These expectations on the part of the researcher made 
apparent the major difficulty of achieving a universal 
concept of the phenomenon under investigation. 
To eliminate bias as far as possible the researcher sought to 
ensure: 
a) That all consumer groups were describing the same 
phenomenon 
b) That if it became apparent that the phenomenon 
being described by the various consumer groups 
was not the same then the researcher had 
developed some understanding of why this had 
occurred. 
With these thoughts in mind the researcher sought to 
construct a battery of instruments that would not only answer 
the questions raised in the previous chapters but would also 
give results with the maximum possible reliability and 
validity. 
4. Constructing the Battery of Instruments 
In constructing the battery of instruments attention had to 
be paid to certain basic criteria, these were: 
a) Research Concerns 
The research needed to be as reliable as possible, seeking to 
take account of and to balance as far as possible all 
anticipated bias. The researcher sought to eliminate bias by 
asking a number of questions concerning the validity of the 
instruments in his battery, for example: 
(i) Is the instrument measuring what it is supposed to 
( i i ) 
measure? 
How accurately do the questions asked elicit the 
information sought? 
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(iii) To what extent are changes . th 1n e dependent 
variable the result of the influence of the 
independent variable? 
(iv) Can the conclusions drawn from this study be 
generalised to other cases? 
In an attempt to answer these questions and refine the 
instruments so that bias was minimised as much as possible, 
the instruments were piloted in a group of subjects before 
use in the final research.(3) 
It was decided to conduct the research in an entirely open 
and frank manner leaving respondents in no doubt as to the 
object of the instruments used by assuring them of anonymity 
should they wish it. To this end, maximum transparency was 
aimed for, with the hope that complete honesty on the part of 
the researcher would be reciprocated by the respondent, 
thereby achieving minimum fakeability. 
Due to financial and temporal constraints the battery of 
instruments would be as simple as possible. It was hoped 
that this would have a posi ti ve effect in that minimum 
complexity would maximise response. 
Respondent Concerns 
From the respondents point of view the instruments would need 
to have minimum noxiousness if maximum co-operation was to be 
obtained. Any questions asked would need to be couched in 
language that the respondent understood and indeed any 
answers given would need to be clearly understood by the 
researcher. 
As stated earlier the research sought to use anecdotal and 
observational data and attitude scales to achieve its aim. 
Having regard to research and respondent concerns the 
researcher sought to include the following in his battery of 
instruments. 
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a) Field Study 
The researcher sought to give an accurate description of the 
behaviour of private security guards patrolling shopping 
centres. The study was to pay due regard to the relations 
between security guards and their environment and security 
guards and at least two groups of consumers, the shopping 
public and business operators within shopping malls. 
Since behaviour is a more or less continuous matrix of 
actions and interactions only through some kind of analytic, 
abstractive process can it be grasped, recorded and 
understood. The researcher sought to do this in two ways: 
a) By use of sampling procedures 
b) By use of categories 
Time sampling in spite of its limitations was decided upon as 
the appropriate means of sampling because of the restrictions 
of time and finance. This method of sampling utilises short 
time periods sampled at regular intervals, and descriptive 
categories which have been established in advance and which 
are judged during the sample period. It has been suggested 
that this type of sampling can be meaningfully used only for 
events that happen fairly often, at least every 15 minutes on 
the average. A second limitation relates to the fact that 
certain sequences of behaviour may last longer than the 
sample time period, thus producing judgements on "fragmented" 
sequences of behaviour. Wright (1960) notes that the various 
sampling plans do not differ generally in terms of 
reliability or observer agreement (Plutchik 1974) so the 
researcher felt justified in using this plan rather than any 
other. The object of categorisation was to group large 
numbers of observations into a smaller number of classes of 
actions. 
vetting, 
extremely 
Information 
wage rates, 
difficult to 
on such topics as pre-employment 
and training would obviously be 
observe and would be studied by 
alternative means. The researcher devised seven categories 
which it was fel t could be usefully observed and would 
provide some of the information sought by the research. 
These categories were: 
102 
1. Visits by Supervisors 
This category should give an indication of the level of 
supervision. 
2. Interaction with Public Police 
This would include any interactions whether casual 
conversation or active assistance and would be regarded 
as a measure of the posi ti vi ty or negati vi ty of the 
police/private security relationship. 
3. Interaction with Shoppers 
This category would provide some indication of the level 
of satisfaction experienced by shoppers. 
4. Interaction with Business Operators 
This category would provide some indication of the level 
of satisfaction experienced by business operators. 
5. Abuse of Authority 
This category would include any behaviour that was 
violent, abusive or appeared to cause dissatisfaction 
to any consumer or that may lend added weight to the 
argument for closer regulation. 
6. Crime Control 
This category would include arrest, pursuit of suspects 
or assistance to the police.(4) 
7. Loss Control 
This category would include any behaviour obviously not 
of a crime control nature but aimed at securing the 
property of consumers, for example fire prevention, 
ensuring compliance with safety regulations, etc. 
Whilst the field study would provide data on some of the 
topics under investigation it was not practicable to study 
all the topics by this means. 
The interview was considered to be the most practicable 
instrument for use wi th securi ty operatives in shopping 
centres whilst the attitude statement instrument was 
considered most appropriate for 
owners themselves. 
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use wi th the corporate 
Having decided on a non-participatory observational study of 
security patrols it was decided to supplement this with a 
number of interviews with security operatives carrying out 
their duties wi thin shopping precincts. The structured 
survey interview is presented as a data collection device 
invol ving si tuations where the interviewer merely poses 
questions and records answers in a set pattern. Few field 
researchers have followed the structured approach preferring 
to use an informal or unstructured style of interviewing 
which employs a set of themes and topics to form questions in 
the course of conversation (Burgess 1984). As already stated 
this research aimed to be descriptive rather than explanatory 
and for this reason it seemed proper to follow a long 
tradition in social science research where interviews have 
been perceived as conversations with a purpose. This style 
of interview has been used to good effect by Mayhew in his 
report of London Labour and the London Poor (1851) and Zweig 
in Labour, Life and Poverty (1948) and The British Worker 
(1952). The approach has been defended by such researchers 
as Finch (1984) who suggests that text book approaches to 
interviewing provide particular problems for feminist 
interviewers who wish to validate women's subjective 
experiences as women and people. Finch argues that it is 
preferable for women to interview women because women are 
seen as a member of the II in group II and are more 1 ikely to 
access information than a male who would be viewed as a 
member of an lIout groupll. 
Finch implici tly suggests a need for a detailed if not 
intimate knowledge of the subjects in an unstructured 
interview. Zweig (1948) also indicates that this style of 
interview cannot be started without detailed knowledge and 
preparation. He recommends that it is essential to observe 
people before a detailed conversation can occur. He suggests 
that detailed knowledge is essential before questions can be 
formed and before individuals are prepared to give detailed 
information on their way of life. Zweig (1952) suggests that 
a social scientist collecting his own material must perform 
two contradictory mental acts. 
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On the one hand he has to identify himself with the people 
who he interviews and describes and to think on their lines. 
On the other hand he suggests that another important quality 
is the ability to detach himself from his subject. 
The researcher chose a non-participatory observational study 
as the means of obtaining a detached but detailed 
understanding of the subjects and the unstructured interview 
as a way of establishing empathy with the subjects. 
The researcher did foresee at least one possible problem 
which may have been lessened by observation. Many 
occupations have their own "native" language and whilst the 
researcher sought not to interrogate the respondent he was 
aware of the need to clarify any utterances in the 
respondents "native" language (Spradley 1979). Some 
incidence of this should have become apparent during the non-
participatory observation and questions designed to clear up 
any ambiguities or lack of understanding on the part of the 
researcher could thus be formulated. By restricting 
questions to the minimum and allowing the respondent to speak 
freely the researcher hoped to avoid the pitfalls of asking 
questions which failed to use terms and phrases that were not 
commonly used in the respondents cultural scene. A Sanyo TRC 
SOOA Microcassette recorder was to be used to tape 
conversations with the subjects approval, where this was not 
forthcoming notes would be made and a record of the 
conservation made as soon as possible afterwards. Although 
this approach could claim no statistical accuracy it was 
hoped that any results obtained would in the tradition of 
Mayhew, Zweig and Finch, provide a rich portrait of what is 
occurring now, in a small section of a dynamic industry. 
Non-participatory 
practicable and 
observation of corporate owners was not 
as time was expected to be of great 
importance to corporate owners of shopping centres, 
interviews were considered a less than ideal instrument. If 
interview had been selected as a tool in this instance the 
researcher would not have expected to have any choice of whom 
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he interviewed as this would most likely have been determined 
by the company. The researcher would have had to allow for 
any status imbalance resulting from such selection and this 
could have been yet another source of unmeasurable bias 
(Burgess 1984). For these reasons the researcher opted for 
the use of the self administered attitude statement 
instrument as the most appropriate tool for use with 
corporate owners, albeit the scope for bias remained. 
The researcher hoped to obtain information about attitudes 
from as many people as possible in the groups of consumers 
comprising business operators and members of the publ ic. 
Time and financial constraints argued against the use of 
interviews with these groups. Because an evaluative 
judgement was required from these consumers, attitude scales 
were deemed the most appropriate instrument. The specific 
questions of typical attitude scales may call for an 
individual to give his/her "opinion" about some aspect of the 
given subject, in this case security operatives, these 
opinions are then used collectively to obtain some general 
attitude level for the anonymous individual represented by 
each questionnaire. 
Some more recent studies of atti tudes have stressed the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour, that is 
cognitive consistency (Hollander 1981). Others have 
concentrated on the reconciliation of the generality of 
measures of atti tudes and the specifici ty of measures of 
behaviour, particularly consumer attitude-behaviour 
correspondence (Aj zen and Fishbein 1980). This research 
however, confines itself to the direction of attitudes on the 
continuum negative to positive as in the Likert scale (Likert 
1932) or the Thurstone scale devised by Thurstone and Chave 
(1929) (Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey 1962). The 
Thurstone scale was rejected by the researcher because it is 
time consuming and unwieldy, requiring a weighting procedure 
which attempts to take account of item differences. It would 
have been necessary to have people judge items with regard to 
. th t t ts represented on a scale of the positlon e s a emen 
negative positive. 
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The Likert scale or "summated scale" 
was used because of its 
simplicity and ease of construction. The items on the scale 
are simply summed to get a total score and give a general 
overall positive or negative aspect to attitudes towards a 
given topic in this case private security in shopping 
centres. 
The Likert scale was constructed by selecting a large number 
of statements that related to private security and 
particulary those aspects under observation. 
Obviously if the summation of the scale was to have any 
meaning, then statements should be clearly anti or pro the 
object. Since respondents are required to indicate their 
agreement or disagreement with each item on the scale the 
items were required to meet two conditions. 
a) They tend to be responded to in the same way 
b) They elicit the same response on a number of occasions 
(Arnold and Robertson 1991) 
In order to meet these conditions it was necessary to pilot 
the scales. Ideally items should elicit an extreme or 
consistent response as in a five point scale such as that 
used in this research, similar scores could be achieved by 
respondents having strong positive views and strong negative 
views for equal numbers of items or a respondent having no 
extreme views either way. A smaller number of items than is 
normal was used on this occasion to allow not only for an 
overall positive negative indication but also to allow the 
researcher to analyse the differences in responses from each 
consumer group. The items comprising the scale used in this 
research are shown at Appendix C. Of the thirteen statements 
nine were positive and four were negative, this meant that 
scoring of responses for positive and negative statements was 
inverted. That is if the positive statement "I believe that 
security officers working in shopping centres are well 
supervi sed" el i ci ted a response, "strongly agree" lit was 
awarded a score of one if it elicited a response of "strongly 
disagree", it was awarded a score of 5. Similarly if the 
negative statement "I do not believe that security officers 
should have a code of conduct similar to the Police 
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Discipl ine Regulations II el ici ted 
a response of "strongly 
agree" it was awarded a score of one and "Strongly disagree" 
was awarded a score of five. T f th 
wo 0 e positive statements 
were directly opposi te to previous statements and were 
inserted as controls to ensure that respondent . 
s were readlng 
and understanding the statements, these were not scored. The 
remaining responses to the attitude statements 
were scored 
separately for corporate owners, business operators in each 
shopping centre and members of the public in each shopping 
centre. The scores were then adjusted to give a percentage 
score. 
The eleven statements that were scored were then grouped into 
those categories to which they related, that is: 
a) Vetting 
b) Supervision 
c) Pay 
d) Parity with Police Pay 
e) Regulation 
f) Private Justice 
g) Crime Prevention 
h) Social Control 
i) Co-operation with Police 
j) Training 
and percentage scores derived for consumer attitude to these 
areas. 
5. Formulating the Question 
Having decided on a battery of instruments it was then 
necessary to formulate the statements and questions to be 
used in those instruments. The researcher proposed asking 
question of any question intended for inclusion in the 
research instruments in an attempt to identify the underlying 
principles and theories that gave rise to the questions. For 
instance the question, 
"Does your company believe that there is sufficient 
interaction between private security employed to patrol your 
premises and the local police?" 
has relevance to the Junior Partner Theory, Economic Theory, 
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Radi cal Theory and the Consumer Hypothes is. It was the 
researcher's aim to ensure that questions or stat t emen s were 
not loaded in favour of one theory at the expense of others. 
Where this was not possible, questions or statements that 
were loaded in favour of one theory would be balanced by 
statements or questions loaded in favour of the others. 
The researcher was aware that no assumption could be made 
that statements or questions can be formed in terms that are 
widely understood in the same way such that their meaning 
wi 11 be understood by anyone. Some survey researchers 
believe that it is possible to construct a standardised 
question that wi 11 be understood by almost all Engl ish 
speakers in a population. 
be possible to measure 
Others argue that although it may 
some types of rather superficial 
attitudes through standardised questions, richness and depth 
of meaning are sacrificed in exchange for the 
standardisation. For this reason the researcher proposed to 
adopt an unstructured interview style for use with security 
officers purposely aiming for richness and depth of 
information. It was hoped that as well as providing 
information on the specified objectives of the research such 
an approach might indicate whether the proposition by 
Freedman and Stenning (1977) that the personnel of both 
pub1 ic and pri vate pol ice organisations are probably not 
substantially dissimilar in social perceptions is more or 
less accurate in England than in North America. Loy (1969) 
suggested that there are substantial differences between 
officers in the public police particularly in the degree of 
conforming and non-conforming they exhibit. If there are 
such substantial differences between public police officers, 
then it is probable that there will be such differences 
between private police officers and public police officers. 
Loy's research suggested to the researcher that atti tude 
scales would not be the best instrument for use with security 
officers because the conformist personality type who tends to 
see everything in black and white terms would be likely to 
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opt for extremes whereas the non-conformist personality may 
not. These considerations together with the fact, that an 
assessment of whether the subjects interpretation of 
questions matched that of the researcher was needed, 
convinced the researcher that the informal style of Zweig was 
to be preferred with this particular group. This of course 
meant that the researcher would not be in a posi tion to 
prepare questions in advance but would be guided by the 
subjects conversation, only asking questions to clarify 
points and clear up ambiguities. It was hoped that by using 
an informal style without prepared questions that security 
officers might give some indication of their self-concept. 
Turner (1982) sees self-concept as being conceptualised as a 
cogni ti ve structure which functions to regulate behaviour 
under certain conditions, he sees it as comprising two major 
subsystems. 
a) Personal identity referring to self descriptions in 
terms of personal or idiosyncratic attributes such 
as personality, physical and intellectual trends. 
b) Social identity referring to self definitions 
in terms of social category membership such as 
race, class, nationality, sex, a security 
company, the police, etc .. 
A person's total social identity is comprised of specific 
social identi ties and different si tuations make salient 
different self conceptions. (Brown and Turner 1985) Because 
the researcher could not hope to identify these specific 
social identities and their relationship to the saliency of 
different self conceptions, the unstructured interview was 
seen as a means of achieving at least an idea of the self 
concept of security officers in shopping centres. 
In constructing attitude statements for questionnaires the 
researcher sought to arrive at statements that would help in 
the investigation of the objectives raised by the literature 
review. To this end they were pretested: 
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1) To ensure that respondents understood the same 
concepts within the statement as that understood 
by the researcher. 
2) That in as far as possible the statements were 
so framed as to elicit extreme responses. 
Samples of pilot and final attitude scales at Appendix c. 
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( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
NOTES 
Hypothesis B "Consumer satisfaction will increase 
as control over the service provider increases". 
Ratings were rejected as an instrument because they 
are usually made on the basis of overall 
performance of service provider. It was implicit 
in both hypotheses A and B that the assessment of 
overall performance would differ according to the 
degree of consumer involvement with, expectations 
of, and control over the service provider, such 
that ratings could be heavily biased. (page 84) 
It became apparent to the researcher as the study 
progressed that there may be an alternative 
hypotheses, e. g. The researcher di scovered that the 
hypothesis needed refinement to include the 
effects of knowledge or lack of knowledge about 
private security and the service offered. 
(page 161) 
The possibi I i ty that the hypotheses stated were not 
the only hypotheses possible is considered further 
justification for rejecting ratings as an 
instrument. 
It was intended to poll members of the public as 
they went about their shopping wi thin centres. 
Initially the researcher approached male and 
females of various ages al ternately but it was 
found that as many people were reluctant to stop 
and speak to the researcher or where people would 
stop they declined to complete questionnaires on 
the basis of lack of knowledge. The researcher 
eventually settled for anyone who would stop to 
complete a questionnaire trying to balance up the 
number of female and male respondents by the end of 
the day. Fortunately those who did agree to 
complete questionnaires were of varying age groups. 
(page 89) 
Due to temporal and financial restraints the 
questionnaires were piloted in a group ,of twenty 
subjects consisting of friends and relat1ves. The 
group of subjects included males and females of 
varying ages (30-70 years of age). , Most of, the 
subjects had visi ted some of the S1 tes s~ud1e~. 
The researcher felt that responses gained 1n th1s 
manner would not be too far removed from those of 
the intended subjects. (page 96) 
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(4) In the field study the researcher found out that 
his observational categories were not mutually 
exclusive e.~. Categories 2 and 6 overlapped. 
Indeed it became almost impossible to determine the 
difference between Categories 6 and 7 as the main 
purpose of private security seemed to be relentless 
patrolling. During observations the researcher 
noted neither crime nor loss. If patrolling was 
successful was it successful as a crime prevention 
measure, a loss prevention measure or both? 
(page 98) 
The time interval chart (Appendix D) had to be 
supplemented by copious note taking as a result of 
the overlap of categories. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPLEMENTING THE RESEARCH 
The researcher had planned, developed and produced his 
research instruments in the knowledge that he was likely to 
encounter unforseen variables that would affect the validity 
of the research. He had not, however, expected to experience 
lack of co-operation to the degree that it was experienced. 
Providers of pri vate securi ty chose to ignore any 
communication from the researcher making interviews wi th 
private security operatives impossible. Many business 
operators refused to co-operate on the grounds that 
-discussion of security matters was contrary to company policy 
or simply that they were too busy. Members of the public 
were also extremely uncooperative which meant that the 
researcher was left with much smaller numbers of subjects 
than planned to work with.(l) 
Since the research was descriptive rather than explanatory 
the smaller number of respondents was not the disaster it 
might have been and the indifference the researcher 
experienced to the topic of private policing is itself 
evidence of the lack of concern which allows government to 
persist with its policy of self regulation. 
The research implemented was less ambitious than had been 
planned and consisted of: 
a) A non-participational observational study 
b) A list of attitude statements 
c) Anecdotal evidence. 
1. Non-Participatory Observational Study 
A non-participatory observational study was conducted at the 
following shopping centres: 
a) The Manchester Arndale Centre owned and managed 
by P & 0 Shopping Centres. 
114 
b) Merseyway Shopping Centre, Stockport, owned by 
Hammersons and managed by Donaldsons Chartered 
Surveyors. 
c) Houndshill Shopping Centre, Blackpool, owned by 
Pearl Assurance and managed by Hillier Parker. 
d) The Lanes Shopping Centre, Carlisle, owned by the 
City Council and managed by Donaldsons Chartered 
Surveyors. 
e) St. John's Shopping Centre, Workington, owned by the 
City Council. 
f) St. John's Arcade abutting the St. John's Centre 
owned by Ravenscroft Properties Ltd and managed by 
Land Securities Properties Ltd. 
It was felt by the researcher that such a study would provide 
hard visual evidence of whether or not private police are 
doing on private land what public police are doing on public 
land and whether or not they defer to the public police as 
they carry out their tasks. The researcher hoped to obtain 
first hand evidence of the state of the private police/public 
police relationship and the level of co-operation that exists 
at these sites, here and now in England. 
Freedman and Stenning (1977) suggested that the personnel of 
public and private police organisations are not substantially 
disimilar, it was hoped that the observational study would 
provide evidence to support or refute this suggestion. Loy 
(1969) on the other hand suggested that there are substantial 
differences between officers in the public police, 
particularly in the degree of conforming and non-conforming 
behaviour which they exhibit. The researcher intended to 
look for such differences in security personnel, 
particularly, as much of the literature on the subject treats 
the manned guarding section of the industry as one 
indiscriminate mass. 
Simply by observing (2) security officers as they went about 
their business the researcher believed that he might detect 
behaviour that would support or refute the allegations that 
security officers are exercising powers over and above those 
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available to the ordinary citizen and are therefor . e 1n urgent 
need of licencing and regulation. 
The observational study involved the use of fifteen minute 
time intervals and seven classes of action as outlined in 
Chapter 3. These classes of action were: 
a) Visits by Supervisors: 
Any contact between private security patrols and 
supervisors would be recorded. This of course 
would only be possible where the supervisor was 
readily identifiable by differences in uniform 
or badges of rank. 
b) Interaction with Public Police; this was divided into: 
(i) Conversation: 
in which the researcher intended to note any verbal 
communication between private security and the 
local police force. The researcher was not 
particularly interested in the precise reason for 
communication, this would be impossible to 
determine by observation alone. Observations were 
conducted with a view to determining whether or not 
communication occurred with any degree of 
regularity with a view to forming an impression of 
the level of co-operation between these agencies. 
(ii) Physical Assistance: 
the researcher hoped to observe any instance of 
active assistance that private security gave to 
the local police force such as assistance in 
making arrests of offenders. 
c) Interaction with shoppers; this was sub-divided into: 
(i) Positive Outcome: 
the researcher intended to note any interaction 
with members of the public where the outcome 
appeared positive. It was accepted that subjective 
judgements were involved with a positive outcome 
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being judged mainly on facial expressions 
, gestures 
and words where these were heard. 
(ii) Negative Outcome: 
again any judgements were purely subjective and 
were based on facial expressions, gestures and 
words. 
d) Interaction with Traders; this was sub-divided into: 
(i) Positive Outcome: 
as with interaction with shoppers any judgements 
were purely subjective and in the case of 
traders where observations were often through 
a shop window the judgements were almost 
always based on gestures and facial expressions. 
(ii) Negative Outcome: 
again judgements were purely subjective and 
based on facial expressions and gestures. 
e) Abuse of Authority; this was sub-divided into: 
(i) Violence: 
here the researcher was looking for occasions 
where private security might use force, and 
in particular force that was more than 
reasonable to achieve the objective. Since 
this is a matter for the courts to decide 
again any judgement would be subjective. 
(ii) Verbal Abuse: 
the researcher made an arbitrary decision that 
any words or language which might elicit a 
complaint against a police officer would fall 
into this category, and in particular any 
racist words or remarks. It was accepted 
that any judgement would be subjective. 
(iii) Other: 
the researcher was aware of the limitations of the 
categories he had selected and that abuse of 
authority could cover a whole host of behaviours 
other than those cited above. 
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f) Crime Prevention: 
this category was concerned not only with before the 
fact measures such as foot patrols but also with after 
the fact measures such as pursuit and arrest of 
offenders whether by private security alone or in 
support of local police. 
g) Loss Prevention: 
it was apparent to the researcher that it was 
impossible to distinguish between Crime Prevention 
and Loss Prevention activities merely by observation. 
The very act of patrolling has been found to have 
a preventative effect on crime (Bright 1969). However, 
this effectiveness is limited because of the non-crime 
prevention service function of patrolling. (Elliot 1973) 
The categories selected were drawn up into a chart 
(Appendix D) covering seven time intervals of fifteen minutes 
each. Notes were made on the chart when any of the listed 
activities occurred. It very quickly became obvious that the 
selected categories could be no more than a rough guide as 
many of them such as crime and loss prevention were not 
mutually exclusive. It became essential to supplement the 
observation chart with a note pad if the wealth of observed 
evidence was to be recorded. 
In order to obtain as rich a picture as possible whi 1 st 
giving maximum cover to the shopping centres the researcher 
decided to al ternate periods of static observation wi th 
periods of mobile observation. During period one the 
researcher remained static, normally si tting on a bench 
observing any acti vi ty in or near his location. During 
period two the researcher walked about the shopping centre 
actively looking for any incidents that may have been 
occurring. 
The first observational study took place at the Arndale 
Centre, Manchester. This is a massive complex consisting of 
two levels served by lifts, escalators and stai rways and 
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comprising in excess of two hundred businesses ranging from 
shops, cafes and restaurants to pubs. 
There is also an indoor market which is the responsibility of 
the City Council occupying space on both levels. 
The security company employed by the owners and management of 
the Arndale Centre is Secureurop. Patrol officers wear blue 
shirts and dark blue/black trousers with white police style 
caps. The Secureurop uniform does not closely resemble 
police uniform. Supervisors were noted to wear white shirts 
and dark blue/black trousers with a white police style cap 
which again does not closely resemble police uniform. 
A.M. Day I 
During the first fifteen minute period the researcher 
observed two white male security officers patrolling and one 
black female officer who was static at the head of an 
escalator. One white male officer of the Greater Manchester 
Police was observed to pass the two patrolling and the static 
security officers with no interaction of any kind taking 
place. A female member of the public approached the static 
female security officer and from the kinetics noted appeared 
to be asking for directions. The smiles and head nods of 
both participants indicated a positive outcome of this 
interaction. The researcher was mobile for thi s first 
observation period. 
The researcher was static during the second observation 
period when he noted one white male security officer static 
at the head of an escalator who was visited by two white male 
supervisors. For the third observation period the researcher 
was again mobile observing one white male security officer in 
a static position and a little later a black male security 
officer in a different location but also static. 
During the fourth period the researcher was static and noted 
the same black female officer static at the head of a 
different escalator. 
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She was visited by a white male supervisor and a little later 
they were joined by a white male security officer who had 
been patrolling. The researcher was passed by a white male 
supervisor who was patrolling. 
Resuming mobile observations for the fifth period the 
researcher noted one white male supervisor patrolling, the 
same black female officer patrolling and later another white 
male officer patrolling. During the sixth observation period 
the researcher was static and noted nothing of interest. 
During the final observation period of the morning the 
researcher was again mobile and noted what he at first took 
to be two white male officers of Greater Manchester Police 
standing at the head of an escalator. Drawing closer to the 
officers it was noted that their chequered cap bands were 
green and white and that they were wearing shoulder badges 
identifying them as Market Police. 
P.M. Day 1 
During the first period of the afternoon's observations the 
researcher was static and noted one black male securi ty 
officer patrolling. The second observation period was 
conducted whilst the researcher was mobile during which he 
noted one static white male security officer who was joined 
by a patrolling white male security officer. The researcher 
was static for the third observation period when he noted two 
whi te male officers patrol 1 ing. A further two whi te male 
officers were noted patrolling during the fourth observation 
period whilst the researcher was mobile. A white male 
security officer not employed by Secureurop was noted inside 
Burtons the Tailors. During the fifth observation period the 
researcher was static and nothing was observed. The 
researcher was mobile for the sixth period and noted two 
white male officers patrolling and one black male officer, 
possibly the same black male officer observed in the morning. 
Nothing of interest was noted during the seventh and final 
period. 
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Due to the size of the Arndale Centre it was decided that it 
warranted more than one day of observational study. 
A.M. Day 2 
The first fifteen minute period was spent conducting static 
observations during which two white male officers were 
observed conversing at the top of an escalator. During the 
second period the researcher was mobile when he noted one 
black male security officer patrolling, he also noted a white 
male security officer not employed by Secureurop patrolling 
in a ladies clothing shop. Whilst static for the third 
observation period the researcher saw the same black female 
officer noted on the previous day, she was static at the head 
of an escalator. The researcher was mobile for the fourth 
observational period and noted nothing of interest. During 
the fifth observational period in which the researcher was 
static he was passed first by a white male officer and then 
ten minutes later by a black male officer patrolling. The 
sixth period of observation was conducted whilst the 
researcher was mobile during which time he noted a black 
female officer patrolling. During the seventh observational 
period in which the researcher was static nothing was noted. 
P.M. Day 2 
During the first period of the afternoon the researcher was 
static and nothing was observed. The researcher was mobile 
for the second period when he noticed one white male 
supervisor and two white male officers static at the head of 
an escalator and a further whi te male officer was noted 
patroll ing. Nothing was noted during the thi rd period in 
which the researcher was static. For the fourth period the 
researcher was mobile when he noted a white male security 
officer not employed by Secureurop in an electrical goods 
shop. One white male security officer employed by Secureurop 
was noted patrolling during the fifth period in which the 
researcher was static. 
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The researcher was mobile during the sixth period when he 
noted one black female security officer patrolling. A white 
male security officer was noted in a static position during 
the seventh observational period. 
A.M. Day 3 
A final seven period observation was conducted during the 
first session of which, a black male security officer was 
observed patrolling. Whilst static for the second period a 
black female officer was noted in a static position. During 
the third observational period, whilst mobile, the researcher 
noted one male and one female officer, both white, of the 
Greater Manchester Pol ice, patroll ing through the centre. No 
interaction with security officers either Secureurop or in-
house security was noted. Two white male security officers 
were noted static at the head of an escalator during the 
fourth observation period. During the fifth period whilst 
the researcher was mobile a white male Secureurop officer was 
noted patrolling. During the sixth period whilst the 
researcher was static he noted one whi te male officer of 
Greater Manchester Police in a static position. During the 
period of observation no interaction with security staff took 
place. Whi 1st mobile for the seventh period nothing of 
interest was noted. 
The observational study in the Arndale Centre was conducted 
over a period of two and a half days and the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
a) The policing of the centre is complex appearing 
to be a mix of Greater Manchester Police, Secureurop, 
Manchester Market Police and an indeterminate 
number of security officers employed by specific 
businesses. Just as Lidstone (1980) and Johnston 
(1992) draw distinctions between the forty three 
Home Department Police forces in England and 
Wales, other police forces and regulatory bodies, 
it was apparent from the study of the Manchester 
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Arndale Centre that such distinctions could 
equally apply to the various agencies that 
collectively make up the "Security Industry". 
b) Secureurop officers gave the impression of 
omnipresence and although it was impossible 
to determine how many officers were on duty 
it is suspected that skilful use was made of 
stairs and escalators to create the impression 
that a large number of staff was on duty. 
c) The researcher was sure that during the period 
of the observation only one black female officer 
was on duty and it is suspected that only two 
black male officers were observed. All 
supervisors observed were white and male. 
From these observation it is concluded that ethnic 
minorities and females were under represented in 
the security staff patrolling the Arndale Centre, 
certainly under represented in the supervisory 
grades. 
d) The supervision of Secureurop staff observed 
showed regular contact being maintained by 
personal visits, radio and public address 
systems. 
e) No interaction of any kind was observed with 
local police even where police and security 
officers were in close proximity. 
f) The interaction with traders or shoppers 
observed was extremely limited but appeared 
to have a positive outcome on all occasions. 
The relentless patrolling of security officers 
is likely to have created an impression of 
safety for shoppers. 
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g) No abuse of authority of any description 
was observed in fact no overt use of authority 
was observed. 
h) The main function of all security officers , 
Secureurop and in-house security appeared 
to be the maintenance of an obvious presence 
by constant patrolling. 
Having conducted observations in the Manchester Arndale 
Centre the researcher visited the Merseyway Shopping Centre 
in Stockport which is also in the Greater Manchester Police 
area. This shopping centre is patrolled by in-house security 
employed by the property managers Donaldsons Chartered 
Surveyors. The uniform worn by the security officers at this 
site consisted of a dark blue suit and cap which bares little 
resemblance to police uniform. The Merseyway Shopping Centre 
was on a much smaller scale than the Arndale Centre, 
consisting of a covered arcade of perhaps twenty shops which 
leads on to an open plaza where a number of large stores such 
as Wool worths, C & A and Marks and Spencers abut the 
development but are not part of it. Facing these stores on 
the opposite side of the plaza are shops on two levels which 
also form part of the development. Because of the 
configuration of the development it was difficult to 
determine just how many businesses comprise the Merseyway 
centre proper, but it is probably no more than fifty. 
P.M. Day I 
As wi th the Arndale Centre observations were spl it into 
fifteen minute intervals al ternating between static and 
mobile. The first observation was conducted from a static 
position and one white male security officer was observed 
patrol I ing. The second observation period was conducted 
whilst the researcher was mobile and he observed a whi te 
female officer of the Greater Manchester police at the far 
end of the open Plaza, she appeared to be recording details 
of an illegally parked vehicle. 
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The third observation period was recorded whilst the 
researcher was static and the same h' t w 1 e male securi ty 
officer noted earlier was seen patrolling. During the fourth 
observation period the researcher was mobile and observed two 
white male officers of the Greater Manchester Police, 
patroll ing in the open plaza. No interaction wi th the 
security officer was observed. 
The researcher was static for the fifth period when he 
observed the same white male security officer, who appeared 
to be the only one on duty, speaking to a female member of 
the public. From the body language observed it appeared that 
directions were being asked and given and that the outcome of 
the interaction was satisfactory. The researcher followed 
the securi ty officer to the top level of the development 
during the sixth period and observed him speaking to a group 
of youths close to the top of a staircase. The body language 
of the youths once the security officer had moved on 
indicated a positive outcome. During the final period whilst 
the researcher was static the same whi te male securi ty 
officer was observed patrolling. 
Due to the size of the development and the fact that the 
researcher could see the only security officer patrolling it 
appeared that he was alone. However, he was observed to use 
his radio on two occasions, whilst he could have been 
speaking to his control room it is possible that he may have 
been speaking to other officers not readily observable. The 
overall impression was that security presence was very low 
key. Probably due to the much less obvious demarcation 
between the "private" Merseyway development and the public 
shopping area and the much smaller size of the si te, the 
public police presence was much more obvious to the 
researcher. 
A.M. Day 2 
The Merseyway Centre was visi ted again some days later. 
During the first observational period whilst the researcher 
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was static he noted three white male security officers on 
duty. One in a static position and two patrolling. Whilst 
mobile for the second period the researcher noted one of the 
officers in a shop speaking wi th the staff, the outcome 
appeared positive. During the third period whilst the 
researcher was static he noted two white male officers of 
Greater Manchester Police patrolling through the plaza. No 
interaction wi th securi ty officers was observed. Whilst 
mobile for the fourth period one security officer was noted 
climbing the stairway to the upper level of the development 
whi I st another was observed patrol I ing the lower level. 
During the fifth period nothing was observed. During the 
sixth period a white male officer of the Greater Manchester 
Police was noted speaking to members of an army recruiting 
team who were mounting a display at the front of the shopping 
centre. 
noted. 
During the seventh period nothing of interest was 
The following conclusions were drawn from observations at the 
Merseyway Shopping Centre: 
a) The policing of the centre is a mix of Greater 
Manchester Police and Donaldsons in-house security. 
b) The security presence is quite low key whilst 
the local police presence is more obvious. 
c) Ethnic minorities and females were not 
represented in the security presence on either 
day of observation. 
d) There was no obvious supervision of the officers 
on duty. On the second day of observation there 
appeared to be no distinction in uniform marking 
one security officer out as senior to the other two. 
e) No interaction of any kind was observed with 
Where police and security local police even 
officers were in close proximity. 
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f) Interaction with traders and shoppers was 
observed to be limited but that Whl'ch occurred 
appeared to have a positive outcome. 
g) No abuse of authority of any description was 
observed. 
h) The main purpose of the security officers 
appeared to be the maintenance of a presence 
by patrolling. 
The third observational study took place in the Houndshill 
Shopping Centre in Blackpool which lies in the Lancashire 
Constabulary area. The precinct which is fairly small 
comprises of a lower level with probably not more than fifty 
shops and an upper level consisting of only a large 
restaurant. It is now policed by security officers in the 
employ of Rentokil Sterling but these officers had originally 
policed the site as in-house security. The security officers 
wore white shirts with dark epaulettes, dark trousers and no 
caps. They were equipped with personal radios. 
A.M. Day I 
During the first period the researcher was static and 
observed a maintenance worker equipped wi th a personal radio. 
The researcher was mobile for the second period when he again 
observed the maintenance worker. Whilst static for the third 
period the researcher noticed a white male security officer 
patrolling when he stopped to speak to a group of people, 
kissing one of the females in the group. Whilst this was not 
the type of interaction the researcher had anticipated the 
outcome appeared to be posi t i ve for all concerned. The 
researcher was mobile for the fourth period but nothing was 
noted. Whilst static for the fifth period nothing was noted 
except the maintenance worker. The researcher was mobile for 
the sixth period when one whi te male officer was noted 
speaking to the staff in one of the shops, the outcome 
appeared to be positive. 
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During the final observation period one white male security 
officer was observed patrolling, the maintenance worker was 
again observed. The conclusions drawn from observations at 
the Houndshill Centre were: 
a) The policing of the centre appeared to be 
carried out by two white male security officers 
employed by Rentokil Sterling. 
b) The security presence was very low key. 
c) Ethnic minorities and females were not represented 
at all on the security strength. 
d) There was no obvious supervision of the officers 
on duty. 
e) No police presence was noted during the 
observation so no police/security interaction 
could take place. 
f) Interaction with traders and shoppers was 
observed to be limited but what little 
interaction was observed appeared to have 
a positive outcome. 
g) No abuse of authority of any description 
was observed. 
h) The main purpose of the security officers 
appeared to be the maintenance of a 
presence by patrolling but in such a 
small site even when looking for them they 
were not always easy to find. The radio 
equipped maintenance worker maintained a more 
obvious presence. (3) 
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The fourth observational study was carried out in the Lanes 
Shopping Centre, Carlisle, in the Cumbria Constabulary area. 
This is a covered development and as the name suggests it is 
laid out in a number of lanes which have open access to the 
public thoroughfare. As well as some forty or fifty shops it 
also houses the public library. Once again seven fifteen 
minute observational periods alternating between static and 
mobile were conducted by the researcher. No securi ty or 
police presence was noted. The researcher did see a member 
of the maintenance staff and by engaging her in conversation 
was able to determine that no private security was employed 
at the Lanes development. It was established that Cumbria 
Constabulary occasionally patrol through the area. 
Maintenance staff are employed at the centre twenty four 
hours a day and would contact Cumbria Constabulary if any 
problems arose. Throughout the observation periods no in-
house security officers were noted in any of the shops. 
The fifth observational study was carried out at the 
St.John's Shopping Centre, Workington in the Cumbria 
Constabulary area. Seven fifteen minute observation periods 
were conducted. All that the researcher observed was a white 
male officer of Cumbria Constabulary in a sports shop 
speaking to a member of staff. He also noted a white male 
securi ty off i cer patrol I ing Tesco stores. In the final 
observation period the researcher spoke wi th one of the 
business operators in St. John's Arcade which abuts the 
precinct and was informed that no security officers patrolled 
and that occasionally officers of Cumbria Constabulary passed 
through the Arcade and the shopping centre. At night there 
was no access through the Arcade and most of the shops had 
alarms and security grills. 
Having visited five different shopping centres the researcher 
had observed five very different approaches to policing these 
shopping areas and found himsel f questioning the current 
validity of previous research in respect of the policing of 
shopping centres in England today. The observational study 
resulted in the researcher drawing the following conclusions: 
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a) Private police do some but not all of the 
things that public police do. Private 
police were not seen to do anything that 
required powers other than those available 
to the ordinary citizen and were therefore 
not in need of immediate government regulation. 
b) There was no evidence to suggest that a 
close working relationship existed between 
private and public police. The most 
striking feature of the observational 
study was that at all sites visited, even 
in close proximity private and public 
police tended to ignore each other. 
c) The fact that no overt co-operation 
was observed would tend to suggest 
that irrespective of what Freedman and 
Stenning (1977) suggest, officers of 
private and public police organisations 
perceived themselves as being substantially 
dissimilar. 
d) Substantial differences in the behaviour 
of security officers at the various sites 
was observed suggesting that Loy's (1969) 
research may have as much if not more 
relevance to private police as it did to 
public police. 
e) The comments of Mr P W Rabbitts of 
IPSA with reference to the low salaries 
paid by many companies in large cities 
and the employment of many people from 
ethnic minorities, were not borne out 
by the observed evidence of this study. 
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2. Attitude Statements 
The Rand Report 1971 is quoted as having created impresSions 
and characterisations of the average security guard. The 
researcher therefore, felt it necessary to compare his 
impressions of private security derived from the 
observational study with the impressions of corporate owners 
of shopping centres, business operators with premises in the 
shopping centres and the general public. 
As already stated there is a close link between attitudes and 
verbal statements concerning beliefs and behaviour, for this 
reason attitude statements based on the Likert Scale were 
considered an ideal media for poll ing the aforementioned 
users of private security. 
A pilot list of seventeen attitude statements was prepared. 
The statements were all based on material from various 
publications which had commented on private security and 
represented the views of such diverse personages as Bruce 
George MP, Roy Hattersley MP, Mr R Bacon a di rector of 
Securicor, Mr P W Rabbitts of the International Professional 
Security Association, various Chief Officer of Police and 
various other commentators. The atti tude statements were 
selected to be representative of the following perspectives. 
a) Junior Partner 
b) Economic 
d) Radical 
e) Consumer Hypothesis 
The attitude statements represented views rather than 
verbatim quotes and were so constructed as to be positive 
statements about private security except for two statements 
which were not only negative but addressed the same issue as 
previous positive statements. The negative statements were 
included as a control by the researcher who had made an 
arbitrary decision that where 80 (per cent) of respondents 
made directly opposite responses to these statements it could 
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be reasonably assumed that responde t n s were reading and 
understanding the statements, e.g. 
"I believe that security officers in shopping centres are 
well trained for what they do." 
"I believe th~t security officers in shopping centres are 
not well tra1ned for the job that they do." 
The negative statements were purely a control and were not 
summed when the completed attitude statements were scored. 
A pilot list of seventeen statements was administered to 
twenty subjects. Each item on the scale was required to meet 
two conditions. 
a) It tended to be responded to in the same way 
b) It elicited the same response in at least 60 (per 
cent) of responses (Arnold and Robertson 1991). 
Four statements failed to meet these condi tions and were 
rejected. A revised list of thirteen statements, two of 
which were controls was piloted in the field using a further 
twenty subjects. All the statements in the revised list were 
found to elicit a similar response of between 60-70 (per 
cent) . 
The final list of thirteen attitude statements contained two 
control statements and were despatched to: 
a) Assistant General Manger, P & 0 Shopping Centres Ltd 
b) Manchester City Council, Security Section 
c) Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors 
d) Centre Manager, Hounds Hill Shopping Centre, 
Blackpool 
e) Ravenscroft Properties Ltd 
f) Land Securities Properties Ltd 
of these only three were returned by: 
a) Assistant General Manger, P & 0 Shopping Centres Ltd 
who is responsible for the Manchester Arndale Centre. 
b) Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors who are responsible 
for the Merseyway Shopping Centre and the Lanes 
Carlisle. The researcher was requested by 
Donaldsons not to contact the Corporate owners 
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as they would merely forward any correspondence 
to Donaldsons. 
c) The Centre Manager, Houndshill Shopping Centre, 
Blackpool. 
The researcher also requested permission from t2 -= management 
of the five sites visited to approach business operators and 
members of the public with the list of attitude statements. 
Permission was granted to carry out research at: 
a) The Manchester Arndale Centre 
b) The Merseyway Shopping Centre 
c) The Lanes Shopping Centre, Carlisle 
Of the six corporate owners approached by the researcher only 
three completed their Likert Scale attitude instruments. The 
eleven attitude statements were scored and the results are 
presented below. 
COrpOR]\TE O'>1lIERS 
ATTITUDE: RATING 1 2 3 I <\ I 5 I DONT KNOW AGREE DISJ\GREE Is-~~~~-.r ATTITUDE: STRONGLY AGREE .... \. ...... V-.J. 
STATEMF:NT No. J O:S';::;:1.::: 
1 G 
2 2 2 
3 <\ I, 
4 3 0 I 
5 15 
G I 15 
7 2 ·2 I 
I 
8 1 <\ I 
I 
9 4 I 10 
I 
10 2 2 " I 
11 1 4 I ! 
8 24 3 I 16 I 40 
the lower the The more positive an attitude response was 
h se "strongly agree" scored score it rated such that t e respon 
1 and "strongly disagree" scored 5. 
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The formula: 
100 
Total No of attitude statements x subject 
------------------------ --------
------
Total Column Rating x Attitude Rating 
was devised to give a percentage score. 
The scores for each rating as 1 . app 1 cabl e to each of the 
eleven attitude statements was calculat d ( e see over). The 
percentage positive, negative and Don't K now responses are 
presented in the table below. 
PERCEPTIQN 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
POLICE PAY 
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
QF 
PREDomNANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
CORPORATE OWNERS 
POSITIVE DONT KNOW 
PER CENT 
100 
·100 
66 
33 
100 
100 
100 
/100 
100 
NEGATIVE I 
PER CENT t 
,I 
33 
66 
100 
I! 
-
I: 
Ii 
I 
The researcher approached business operators and members of 
the public in all three establishments. Within the Arndale 
Centre forty business operators of various type and size were 
approached, this being approximately 20 ( per cent) of the 
total number of businesses within the centre. Of the forty 
businesses approached twenty one agreed to complete the list 
of attitude statements. Reasons for not wishing to assist in 
the research included, it being contrary to company policy to 
discuss security arrangements, this despite the fact that the 
research instrument had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
security arrangements of either the individual business or 
the shopping centre itself. 
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CORPORATE OWNERS 
% Score for strongly agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 3 
8 x 1 
% Score for agree 
= 100 8 
33 x 1 
100 
Total No.of attitude statements x subjects 
= 24. 2"~ 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 3 
24 x 2 
% Score for dont know 
= 
100 
100 
33 x 
24 
2 
= 36.4% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 
3 
3 
x 3 
% Score for disagree 
= 100 
33 x 
100 
3 
3 
= 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 
16 
3 = 
x 4 
% Score for strongly disagree 
100 
100 
33 x 
16 
4 
= 12.1% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects Attitude rating 
Total column rating x 
= 
100 
11 x 
40 
3 = 
x 5 
100 
33 x 
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40 
5 
= 24. 2"~ 
Other business operators flatly refused to have anything to 
do with the research giving no reason for their refusal and 
some became quite hostile when the researcher tried to more 
fully explain the purpose of the research. 
The twenty one attitude statements completed by the business 
operators in the Arndale centre were scored and the results 
presented below. 
THE M!\NCHESTER 1\rulDi\LE CEllTRE· 
ATTITUDE RATING 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
ATT.ITUDE STRONGLY AGREE .r AGREE I DONT KNOW I DISAGREE \ STRONGLY STATEMENT No. DISAGREE 
, 
" •• :I~ CI , 
"-:.'''1"''"''''''' "" .... 1 <\ JG 12 I 15 1 
2 1 16 I 10 24 I 
3 <\ I 24 20 I 20 
4 1 2 I 9 44 I 25 
5 1 2 \ 12 36 I 30 
6 3 60 I 25 
7 1 8 J 48 I 15 
8 11 20 I 
.. 
J 56 I 25 9 2 
10 2 10 27 
" 
I 
11 1 4 33 28 I 
19 J 80 J 168 I 340 I 155 
calculated as percentages of predominent These scores were 
and t he results are presented overleaf. attitude response 
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MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
% Score for str<mgly agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 21 
19 
% Score for agree 
x 1 = 
100 
100 
231 x 
19 
1 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 21 
80 x 
% Score for dont knov 
= 2 
100 
100 
231 x 
80 
2 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 21 
.=...=:..-...:;..;=-= x 
168 
% Score for disagree 
= 3 
100 
100 
231 x 
168 
3 
x Attitude ~ating 
= 
x Attitude rating 
= 17.3"10 
x Attitude rating 
= 24.2% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 21 
340 x 4 
% Score for strongly disagree 
= 
100 
100 
231 x 
340 
4 
= 36.7% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 21 
155 
= 
x 5 
100 
231 x 
137 
155 
5 
= 13.4% 
PERCEPTION OF 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION. 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
.POLICE PAY 
-
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDOHINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
THE MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
POSITIVE DONT KNON 
PER CENT 
14 57 
43 29 
10 38 
10 14 
7 10 
.. 
10 5 
100 
5 5 
52 43 
15 52 
NEGATIVE 
PER CENT 
29 
29 
52 
76 
83 
85 
90 
5 
33 
Only twenty members of the publ ic agreed to complete the 
research instrument al though perhaps close to a hundred 
people were approached. There appeared to be three distinct 
reactions to the research and the researcher when an approach 
was made. The predominant response was either to totally 
ignore the researcher or to make a curt refusal and hurry 
away. Some members of the public did at least listen to the 
researcher but once they were aware of the topic of the 
research said that they did not know enough about security to 
comment. Of the twenty who actually completed the 
instrument, they did take some time and appeared to think 
about what they were reading, quite often apologising to the 
researcher when they marked an atti tude statement wi th "Don't 
Know", as if they felt that perhaps they should know. The 
twenty attitude statements completed by members of the public 
in the Arndale centre were scored and the results are 
presented in the table overleaf. 
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Ttm ;·;ru;'C:'lE5't'4R ARlIDALE CEnTRE (~ 
--- -- .~~~ERS ·OF THE PUBLIC) 
ATTITUDE RATING 1 2 
. I 3 \ 4 \ 5 
ATTITUDE STRONGLY AGREE AGREE \ DONT KNml \ DISAGRZE \ S~RO"-' v ..I.. ..~~ ...... 
STATEMENT No. DISAGREE 
I 221S 1 2 45 12 I 5 
2 8 36 16 
3 8 30 20 I 10 
4 6 18 40 5 
5 4 12 40 20 
00 
6 2 . 24 44 
7 1 18 21 12 I 
8 3 18 18 8 I 
o 9 6 39 4 I 
10 4 48 8 \ 
11 1 22 21 4 I 
5 98 312 208 l 
The above scores were then calculated as percentages of 
predominent attitude response and the results are presented 
below. 
PER~EPTIQN QF 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
POLICE PAY 
-
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDOHINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE 
HEHBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
POSITIVE DONT KNOW 
rE:E CENT 
5 75 
20 60 
20 50 
15 30 
8 30 
50 35 
60 30 
15 65 
10 80 
60 35 
NEGATIVE 
II PER CENT 
20 I: 
20 II 
30 I 
55 
62 i 
I 
15 
I 
10 
Ii 
5 
Ji 
10 
Ii 
5 Ii 
II 
Similar reactions by both business operators and members of 
the public were experienced in the Merseyway Shopping Centre. 
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MANCHESTER ARNDALE CENTRE 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
% Score for strcmg1y agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 20 
5 x 1 
% Score for agree 
= 
100 
100 5 
220 x '1 = 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 20 
98 x 2 
% Score for dont knov 
= 
100 
100 98 
220 x 2 
= 22 .. 3<'10 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 20 
312 x 3 
% Score for disagree 
= 
100 
100 312 
220 x-3 
= 47.3% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~ x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 20 4 
208 x 
= 
% Score for strong1y disagree 
100 
100 208 
220 x-4 
= 23.6% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects Attitude rating 
. x Total column ratIng 
= 
100 
11 x 20 
40 x 5 
= 100 40 
220 x 5 
140 
= 
The researcher approached fi fteen businesses in the L';erseyway 
Shopping Centre this being approximately 20-25 (per cent) of 
the businesses forming the shopping centre proper. Reasons 
for refusing to complete the instrument were either that it 
was contrary to company policy or that the business operators 
were too busy. 
The seven attitude statement instruments completed by the 
business operators in the Merseyway shopping centre were 
scored and the results are presented below. 
STOCKPORT MERSEYHAY SHOPPING CENTRE (BUSINESS OPEPviTQRS) 
ATTITUDE RATING 1 2 I 3 \ 4 I 5 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE I DONT KNOW I DISAGREE I ;~~~~~~~ ATTITUDE STATEMENT No" . 
1 18 4 I 
2 G 6 0 I 
I 
3 2 12 4 I 5 
4 3 16 I 10 
5 1 2 6 8 I 5 
6 24 1 5 
7 6 . " 12 I 10 
8 3 8 I 
9 20 I 10 
10 8 9 I 
11 12 8 J 
4 26 72 104 I 45 
The above scores were then calculated as a percentage of 
t attl"tude response and the results are tabulated predominen 
overleaf. 
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MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE 
STOCKPORT 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
% Score for stroogly agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude-siatements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
100 
= 11 x 7 
4 x 1 = 100 4 77 x 1 
% Score for agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 7 2 
26 x 
= 100 26 
77 x 2 
% Score for dont know 
100 
Total No.of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 7 3 
72 x 
% Score for disagree 
= 
100 
100 72 
77 x 3 
= 
x Attitude rating 
= 
x Attitude rating 
= 31. 2"10 
Total No. of attitude-siatements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 7 4 
104 x 
% Score for strongly disagree 
= 
100 
100 104 
77 x -4-
= 33.7% 
Total No. of attitude-statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 x 5 
40 
= 100 
77 
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40 
x-
5 
= 10.4"10 
PERCE PT IO~~ OF 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY HI':'H 
POLICE PAY 
--
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRH!E 
PREVENTIO~i 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDONINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
STOCKPORT MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
POSITIVE I DO~;T K~;O'r-l I ~;::::::.;::' IV =-PER CENT I ?::? CE~;T , 
I I 86 I l~ 42 I 29 I 29 29 57 I 1~ 
14 I 85 14 14 I 71 
71 I 28 I 
100 I I 
100 
I 
57 42 
I··. 
57 I 28 
I 
; 
I 
" I, 
" 
I' I! 
" I' 
Of approximately fifty members of the public approached only 
fourteen agreed to complete the research instrument. The 
reactions to the researcher were very simi 1 ar to those 
experienced in the Arndale Centre. 
The fourteen attitude statements completed by members of the 
public were scored and the results presented in the table 
below. 
STOCKPORT' HERSEYWlI.Y SHOPPING CENTRE (!-!E:-mERS OF ~HE PY"lL!C' 
I I 2 I J. I I, I 5 ATTITUDE RATING 1 
I (:.::,::,. ~ I DON:' K!:'''; ] D:S.;GRES I S-"'~"-T '( .... ,." .. ""' ...... ATTITUDE STRONGLY AGREE ::S,\C?:::E STATEMENT No. 1.1' IOU'E'd'QI: .. ! •• H._ . 1I •• lg 
1 1 2 I JO I -. 
2 1 4 27 I 8 I 
3 0 I l2 I 2-' I S 
4 1 <\ 6 I 32 I 5 
5 <\ 12 I 3: I 
6 2 10 I 2·', I 
7 1 <\ I 15 I l~ 1 C 
8 10 27 i ~ 
--
9 :2 10 4 ! 5 
10 G 27 0 i 
. 0 I 5 24 11 1 4 
I I :16 :55 30 I. GO ~-~ 5 ==-= -=--==.:-...=.::...---=-=-:::.==-=~=-- =-:......--=---=-::--~ .-
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% Score for strang1y agree 
MERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE 
STOCKPORT 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 14 x 1 
5 
% Score for agree 
100 
100 5 
154 x 1 
= 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 14 
60 x 2 
% Score for dont knov 
= 
100 
100 60 
154 x 2 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 14 
216 x 3 
% Score for disagree 
= 100 216 
154 x 3 
100 
= 19.4% 
x Attitude rating 
= 46.7% 
Total No. of attitude-8tatements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 14 x 4 
156 
= 
% Score for strong1y disagree 
100 
100 156 
154 x 4 
= 25.3% 
Total No. of attitude-8tatements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 14 x 5 
154 
= 100 13 
154 x 5 
144 
= 
The above scores were then calculated 
as percentages of the 
predominent attitude response and the 
results are tabulated 
below. 
PERCEPTION 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
POLICE PAY 
--
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
STOCKPORT HERSEYWAY SHOPPING CENTRE 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
OF POSITIVE DONT KNOW NEGATIVE 
PER CENT PER CENT 
14 71 7 
21 64 H 
28 28 43 
21 14 64 
11 36 51 
21 35 44 
35 65 
. 42 42 14 
21 65 14 
" 
14 65 14 
In the Lanes Shopping Centre, there was the obvious variable 
of no private policing service being available but the 
researcher al so became aware of a number of unforeseen 
variables. Ten business operators were approached of whom 
seven agreed to complete the research instrument. 
The seven attitude statements instruments completed by the 
business operators were scored and the results are presented 
overleaf. 
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ATTITUDE RATING 1 2 3 I 
\ 
4 
\ 
5 
ATTITUDl': STRONGLY AGREE AGRl':E \ DO NT KNOW \ C!SAG?-EE 
---~ 
STATl':HENT No .. 
I S':'ROSG:'Y 
O:SAG"SE 
1 ! 2 12 \ t, 
2 I, 12 
" 
J 9 0 10 
I, 2 3 16 5 
5 3 20 5 
6 3 :G :0 
7 G 16 
a I, 6 
9 2 20 5 
10 2 9 I ~2 
11 I, 9 0 
I, 30 GO 121, 35 
The scores were then calculated as percentages of the 
predominant 
below. 
attitude response and the results tabulated 
PER~EPTION QF 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
POLICE PAY 
-
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIHE 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDOMINANT ~TTITUDE RESPONSE 
THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
POSITIVE DONT KNOW 
NE:GATIVE: 
PER CENT 
PE:R CEN:' 
I 14 57 14. 
28 57 14. 
42 57 
28 14 
57 
-
14 85 
57 
42 
100 
£5 
14 
14 42 
~2 
~2 28 28 
I 
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THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE 
CARLISLE 
BUSINESS OPERATORS 
% Score for strongly agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 
4 
% Score for agree 
x 1 = 
100 
100 x 
77 .. 
4 
1 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 x 2 
30 
% Score for dont knov 
= 100 x 30 
77 2 
100 
= 5.2% 
x Attitude rating 
= 19.4% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 x 3 
60 
% Score for disagree 
= 100 x 60 
77 3 
= 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 x 4 
124 
= 
% Score for strongly disagree 
100 
= 40. 27~ 
Total No. of attitude-5tatements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 7 x 5 
55 
= 100 x 55 
77 5 
= 
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The researcher was eventually approached by the Centre 
Manager and asked to explain his presence in the Centre. In 
spite of the fact that Donaldsons had granted permission for 
the research to be conducted the Centre manager insisted that 
he did not wish his customers or the business operators to be 
pestered by people conducting surveys. He did, however, 
indicate that for the sum of forty pounds per day payable to 
him the annoyance to hi s customers might in some way be 
lessened. The researcher refused to pay and moved to the 
public library which is also situated in the centre. The 
object of the research was explained to the librarian and the 
researcher was allowed to approach members of the publ ic 
using the library. The reaction to the researcher was 
similar to that experienced in the Arndale Centre and the 
Merseyway Shopping Centre except that many of the forty two 
people who agreed to complete the research instrument were 
only too willing to give their views on a list of topics 
which, while extremely interesting, were in no way related to 
this research. 
The forty two atti tude statement instruments completed by 
members of the publ ic in the Lanes were scored and the 
results are presented below. 
THE Li'\m;s SHOpPHIG CENTRE CARLISLE . HEloffiERS OF THE PU13LIC 
. .' 
ATTITUDE RATING 1 2 3 4 5 
IDS-I" [1.s0l\G~;GRE"'· E'[ ATTITUDE STRONGLY AGREE ~'S~T~A~TE~M~EN~T~N:O~'~~::~~~~~~ ____ ~~~~+-~ __ ~~ __ -i ____ ~~ ____ ~ __ -:~:::::1 
/:- 20\ 5 1C=====21====~L-----22------~----~2~2------t-----;66~----t-----:44~--~1===~1~O======i ~=====j~~=====t=====~~=======~====~2~:======t=====~~ :~=====1=====;~=::::::::i::::::::::::::::::::::::l r::::::::::j:t::::::::::f::::::::::~2::::=====}====~4=0======+=====~~;4o~ _-_-_-_---1t-_-_-_-_~~~:~~86 =::::::::~::::::::~G~o::::::::::=l ~1t=====~~~====r=========~~,-h-----5~6~----+---~'~'~~0~2-----i----~1~:~:----~============: 
AGREE DONT KNOW DISAGREE 
[====~~====r=====~~----~--~~-----+~---;18~~--i---~1~O~4=====lI============ 8 . 2 16 6 I ' 24 1 6 . 48 I 
9 96 16 I 12 ' 10 GO 24 I 11 I 540 I r::::::::::::J::::=2~4~====~====!2~42~====~==~5~O~4======~==~~======. 
8 16 
75 
148 
THE LANES SHOPPING CENTRE 
CARLISLE 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
% Score for strong1y agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating x Attitude rating 
100 
= 11 x 42 24 x 1 
= 100 24 
462 x 1 
% Score for agree 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 42 
242 x 2 
% Score for dont know 
= 
100 
100 242 
462 x 2 
Total No. of Attitude statements x subjects 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 42 x 3 
504 
% Score for disagree 
= 100 504 
462 x 3 
100 
= 
x Attitude rating 
= 26.1% 
x Attitude rating 
= 36.4% 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
= 
100 
11 x 42 x 4 
540 
% Score for strong1y disagree 
= 100 540 
462 x 4 
100 
Total No. of attitude statements x subjects x Attitude rating 
Total column rating 
100 
= 11 x 42 
75 x 5 
= 100 75 
462 x 5 
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= 
The above scores were then calculated 
as percentages of the 
predominent attitude response and are presented bel 0""; • 
PERCEPTION OF 
VETTING 
SUPERVISION 
PAY 
PARITY WITH 
POLICE PAY 
REGULATION 
PRIVATE 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 
PREVENTION 
SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
COOPERATION 
WITH POLICE 
TRAINING 
PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE RESPONSE 
THE ~ES SHOPPING CENTRE CARLISLE 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
POSITIVE DONT KNOW NEGATIVE EEB CEUI PER CENT 
31 52 17 
9 60 31 
43 57 
52 19 28 
19 82 
66 9 24 
24 14 62 
71 19 10 
14 76 10 
". 
38 48 14 
The Chief Constables of Greater Manchester Police and 
Lancashire and Cumbria Constabulary were contacted and asked 
for permission to undertake the research in thei r force 
areas. As well as granting permission all these Chief 
Officers nominated a contact officer and offered any 
assistance that the researcher might require. Greater 
Manchester Pol ice very kindly submi tted the proposed research 
instrument to their Development and Inspectorate Department. 
A number of questions concerning the research instrument were 
raised by the department. The researcher felt that he had 
addressed these questions in designing the research but 
welcomed the opportunity to revisit them aided by another 
pOint of view. 
The questions raised by the department included: 
a) "The questionnaire requires a lot of knowledge 
about security officers and their role which 
respondents may not have" 
The Development and Inspectorate Department were 
evaluating the research instrument without 
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benefit of the foregoing three chapters in 
which the researcher hypothesised that the 
different categories of respondents 
(i) Corporate Owners 
(ii) Business Operators 
(iii) Members of the Public 
were likely to have differing levels of knowledge and 
control in connection with private security. 
b) "The questionnaire does not appear to test the 
hypotheses stated as it does not ask about the 
satisfaction of customers towards "private 
policing" only about their attitudes. In addition 
there appear to be no questions inquiring if 
the respondent is a customer/user" 
In earlier chapters the researcher had examined the 
connections between attitudes and customer 
satisfaction (Rosenberg and Hovland 1960) 
(Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993) (Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980) and he intended to use the data concerning 
attitudes together with evidence from the 
observational study and any anecdotal evidence 
when arriving at conclusions. Since the 
instrument was administered by the researcher 
he was aware of the status of the respondent. 
c) "The layout of the instrument could be improved 
by more space between the statements." 
The researcher accepts this as a valid comment. 
d) "As all the statements provide the same response 
(strongly agree, agree, etc) it would be better 
to alternate the response, for example the first 
five questions could start with Strongly Agre~ 
and the next five Strongly Disagree, etc. ThlS 
will mean that respondents are required to think 
about their responses to each of the statement~ " 
rather than circling the same response every tlme 
The responses to the statements were standard 
Likert type responses and the researcher chose to 
build in a slightly more subtle check of respondent 
f th statements which is detailed understanding 0 e 
below in response to other criticisms. 
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e) "No instructions were given as to where and when 
to return the instrument, nor who the instrument 
is from." 
The instrument was admini stered by th e researcher and 
any information required was provided personally by 
him. This strategy was adopted as a means of 
maximising response. 
f) "No clarification is given as to whether the 
:efer7nc7 to s~opping malls concerns all those 
1n Br1ta1n or Just, for example, the Manchester 
Arndale Centre." 
Again this information was provided verbally by 
the researcher. 
Further criticisms were raised in connection with specific 
statements. 
Statement 1 
"If respondents are not aware of pre-employment checks will 
they be able to comment on them being satisfactory?" 
The previous chapters which the Development and Inspectorate 
Department had not seen indicated that the researcher 
expected different levels of awareness from the different 
categories of respondent "Shopping Malls" is a very American 
term it may be better rephrased as "shopping centres". 
The researcher contends that this is matter of opinion. Mall 
is defined as: 
"A public walk, originally a place where Pall-Mall was 
played." (The Concise English Dictionary 1968). 
Since one of the most famous public walks in the world is 
called Pall-Mall and is situated in the centre of London the 
opinion stated above does not appear to rest on any 
linguistic, historical or geographical matter of fact. 
Statement 2 
"Will respondents be aware of how securi ty officers are 
supervised?" 
It was the researchers contention that levels of awareness 
would depend on the category of respondent. 
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statement 3 
"Do respondents know how much security off' 
f th 'd " lcers are paid'> I ey are pal well who lS thlS in com a ' , . 
person answering the question, a top busin~s~lson wlth - the 
in part-time work, etc?" person, someone 
Much of the literature on private security indicates that 
security officers are poorly paid and have to work long hours 
to achieve a living wage. It was the researchers contention 
that awareness or indeed concern with the literature would 
depend on respondent status. 
Statement 4 
"The comments to Statement 3 al so appl y . In addi t i on wi 11 
respondents be aware of the pay scale of police officers?" 
As a result of the Police and Criminal Justice Act and the 
Sheehy Inquiry police pay and conditions were given 
substantial media coverage both in the press and on 
television to the extent that the least politically aware 
person in the country would have had some rough idea of what 
police officers earn. 
Statement 5 
"Respondents may be unaware as to why government may wish to 
licence firms of security officers." 
The whole point of this statement is that government do not 
wish to licence firms of security officers, what the 
researcher was concerned wi th, was whether the electorate saw 
such a need. 
Statement 6 
"Will respondents be aware of Police Discipline regulations?" 
The researcher would have been surpri sed if any of the 
respondents had a detailed knowledge of the police Discipline 
Regulations but it is evident from the number of complaints 
against police in general that respondents would be aware 
that a regulatory mechanism exists in respect of the police. 
Statement 7 
"Compared to serving who? I presume this refers to serving 
members of the public or business?" 
Statement 7 represent a radical perspective which sees the 
153 
police enforcing state law, and private security 
enforcing 
property. As a 
Likert scale it invites an instant 
the rights associated wi th ownership of 
statement in a 
the statement 
implied. 
Statement 9 
response to 
and therefore no comparison was intended or 
"This is a subjective statement as it depends on the 
respondents view of whether the government control the public 
or not. This also assumes that the government currently 
controls the public." 
Precisely! The radical view sees the government as 
controlling the public by use of the police and private 
securi ty. Responses to such statements were intended to give 
a rough guide as to the most prevalent concept of private 
security, i.e. junior partner, economic or radical. All the 
statements in the instrument were subjective being based on 
statements in the media credited to such diverse personages 
as Mr Bruce George MP, Mr Roy Hattersley MP, Mr R Bacon, a 
Director of Securicor Ltd, Mr Patrick Rabbitts of the 
International Professional Security Association and a number 
of Chief Officers of Police. 
Statement 10 
"Do security officers work with the police? If they do, will 
all respondents know if they work "well" together? Work well 
doing what?" 
What the researcher hoped to establish was whether the 
respondents perceived any co-operat i on between pol ice and 
private security. Such perception would have implications 
for customer satisfaction (Rosenberg and Hovland 1960) (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 1980) (Eiser and Van der Pligt 1993) and would 
indicate which of the five stages in the relationship between 
police and private security identified by Stenning (1989) was 
perceived by respondents as existing at present. 
Statement 11 
Statement lIon the actual attitude scale inventory was UI 
believe security officers in shopping centres seldom work 
with the police" . The development and inspectorate 
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department felt that like Statement 10 this statement 
be subjected to the same question. 
should 
"Do security officers work with the police? If the do 
all respondents know if they work "well" tog th ') Y , will 
doing what? II e er. Work well 
Statement 11 was not scored it was included purely as a 
control, being the opposi te of statement 10. The sole 
purpose of this statement was to allow the researcher to 
determine whether respondents were reading and understanding 
the statements. It was arbitrarily decided by the researcher 
that if 80 (per cent) of respondents gave opposite responses 
to statements 10 and 11 then responses could be regarded as 
valid. 
Statement 12 
"What training are security officers given? If the 
respondent is not aware of the training they will not be able 
to comment on how good it is." 
Again the researcher expected very different levels of 
knowledge for the various categories of respondents and 
therefore different responses. 
Statement 13 
"In addition statement 12 is a duplicate of 13, i.e. if a 
respondent agrees to question 12 then they disagree to 
question 13." 
Exactly! and if 80 (per cent) of respondents show this trend 
then the instrument can be considered valid. 
The researcher was aware from the outset that the research 
would never meet the stringent requirements of a laboratory 
experiment and expected to experience some difficul ty in 
finding sufficient subjects to co-operate in the research. 
Due to the small numbers who were willing to complete the 
research instrument no attempt to extrapolate the findings of 
the research to the whole of the Security Industry would be 
possible. As stated earlier the object of the research was 
to provide a snapshot of one small sector of the Industry at 
a particular moment in time. 
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Although the researcher felt that he could defend his 
research instruments against the criticisms levelled by the 
Greater Manchester Police evaluation, he fel tit necessary to 
acknowledge these concerns. 
3. Problems Encountered 
The researcher had hoped to conduct a number of informal, 
interviews as used by Zweig (1948 & 1952) wi th security 
officers None of the security companies 
operating within the shopping centres studied answered the 
approaches of the researcher, so that the conducting of Zweig 
type interviews was not possible. The researcher did, 
however manage to engage people in conversation in all of the 
centres visi ted and fel t that their remarks were worth 
themselves. 
recording and considering with the data obtained by the non-
participational observational study and the atti tude 
statements instrument. 
In the Arndale Centre the researcher managed to speak to a 
member of the Manchester Market Pol ice wi th whom he was 
acquainted. It was ascertained that these officers are not 
attested constables but are Peace Officers deri ving the power 
to enforce market bye-laws under the Manchester Markets Act 
1879. The only power of arrest available to these officers 
is that of a citizen. Although the Markets police officers 
do not have full police powers they did appear to have more 
powers within their particular sphere of influence than the 
officers employed by Secureurop. What was particularly 
interesting was the fact that the Ci ty Counci 1 had been 
considering replacing the Market Police wi th contracted 
private securi ty as a less expensive means of providing 
policing services within the city's Markets, however this had 
eventually been decided against. The officer spoken to was 
not in a position to enlighten the researcher as to what had 
informed the council's decision to retain its more expensive 
police force, but it would not be unreasonable to assume 
that, the increased powers available to its officers, and the 
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direct control enjoyed by the Council had some effect on the 
decision. 
the security officers 
conversation. As a 
The researcher managed to engage one of 
in the Merseyway Shopping Centre in 
result of this conversation it 
was established that 
Donaldsons Chartered Surveyors have their own sec . t 
urI y guards 
responsible for policing some of the properties they manage, 
this includes the Merseyway Shopping Centre. The officers in 
the shopping centre do not go into the stores that abut, but 
do not form part of the centre, unless they are asked to. 
The officer saw himself as a deterrent in the prevention of 
theft. He also said that it was part of his remit to prevent 
public order offences such as drunkenness and begging and 
also to prevent the riding of bicycles in the centre. He 
said that the local police were always passing through the 
centre and that a good relationship existed between police 
and security guards. 
with this officer 
It was obvious from the brief exchange 
that he saw his role as much crime 
preventative as loss preventative. 
Donaldsons also managed the Lanes Shopping Centre in Carlisle 
but no security guards operate there. However, one business 
operator who completed the atti tude statement instrument also 
provided the researcher with much useful anecdotal evidence. 
It would appear the there had been a number of disturbances 
in the shopping centre caused by youths engaging in general 
"hooliganism". These disturbances were short lived and the 
youths had disappeared by the time Cumbria Constabulary had 
arrived. Business operators worried about the effect of such 
incidents on their businesses had formed a committee to bring 
pressure to bear on the City Council and Donaldsons with a 
view to employing security guards. The lady providing this 
information had mixed feelings about such a move since as a 
result of the disturbances private security had been employed 
in her store. Three guards were employed on a shift basis 
and she only felt comfortable in her own store when one of 
I ill at these guards was on duty, the other two made her fee 
ease. 
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Eventually money began to disappear from the bags of staff 
left in the rest room, this had not been a problem before and 
ceased as soon as the guards ceased to be employed in the 
store. 
The data collected was analysed and the results obtained are 
discussed in the context of those areas identified as 
problematical by previous research. 
4. Analysis of the Data 
The resul ts of the analysis of the data represents the 
perceptions of 3 corporate owners, 35 business operators and 
76 shopping public. 
As expected by the researcher the predominant attitude 
responses of these three groups of users varied considerably. 
The percentage responses for positive/negative attitudes and 
Don't Knows for each group are presented in table form below. 
P'REDOHINANT ATTITUDE 
COMPARISON OF CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS, 
PERCENTAGES I . 
'. POSITIVE DONT KNOW NEGATIVE 
CORPORATE BUSINESS SHOPPING CORPORATE BUSINESS SHOPPING CORPORATE BUSINESS SHOPPING 
OWNERS OPER..TORS PUBLIC, OWNERS OPERATORS PUBLIC 
VETTING 100 9 17 67 66 
SUPERVISE 100 38 17 3B 61 
PAY' 66 13 30 46 45 
PARITY 13 29 33 14- 21 
WITH 
POLICE 
REGULATE 7 6 13 28 
PRIVATE 100 41 46 11 26 
JUSTICE 
CRIME - ioo lOa 40 36 
PREVENT. 
SOCIAL 100 40 43 2 42 
CONTROL , 
COOPERATE 100 41 15 42 74 
WITH 
POLICE 
TRAINING 100 14 37 SO 49 
The researcher sought to make comparisons 
perceptions of private security identified 
1971. 
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OWNERS OPERATORS PUDLIC 
19 
2·\ 
33 <l1 
66 73 
100 79 
47 
5B 
16 
30 I 
with the negative 
by The Rand Report 
15 
22 
3S 
·\9 
6S 
2B 
2~ 
10 
11 
11 
I 
I 
The results are also used to test Consumer Hypoth ' 
eses pos 1 ted 
by the researcher. 
a) Vetting 
Only three corporate owners were polled but they were 
unanimous in believing that the vetting of security officers 
employed in their centres was satisfactory I al though they 
stressed that they were not prepared to comment on the 
vetting of officers employed at other shopping centres. The 
majority response from business operators (60 per cent) was 
that they knew little about how security officers were vetted 
and of those that did express an opinion twice as many tended 
towards 
perception. 
per cent) 
a negative perception than towards a positive 
A similar percentage of the shopping public (66 
claimed to know Ii ttle about the way securi ty 
were vetted and of those who expressed views I officers 
opinion was fairly even between negative and positive (15 
percent and l7 per cent respectively). In the centres 
studied attitudes to vetting were much more complex than The 
Rand Report would have suggested. Corporate owners expressed 
a highly posi ti ve atti tude in respect of those securi ty 
officers over whom they exercised control. Business 
operators and the shopping public to a large degree confessed 
ignorance of vetting procedures and were unable to form any 
perceptions I of those who did have a view I negative and 
positive perceptions appeared to be roughly balanced. 
The perceptions of corporate owners is born out to some 
extent by documentary evidence obtained by the researcher 
which suggests that many companies do carry out vetting to as 
high a standard as possible. Some companies require 
the dl'rect access to the Police National applicants to use 
Computer allowed under The Data Protection Act wi th the 
company paying the necessary fee (see Appendix B). Vetting 
so far as the majority of business operators and shopping 
public were concerned in the centres studied is not 
problematical. 
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b) Supervision 
Corporate owners expressed a unanimous posi tive atti tude 
towards the supervision of securi ty officers in their employ. 
Business operators were evenly divided (38 per cent) between 
a positive attitude towards supervision and lack 
knowledge, there was a negative perception (24 per cent) 
of 
but 
this was certainly not the predominant response. The 
predominant 
knowledge 
response of the 
(61 per cent) . 
shopping publ i c was I ack of 
In the centres studied the 
perceptions of supervision were largely positive where 
perceptions had been formed but in the main lack of knowledge 
prevented the formation of perceptions. 
c) Pay 
Two of the three corporate owners polled believed that the 
security officers in their employ were well paid, whilst one 
thought that they were poorly paid. Business operators were 
almost evenly divided in believing that security officers 
were poorly paid and professing no knowledge of their levels 
of pay (41 per cent and 46 per cent respecti vely) . The 
predominant response of the public was lack of knowledge with 
a roughly even distribution between positive and negative 
perceptions of levels of pay (30 per cent and 35 per cent 
respecti vely) . Again the obvious factor here is lack of 
knowledge particularly in respect of the shopping public and 
business operators. 
d) Parity with Police Pay 
On the question of whether security officers should receive 
the same pay as pol ice, two corporate owners responded 
negatively whilst one did not know. Business operators 
exhibited a strong negative response of parity of pay with 
police (73 per cent) whilst there was a roughly even 
distribution between lack of knowledge and a positive 
response (14 per cent and 13 per cent respectively). The 
overall public attitude towards parity of pay with police was 
negati ve (42 per cent) but less so than ei ther corporate 
owners or business operators. 
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Almost one third (29 per cent) of the public polled believed 
that security officers should receive 
The overall trend was towards a belief 
similar pay to police. 
that security officers 
pay as police, the researcher 
the majority of those polled 
should not receive the same 
concluded from this that 
perceived police and private security as performing different 
functions. The lower per cent age of shopping publ ic in 
comparison to percentage of corporate owners or business 
owners believing that private security should receive less 
pay than pol ice is consistent wi th the lack of knowledge 
about private security. 
e) Regulation 
Corporate owners were unanimous in agreeing the need for some 
form of government licencing or regulation. Business 
operators were also strongly in favour of regulation (79 per 
cent) with the shopping public also showing a strong positive 
response towards regulation (65 per cent). 
Many areas of the private security industry in America were 
shown by The Rand Report 1971 as being problematical the only 
area that this study revealed as producing a strong negative 
perception of private security was in the area of licencing 
and regulation. 
f) Private Justice 
All the corporate owners believed that the private security 
officers operating in their centres were there not only to 
serve their interests, but to serve the interests of business 
operators and shoppers alike. A large proportion of business 
operators (58 per cent) disagreed believing that the security 
officers employed in the shopping centres were there to serve 
their paymasters. Evidence of the strength of this belief 
was seen in the number of in-house security officers employed 
in the Arndale and Merseyway Centres. The predominant publ i c 
attitude (46 per cent) was that private security were not 
there simply to serve those who payed them. Those who 
t there to serve the believed that private security were no 
public was fairly evenly balanced by those who did not know 
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(28 per cent and 26 per cent respectively). The perceptions 
of private security meeting the needs of special interest 
groups appeared more complex than suggested by The Rand 
Report but tended towards a posi ti ve rather than negati ve 
perception. 
g) Crime Prevention 
Corporate owners were unanimous in their belief that security 
officers in their centres were employed to prevent crime and 
assist the public. Business operators were also unanimous on 
this point. Surprisingly the shopping public who had shown 
the strongest trend towards a belief that private security 
should receive similar pay to the police were less sure about 
the crime preventative role of private security. The 
predominant response was lack of knowledge (42 per cent) with 
slightly fewer believing there was a crime preventative role 
(40 per cent). The observational study of all sites failed 
to reveal one instance of a law enforcement function. The 
most evident activity of private security was their 
relentless patrolling of the centres. Although research has 
shown that patrolling has a limited effect on levels of crime 
(Bright 1969) it was not established whether people perceived 
patrolling as a crime prevention activity although there is 
a body of opinion that holds that this is the case. The 
observational study tended to support the junior partner 
perspective in respect of the centres observed since at no 
time was anything that could be remotely described as a law 
enforcement function carried out. 
h) Social Control 
Corporate owners did not believe that security officers in 
their shopping centres were a means whereby government 
control 1 ed the publ i c. In the 1 i ght of the response to 
t t radical theorist might previous attitude sta emen s a 
reasonably suggest that corporate owners saw pri vate securi ty 
as a means whereby they controlled the public whilst in their 
shopping centres. Surprisingly the predominant response of 
business operators (58 per cent) was that private security 
was a means of social control. 
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A radical theorist looking at pr " 
eVIOUS responses might 
suggest that as business operators appear t h " 
o ave lIttle or 
no control over the officers employed to pat 1 th 
ro e centres 
this may account for their perception that p" t " 
rlva e securIty 
exercise a controlling function They may f 
. go urther to 
suggest that it is not the controlling function itself that 
is objected to, but the lack of power in exercising control 
which would then explain why some stores found lOt n ecessary 
to employ their own guards. The shopping public showed a 
fai rly even di stribution between those who did not see 
private security as a means of social control and those who 
did not know (43 per cent and 42 per cent respecti vely) . 
Nothing was noted by the observer in any of the observational 
studies that would lead to the ordinary member of the public 
adopting a radical perspective in respect of private security 
operating in the centres. (5) 
i) Co-operation with the Police 
Corporate owners expressed a unanimous view that security 
officers co-operated wi th the police, however the 
observational study saw little evidence of this perceived 
co-operation. Certainly nothing approximating to the active 
partnership described by Stenning (1989) was evident. 
Business operators were evenly divided between those that did 
believe that there was co-operation between police and 
private security and those who did not know (41 per cent and 
42 per cent respecti vely). The predominant response from the 
shopping public was lack of knowledge (74 per cent). This 
did not surprise the researcher whose observations had 
revealed nothing of any potential for interaction with sworn 
or public law enforcement agencies (The Rand Report 1971). 
j) Training 
Corporate owners expressed satisfaction with the training of 
officers in their centres. The majority of business 
operators knew little about training (50 per cent) whilst a 
high proportion (30 per cent) believed security officers to 
~ poorly trained. 
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A similar proportion of the public (49 per t) . 
cen admItted a 
lack of knowledge about the training of sec . t . 
urI y offIcers 
whilst a high proportion (37 per cent) belie d th 
ve at they 
were well trained. The only clear trend here is a lack of 
knowledge about training. The perceptions of . 
securIty 
officers as being poorly trained disclosed by The Rand Report 
do not hold true for the shopping centres investigated by 
this research. 
k) Comparison of Consumer Views 
The perceptions of the three groups of consumers were 
different and particularly in respect of corporate owners who 
had a strongly positive attitude towards officers in their 
employ, although they did favour some form of licencing or 
regulation and did not believe that security officers should 
receive the same pay as police. 
Business operators expressed negative perceptions in the 
areas of regulation, private justice and social control and 
appeared to have little knowledge of the supervision, 
training and pay of security officers and the amount of co-
operation, if any, with the police. Since business operators 
pay for the security in the centres as a proportion of their 
rent, this lack of knowledge and indeed lack of power, may 
have some bearing on the negative perception. 
The predominant response of the public in respect of vetting, 
supervision, pay, training and co-operation with the police 
was lack of knowledge. They expressed negative perceptions 
towards security officers in respect of parity of pay with 
the police and regulation but had some positive perceptions 
in that they did not believe private security to be involved 
in the provision of a private justice system yet they did 
believe that private security had a crime prevention role. 
The overall atti tude of members of the public surveyed 
requires some qualification as there was some considerable 
variation in responses in different shopping centres. 
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The percentage atti tude response in respect of the th 
different centres is presented in ree table form below. 
PREDOMINANT ATTITUDE 
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC (ALL THREE SHOPPING CENT RES) 
POSITIVE DONT KNOW NEGATIVE 
ARNDALE MERSEYWAY THE LANES ARNDALE MERSEYWAY THE LANES ARNDALE HSRSEYWI\Y THE 
LAN::: 
VETTING 5 14 31 '75 71 52 20 7 I 17 
SUPERVISE 20 21 9 . 60 6-1 60 20 14 31 
PAY 20 20 43 50 20 57 30 4:) 
PARITY 15 21 52 30 H 19 55 64 20 
WITH 
POLICE 
REGULATE . 0 11. 30 36 19· 62 51 02 
PRIVATE 50 21 GG . 35 35 9 15' 44 21 
JUSTICE 
CRIME 60 35 2-1 30 • G5 14 10 62 
PREVENT. 
SOCIAL 15 42 71 '65 42 19 5 H 10 
CONTROL . , 
COOPERATE 10 21 H 00 65 76 10 14 10 
WITH 
POLICE 
TRAINING 60 14 38 35 65 ,48 5 14 14 
Whilst the predominant response to the question of vetting in 
the Arndale and Merseyway centres was one of lack of 
knowledge (75 per cent and 71 per cent respectively), the 
predominant response though similar was not so marked in the 
Lanes shopping centre (52 per cent) even though no private 
security is employed. Although the predominant response to 
the question of pay was lack of knowledge the responses for 
individual centres was markedly different, Arndale (50 per 
cent) Merseyway (28 per cent) The Lanes (51 per cent). 
165 
I 
; , 
! j 
Where perceptions were admitted these were t t 11 . 
. 0 a Y Opposlng, 
in The Lanes a hIgh proportion bel ieved se . t . CUrl y offlcers 
were well paid (43 per cent) whilst in the M 
erseyway centre 
the same proportion (45 per cent) believed they were not well 
paid. 
On the question of regulation the general trend in all three 
si tes was towards a negative perception but of varying 
strengths, Arndale (62 per cent) Merseyway (51 per cent) and 
The Lanes (82 per cent). There was a general trend towards 
a posi ti ve response in respect of provision of a private 
justice system, Arndale (50 per cent) Merseyway (21 per cent) 
and The Lanes (66 per cent) but the responses were markedly 
different with those polled in the Merseyway centre showing 
a predominantly negative response (44 per cent). There was 
no uniformi ty at all in the responses to the question of 
social control. On the question of co-operation wi th the 
police there was a strong trend towards lack of knowledge, 
Arndale (80 per cent) Merseyway (65 per cent) and The Lanes 
(76 per cent). 
at complete 
The question of training also drew responses 
variance. It should be noted that the 
percentages quoted are based on small numbers of respondents. 
The different results obtained at The Lanes shopping centre 
could be explained away by the fact that no private security 
are employed there, that the centre is in a different police 
area than the other two centres, that it falls within the 
sphere of responsibility of a County rather than a 
Metropolitan Police force. Most of the respondents polled in 
The Lanes were polled in the public library which may well 
have made them less representative of the shopping public 
than respondents in either of the other two centres. 
It is more difficult however to account for the vast 
di fference in responses between the Arndale and Merseyway 
centres. Whilst it is possible that the size and 
configuration of the developments and the different styles of 
have had some effect on responses, the policing may 
researcher felt that the only safe conclusion to draw from an 
analysis of the responses of the shopping public was that 
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there is overwhelming evidence of a general lack 
of knowledge 
about private security in shOpping centres. 
1) Proving the Hypotheses 
The researcher proposed three hypotheses all of which were 
borne out to some extent by the research. 
(i) Hypothesis A 
"Consumer ~t~i tu~e towards a service provider will 
s~ow a posltl~e lncrease as his/her satisfaction 
wlth the serVlce provided increases" 
The atti tude of corporate owners tended to be 
highly positive towards those security officers 
employed solely for their purposes and a high 
degree of satisfaction was claimed in respect of 
security officers operating in individual shopping 
centres. Corporate owners did however make it 
plain that they were basing their judgements 
completely on the activities of security officers 
in their employ. 
Business operators showed a less positive attitude 
towards private securi ty than ei ther corporate 
owners or members of the public and the lack of 
satisfaction is evidenced to some extent by the 
fact that many in-house security officers were 
employed by stores within the centres. The 
majority of business operators polled by the 
researcher did not employ in-house security. 
It was difficult to detect any strong levels of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the part of 
the general public, the overwhelming impression 
obtained by the researcher was lack of knowledge 
coupled with lack of interest. It is held that 
hypothesis A was found to be true in respect of 
corporate owners and business operators, but the 
hypothesis needs refining to take account of the 
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effects of knowledge or lack of knowledge of both 
the service on offer and those who are 
providing it. 
(ii) Hypothesis B 
(iii) 
"Consumer satisfaction will increase as cont 1 
""d ro over serVlce prOVl er increases" 
Corporate owners appeared to exercise total control 
over the service provider and expressed a high 
degree of satisfaction with those over whom they 
had control, they refused to comment on other 
service providers over whom they did not exercise 
control. 
The level of business operators satisfaction was 
perceptibly lower than that of the corporate 
owners, business operators exercised no power 
over the day to day functioning of security 
officers employed by the corporate owners, yet they 
were paying for the service by virtue of a 
proportion of site rent. 
The shopping public had no control whatsoever over 
security officers yet their general level of 
satisfaction as expressed by lack of negative 
attitude (lack of knowledge prevented the 
expression of positive attitude) appeared to be 
greater than that of business operators. 
Once again though the hypothesis in general 
terms was held to be true it needed refinement 
to include the effects of knowledge or lack 
of knowledge of service providers and service 
offered. 
Hypothesis C 
"Shopping centre owners, business operators and 
members of the public would ex~ibit differ~nt 
attitudes towards service provlders operatIng 
in shopping centres" 
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This hypothesis appeared to hold tr . 
ue In respect 
of all categories of consumer, and whilst the 
researcher originally expected this to be so 
as a result of the degree of control exercised 
by each group of consumers,it has to be 
acknowledged that levels of knowledge of service 
and provider are as important if not more 
important than the degree of control. 
In the shopping centres studied very different approaches to 
policing were observed and it is highly likely that if the 
number of shopping centres studied was increased, then an 
increasing number of different styles of policing would have 
become apparent. The issue that all groups of consumers 
polled in this research most strongly agreed upon, was the 
need for licencing and regulation. 
Of all the issues highl ighted by research such as The 
Hallcrest Report and The Rand Report, British politicians 
police officers, academics and leading members of the 
security industry, all agree that licencing and regulation is 
a vi tal issue. In the next and final chapter a number of 
conclusions will be drawn based on the resul ts of this 
research not least of which will be the need to provide a 
stronger base of knowledge about security across industries 
(and across consumers) and a need for a better and more 
consistent and co-ordinated research programme. 
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(1) 
NOTES 
The observational study i~ the Manchester Arndale 
Centre was carried out mIdweek over a period of 
three days, July 1995 
The observational study in the Merceywa S1 . 
Centre was carried out mid-week over a Y l?PdPlng 
two days, July 1995 perlO of 
The observational study in Houndshill Shopping 
Centre was carried out on a Saturday, July 1995. 
The observational study in the Lanes Shopping 
Centre was carried out on Saturday, August 1995. 
The observational studies at the St. John's 
Shopping ~entre and St. John's Arcade Workington 
were carrled out on the same mid-week day during 
June 1995. 
It was intended that the fifteen minute 
observations would be recorded on the time interval 
charts (Appendix D). It soon became apparent that 
the categories decided upon by the researcher 
tended to overlap and it was necessary to augment 
the records on the time interval charts with 
copious note taking. 
The researcher was aware whilst conducting 
observations in the locality the real drama could 
be occurring in another areas of the Shopping 
Centre or indeed in areas to which the researcher 
did not have access. This is one of the reasons 
that the observations were di vided up into time 
intervals of 15 minutes and al ternated between 
static and mobile recording thereby providing a 
measure of control. The researcher made no attempt 
at concealment openly observing and recording what 
he saw. 
Obviously access to closed circuit television 
recordings would have provided much more valuable 
and accurate observations but on the basis of the 
responses from securi ty companies asked to complete 
questionnaires or allow interviews with staff the 
researcher was convinced that such access would not 
be granted. Whilst it is admitted that the 
observational technique adopted by the researcher 
is less than perfect it is easily replicated.and 
the accuracy or otherwise of the observatlons 
easily tested. 
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(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The researcher was aware that by obs ' 
b ' t ' erv1ng su ]ec s, mean1ng could be imputed t t ' 
h ' 0 ac s WhlCh may not ave been 1ntended by those ob d 
f th ' serve. It was or 1S reason that the researcher had hoped 
to conduct ZWEIG type interviews (ZWEIG F 1948 
~952) ~s a means of recording meanings imputed ~nd 
1ntent1ons of the subject. However, since the main 
thrust of the research was to explore the att't d 
f ilth b II ' 1 U es o 0 er 0 servers 1.e. shoppers business owners 
and corporate owners it was felt that attitude 
statemen~s would support the accuracy of 
~bservat1ons. One result of this comparison of 
1nstruments w~s the recognition that the degree of 
control exerc1sed over security companies would 
affect the imputation of meaning to actions of 
officers by the various categories of consumers. 
The conclusions drawn at all centres are purposely 
couched in cautious language. For instance where 
there appeared to be Ii ttle supervision of officers 
they may have been supervised by means of closed 
circuit television, the cameras for which were not 
obvious to the researcher. The number of females 
or ethnic personnel employed could only be 
accurately determined by accessing personnel 
records. Since the researcher was not granted 
permission to interview staff it is highly unlikely 
that free access to personnel records would be 
granted. It is a natural function of the human 
animal to impute meaning to what it observes, the 
meanings imputed by the researcher have been 
recorded without access to confidential data held 
by the securi ty companies studied. The only way to 
determine the accuracy of the conclusions drawn is 
replication of the observational study. 
There were eleven attitude statements which were 
scored and five attitude ratings recorded in 
columns from 1 for strongly agree to 5 for strongly 
disagree. Attitude statements 12 and 13 on the 
questionnaire were control and w~re not scored. 
The number of subjects of a part1cular group ~f 
users at a given location were polled and thel r 
responses to each atti tude statement scored and 
entered in the table (page 126). Each column ~as 
summed to give a total score for each of the flve 
attitude ratings. The eleven attitude statements 
covered those areas of concern shown in ~he table 
Predominant Attitude Response (p 127) w~lch shows 
percentage scores. These scores were arr1 ved at by 
use of the formula 
100 
Total No. of Atti tude Statements x Subject x Att~tude 
Total Column Rating Ratlng 
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(5) The researcher has already mentioned lack of access 
to tapes recorded by close circui t television. 
Since the researcher was concerned with the 
security operatives themselves no mention was made 
of closed circui t television to subjects. The 
researcher now accepts that had subjects been aware 
or been made aware that they were being observed by 
closed circuit television this could have affected 
atti tudes towards securi ty officers themselves. It 
has to be accepted that some members of the public 
may regard use of surveillance equipment as an 
unwarranted infringement or their civil liberties. 
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C HAP T E R 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research examined a very small section of the contract 
manned guarding sector of the private security industry in a 
limited geographical area. It examined private POlicing of 
shopping centres, seeking to determine the rele f vance 0 those 
issues which previous research, particularly in the United 
States, had identified as problematical. The one issue which 
united all groups of consumers of private security services 
covered in this research project was that of licensing and 
regulation. It is this issue above all others which also 
appears to unite police, politicians and members of the 
industry itself, yet on the basis of this research coupled 
with reports of what is happening now, throughout the 
industry it would appear to be extremely ill-advised to rush 
into any form of regulation. 
1. The Inadvisability of Regulation 
Regulation of the private security industry is an issue that 
crosses political boundaries, in the 1970's private members 
bills sponsored by Norman Fowler and Bruce George failed to 
gain parliamentary assent (Johnston 1992). Roy Hattersley 
has been one of the Labour party's more vociferous 
campaigners for the regulation of the industry. The 
Association of Chief Police Officers has for a considerable 
time argued for national legislation, backed by governmental 
support and authori ty, stating its case wi th increasing 
force. John Wheeler (1990) introduced The Security Industry 
Bill in which he argued for a regulatory mechanism sponsored 
by the industry itself. Bruce George (1990) introduced The 
" ) Bl" 11 Whl" ch suggested a ~P...:!:r....:!:i~v~a~t~e~----=S~e~c~u~r.:!:i~t:....lY~_(LR~e~gL:!:i:..!:s~t~r!:.Ca~t-=l~o:.::n~L--~=-=-=-
regulatory mechanism sponsored by the state, both bills were 
defeated. Politicians, police and academics such as Johnston 
(1992, 1994, 1996) South (1988) I the International 
Professional Security Association and the British Security 
Industries Association all continue to argue for regulation. 
173 
The researcher found that corporate owners, business 
operators and members of the public in the sh . Opplng centres 
studied all agree that security officers should b e regulated, 
yet the government persists in its policy of self I' 
-regu atlon. 
Many commentators argue that self-regulation is an acceptable 
policy for professionals such as doctors, lawyers and social 
workers (Wilson 1968) but is less than an ideal policy for 
police since the lowest ranking member of the organisation is 
the one who is making life and death decisions or decisions 
affecting a citizens liberty on a regular basis. Wilson like 
many other commentators links regulation to accountability. 
In Britain it is argued that the police should not be allowed 
to regul ate themselves and in some quarters the Pol ice 
Complaints Authority is viewed with a great deal of 
scepticism. Even where government has introduced ostensibly 
regulatory machinery such as The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 this is seen by some commentators as an extension of 
the coercive powers of the pol ice (Kinsey, Lea and Young 
1968). It seems strange that concerns about regulation of the 
security industry which are widely held arouse none of the 
passionate debate that surrounds accountability of the 
police. 
Hoddinott (1994) argues that it is the nature of the 
accountability that is one of the main differentiating 
factors between public and private policing. In the case of 
public policing and the police service accountability is 
subject to statutory regulation, to local democratic control 
and to a variety of formal and informal controls. In the 
case of the private sector, accountability is more 
restricted, confined to either contract or the board of a 
company. Hoddinott argues that the powers enjoyed by the 
public police demand the sort of accountability that only the 
. d the He argues that private public police are requlre 0 av. 
policing can complement public policing (junior partner 
. t fashion, and he sees this as 
stance) in an approprla e 
policing private space or the supply of ancillary services to 
the public police. 
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The point here is that need for regulation is linked with the 
need for public accountability. 
The link between regulation and accountability is an 
important one, Hoddinott maintains that the accountabi 1 i ty of 
private policing is confined to either contract or the board 
of a company. It is not known for Sure how many pr i va te 
securi ty organisations are operating in Bri tain today (1), or 
how many contracts or boards of companies demand 
accountabili ty of such organisations. What became very clear 
from the non-participational observational study undertaken 
by the researcher was that the expectations of boards of 
companies in respect to the private security companies they 
employ are very different. This being the case, the 
accountability and the regulation required to achieve it 
would be very different for various security companies. 
Lidstone (1980) draws distinctions between Home Office and 
non-Home Office police forces, Johnston (1992) expands these 
distinctions to include all manner of regulatory bodies, 
governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. The researcher 
argues that such distinctions could and should be applied to 
the private security industry. The accepted distinctions of 
intruder alarm sections, contract manned guarding, in house 
securi ty and cash-in-transi t do not begin to hint at the 
different activities embraced by the security industry, the 
styles of policing adopted and the type or types of 
regulation which may be necessary. 
Todate calls for regulation have largely fallen into two 
camps, ei ther statutory licensing using existing Bri tish 
Securi ty Industry Association Inspectorates, that is the 
present system of self-regulation backed up by statute, or 
statutory regulation backed up by an independent body. It is 
. . d· members of parliament remarkable that prest1g1ous aca em1CS, 
and high ranking police officers can argue for the regulation 
of something which they all admittedly know so little about. 
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Even the International Professional Securit A 0" y SSocIatIon and 
the British Security Industry Association admit that 
they do 
not know how many securi ty companies ope too ° 
ra e In Brl taln 
today. Surely before any thought can be give t " 
n 0 regulatIng 
the securi ty industry, some attempt must be made to determine 
exactly what it is that requires regulating. 
Various commentators have defined prl"vate security in terms 
of junior partners to the public police, as private providers 
of what were once publicly provided services, as similar to 
the police but enforcing an al ternative justice system or 
simply as commercial competitors for the provision of 
policing services. If any or all of these definitions are 
accurate, then surely each definition would demand different 
types of accountability and regulation. 
Security companies vary in size from two men and a dog to 
companies employing thousands, the tasks undertaken by 
different companies vary so substantially that an all 
embracing regulation would be difficult if not impossible to 
achieve. Purely on the basis of observations of the policing 
of a few shopping centres the researcher argues that security 
companies are vastly different, when these differences are 
magnified through the entire industry the problems of 
proposing and enforcing any constructive regulation are 
enormous. What is essential before regulation is even 
contemplated is a co-ordinated systematic investigation of 
the industry to determine exactly what it is that requires 
regulation. 
In view of the many and varied cl ients of the securi ty 
industry what is now essential in Britain is a review of the 
security industry along the lines of the Benchmark II Survey 
t C Ott looklOng l"nto the Review of (1972). The Independen omml ee 
Core and Ancillary Tasks have thankfully, included private 
securi ty in the list of key questions they addressed by 
eXamining the role of other agencies, voluntary, private and 
what might be termed policing statutory in delivering 
services (Newburn and Morgan 1994). 
176 
It is essential that any major 
not study them in isolation but 
review of the industry does 
as a part of the wider order 
maintenance and crime prevention system with1· tho 
n 1S country. 
Any review body appointed should include as .. 
a m1nlmum, 
members of the Inspectorate of the Securi ty Industry, members 
of the boards of management of various companies, 
representati ves of securi ty companies, representatives of the 
Home Office, local government and the police as well as 
leading academics in the field of policing and securi ty. The 
sort of questions this team should be addressing would 
include: 
a) What exactly is the security industry? 
b) How many security companies operate in Britain today? 
c) What is the total number of security staff? 
d) What tasks are being performed by the industry as a 
whole? 
e) Are private security officers increaSingly coming 
into contact with the public in public or quasi 
public places? 
f) If contact is increasing, is the contact of an 
informal or service nature or of a formal or 
coercive nature? 
g) What is the level of complaint, if any from 
the public? 
h) What machinery, if any, exists for the recording 
and investigating of any complaints that may be made? 
i) Are private security officers in Britain becoming 
significantly less like the ordinary citizen? 
j) How varied is the level and quality of service 
offered by the various security organisations and 
. . ') does this relate to pay training and supervlS1on. 
how 
To attempt licencing and regulation before these types of 
questions have been addressed would cause more problems than 
it would sol ve. The 
reviewed and reported on 
public police have been studied, 
since their inception and the Review 
Tasks would tend to suggest that 
of Cor~ and Ancillary 
government have still not got it right, or perhaps to be more 
177 
accurate that the government still believe th I" 
e po Ice have 
not got it right. In Bri tain apart f " 
rom varIoUS unrelated 
research projects carried out by academic "th " 
s WI an Interest 
in private policing there has been little "" 
reVIewIng or 
studying of a form of policing that is generally accepted as 
existing before and continuing alongside the public police. 
The Home Office did set up a Home Office Working Group in 
1988 to see whether there was scope for further improvement 
in self regulation (Johnston 1992) I f 
. n e fect this was not 
so much a study of private security but rather the ensuring 
that the results of decisions made in 1979 and identified as 
being deeply flawed, (South 1988) remained in place. 
What became obvious to the researcher not only as a result of 
his own research but as a result of studying the research of 
others is that private security or sections of the industry 
cannot meaningfully be studied in isolation. The question 
must eventually be answered as to why government refuses to 
become directly involved in any realistic research into the 
industry, let alone regulation. The argument that 
invol vement would be contrary to the government I s stated 
policy of minimal state interference only holds true if 
deregulation and decentralisation are fact and not myth. It 
could be argued that what government are seeking to do in 
many instances, is to centralise control but to decentralise 
blame. Education and the police are but two examples of 
where the government have tightened their control but have 
readily identifiable scapegoats at whom to point when things 
go wrong. Any attempt to regulate the security industry in 
its present state would not necessarily increase government 
control to any great extent but would certainly identify a 
government department and a minister at whose feet any blame 
could be laid. From this perspective regulation would not 
only be against stated government policy but would also be 
against possible hidden agendas. Legislation is generally 
enacted to rai se money or to deal wi th matters that have 
become problematical, particularly to the government. If 
lack of regulation of the security industry is not going to 
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cost votes at a general election or . 1S unlikely to attract 
the attention of a powerful pr essure group, then regulation 
is unlikely to happen. 
Admittedly the police and the 0 dO . JU 1C1ary are a powerful group 
but if they alone are seen as the only 0 . r ma1n advocates of 
regulation they stand to be accused of t· . rY1ng to d1splace 
their own perceived shortcomings on an unprotected rather 
than unregulated security industry. 
There are many conflicting ideas about the sec °t . d ur1 y In ustry 
not least of these is what type of training is required but 
before that question has been answered, there is already 
considerable debate about quality of training. 
2. Quality of Training 
The researcher identified very different types of private 
policing in very different environments and concluded that 
whereas a simi lar basic level of training may have been 
appropriate to all sites visited each site clearly had it own 
specific training requirements. 
As identified earlier the Security Training Organisation 
(SITO) is the independent training organisation recognised by 
the Department of Employment as the Training Organisation for 
the securi ty industry. SITO is recognised by both the 
British Security Industry Association and the International 
Professional Securi ty Association as having made considerable 
progress in developing training for the manned services 
industry (yet another category, which incorporates contract 
and in-house security). 
The researcher found it difficult to obtain information about 
training of security officers in the sites studied and found 
it necessary to contact the British Security Industry 
Association, seeking information about their members who 
police shopping centres. Mr David Fletcher, Chief Executive 
of BSIA suggested contacting Pinkerton Securi ty Services Ltd I 
Richmond Surrey, Securi ty Express Guards, Edbaston Bi rmingharn 
and Sterling Granada Security Services Ltd, Londono 
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All of these companies confirmed that they followed BSIA 
requirements and regulations in respect of selection and 
training. All recruits undergo induction training and are 
required to take BSIA, SITO Examination papers A, B, C and D. 
Failure to successfully complete induction training results 
in termination of employment. 
It would appear that there is some standardisation of 
training among some IPSA and BSIA members. By the simple 
expedient of contacting companies selected at random from the 
telephone book the researcher discovered that at least one 
member of IPSA, Bastille Investigation Services of Norwich, 
trains its guarding personnel in accordance with the 
particular assignment that the person has been recrui ted for I 
rather than in accordance with the general training 
recommended by its professional body. Securicor Securi ty 
Services run three day induction training courses at one of 
their three training centres before guards start work on an 
assignment. On reporting to his/her first assignment the 
securi ty officer receives assignment familiarisation training 
from the supervisor. Any specialist training such as First 
Aid is given as required and is usually off-the-job training. 
Primeguards of Braintree, Essex follow the BSIA standards in 
respect of vetting and selection and indicate that they look 
for education levels of G.C.E. "0" level C or above. 
Primeguards are not members of either IPSA or BSIA and run 
their own training courses which are a combination of 
classroom, introductory and assignment specific training. 
They see the lack of legislation and the illogical insistence 
on BS5750 by many clients as mitigating against the 
development of IPSA or BSIA as specifiers of standards within 
the industry. (2) 
A minimum standard is available for security officers but 
there is no controlling body with sufficient power to make 
The Home Office police forces 
such training mandatory. 
constantly review the functions and training of their 
officers and the current training enjoyed by statutory police 
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officers incl uding those of fo 
rces such as the Bri tish 
Transport Pol ice, the Royal Park Pl' 
s 0 lce and Ministry of 
Defence Police is a direct result of The Working Party on 
Police Probationer Traininq in England and Wales (1986). 
Training is experienced based, modular and requires close co-
operation between forces and central trainers. This type of 
co-operation is virtually impossible in such a highly 
competitive and secretive industry as the private security 
industry. 
Without a properly researched training needs analysis, it is 
impossible to produce a training programme to suit the needs 
of all security firms. In fact such an analysis may well 
prove that a universal training programme is not achievable. 
Unless and until it is determined just how many firms 
comprise the industry and what it is that they do, a training 
needs analysis is hot possible. 
Mollie Weatheritt (1985) writing of the police, suggested 
that: 
"In common with most other institutions, the 
police service tends to think of its work 
as importa~t and necessary and it is not 
given to spending too much time and effort 
questioning the purpose and the effectiveness 
of what it does. The police have been 
remarkably successful in creating an appearance 
of usefulness and competence, such that the 
value of much traditional activity - patrol 
for example, and crime prevention - is hardly 
questioned, either by the service itself or by 
the public. Failures of performance are 
admitted but tend to be laid at other doors 
in lack of manpower and of money, in inadequate 
po~ers, or in an intractable envir~nmen~ .... 
many aspects of policing have rema~ned lmm~ne 
from critical scrutiny and the pollce serVlce 
has been able to discourage and rebuff the 
attentions of research with relative ease."(p 11) 
It could be argued in light of the White Paper preceding The 
Police and Magistrates Court Bill which says: 
"The main job of the police is to catch criminals" 
that traditional activities such as crime prevention are now 
being questioned and the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks 
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may well see such tasks being hived off to private 
enterprise 
(Reiner 1994). 
The researcher feels that Weatheri t' s comments are t d o ay, 
more applicable to private security and certainly in respect 
of the abi 1 i ty to rebuff the attentions of research wi th 
relative ease. 
it is highly 
Whilst the British industry has this ability 
unlikely that any serious training needs 
assessment such as advocated by Chuvala and Gilmere (1992) 
for the industry in the United States, is ever likely to 
occur. 
Perhaps some indication of the government's stance in respect 
of training within the industry is the fact that Department 
F3 of the Home Office is keeping a watching brief, The 
Department of Employment recognises SITO as the training 
organisation for the industry whilst yet another government 
department the Ministry of Defence makes its own training 
arrangements. There was a time when the ci vi I ians who 
guarded MOD Establishments were not regarded highly but Allen 
(1995) argues this has changed with the inauguration of the 
MOD guard service (MGS) in 1992. Every guard has to pass a 
two week foundation course run by the MGS Training Wing at 
the Ministry of Defence Police Headquarters in Wethersfield, 
Essex. Recruits who fail have their service terminated and 
there is no second chance to attend the course. MGS Training 
is a multi service organisation headed by a MDP Inspector. 
Trainers are drawn from MDP, the Army, Royal Air Force and 
Royal Marines. Before MGS each service had its own guarding 
arrangements consisting of a mix of contract security, 
industrial patrolmen and watching grades. Training which was 
done at a local level was almost non-existent, all MGS 
members are encouraged to study for NVQ/SVQ qualifications. 
Once posted to station MGS who have their own administrative 
chain of command come under the operational control of the 
Ministry of Defence Police. For one small sector of the 
industry at least the government does regulate in respect of 
vetting, training, pay and conditions. 
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In thi s instance government 
localised blame, that is blame 
has centralised control and 
can be attached to the Head of 
the Guard Service and the Chief Constable MOP. Whilst no 
doubt both of these gentlemen prefer the present situation to 
that which allowed the IRA bombing of the Royal Marine School 
of Music at Deal in Kent, the very different atti tudes 
towards private security adopted by three different ministers 
is confusing to say the least. 
What is interesting in respect of MGS training is that 
although the Training Wing is situated at MDP Headquarters 
and headed by a police Inspector the training undertaken by 
MGS is not a "watered down" version of police training, but 
is more akin to the type of training undergone by security 
officers employed by private firms, albeit of a longer 
duration. In common with IPSA and BSIA the management of MGS 
incline towards vocational training. This is an important 
point because if MOD bel ieve that securi ty guards requi re 
such a different form of training from that enjoyed by a 
bone-fide police force, it tends to suggest that they do not 
perceive security guards as carrying out a policing function. 
This line of thought agrees with that espoused by Mr Rabbitts 
of IPSA (see Appendix A) who dislikes the term private 
police, insisting that his members carry out a security and 
not a pol icing function. It is possible then, that a 
proportion of the criticism of private security is as much 
due to misappropriate semantics as it is to misappropriate 
behaviour. 
If it is accepted that in comparing the training of police 
and private security one is not comparing like with like then 
the results of any such comparison become meaningless. An 
example of the futility of such comparisons is an examination 
of the perfection versus cost dichotomy in respect of the 
training of police and private security. It is possible to 
achieve a moderate level of perfection at moderate cost but 
there comes a point where the achievement of total 
perfection, if at all possible is so prohibitive as to be 
impractical. 
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In the graph below perfection is measured 
as a percentage and 
costs of training in thousand of p d 
oun s. It can be seen that 
if, to achieve 65 per cent perfect· . . 10n 1 t 1S necessary to 
spend £35,000, it may be possibl t . 
e 0 ach1eve 90 per cent 
perfection at a cost of f a urther £30,000. To increase 
cost a further £30,000 perfection to 100 per cent may then 
which makes poor economic sense. 
Fig. 3 
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Any training organisation including the police have to 
determine the minimum acceptable level of perfection and the 
maximum cost they are prepared to pay to achieve it. Even if 
private securi ty were attempting to carry out a similar 
function to the police the amount of time and money spent on 
training indicates that private security have settled for a 
far lower acceptable level of perfection. Even if private 
security begin to take over some of those tasks declared by 
government to be ancillary to the core policing function. 
Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks (Reiner 1994) it will not 
be necessary to adjust the accepted level of perfection 
upwards to anything like that required of the police. The 
research undertaken in a limited number of shopping centres 
would tend to suggest that at least one good reason for this 
is that al though pri vate securi ty, may in a very general 
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sense, be involved in crime prevention, it is not involved in 
the specific sense in II catching criminals ll (Reiner 1994). 
3. Private Security - Crime Prevention or Crime Control 
Whilst the researcher saw strong evidence of crime prevention 
measures such as heavy patrolling of shopping centres, he did 
not see any evidence whatsoever of private security catching 
criminals. Where the researcher managed to speak to securi ty 
off icers they spoke of preventing begging, stopping the 
riding of bicycles in pedestrian areas and preventing drunks 
loitering in the centres. When not engaged in crime 
prevention, private securi ty in the centres visi ted, appeared 
to be engaged in order maintenance rather than the detection 
of crime. The adoption of an order maintenance role rather 
than a detection role including the arrest and processing of 
prisoners means that security officers can rely on citizens 
powers such as arrest for Breach of the Peace as a means of 
maintaining order rather than relying on the statutory powers 
available to constables. 
Wilson (1968) identified several styles of policing in 
various cities through out the United States, these styles 
can, to a certain extent, be identified in the policing of 
British cities and to a limited extent in some private 
security forces. The patrolman style of policing was 
identified as being concerned with the maintenance of order 
and the researcher suggests that this style is applicable to 
both public and private police. Wilson saw this style being 
used in situations which did not involve serious crime. He 
also identified a legalistic style which acts on the whole as 
if there were a single standard of acceptable conduct 
b 1 rather than d ifferent standards of conduct prescribed yaw, 
for different groups. As a result of their constabulary 
powers the public police are better placed to 
legalistic style when necessary and as a resul t 
training particularly in human awareness are more 
know when and where to practice such a style. 
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adopt a 
of thei r 
likely to 
Inherent in the office of constable is the ability to use 
individual discretion that is to individually match policing 
style to a given si tuation, success in thi s requi res the 
levels of training undertaken by a police officer. This 
discretion is practised on a larger scale by the police 
administrator who is concerned with the managing of 
discretion force wide and the management of critical events 
whi 1st moni toring communi ty reaction. Whi 1st indi vidual 
officers are equipped to detect and arrest criminals it is 
the police organisation as a whole, Criminal Investigation 
Department, Custody Officers, Review Officers, Scenes of 
Crime Officers, Forensic SCientists, etc, who are involved in 
the process of bringing criminals before the court. Simply 
because private security companies do not have the necessary 
administrati ve and technical machinery it might be argued 
that they cannot be involved in the catching of criminals. 
However, simply because the public police do have the 
necessary machinery to catch and prosecute criminals it does 
not necessarily follow as the Review of Core and Ancillary 
Tasks seems to suggest that thi sis the main task of the 
police (Reiner 1994). 
Sheehy (1993) names the four main aims of policing (that is 
public policing) as: 
a) The prevention of crime 
b) Punishing and bringing to justice those who break 
the law 
c) Keeping the Queens Peace 
d) Protecting, helping and reassuring the community 
Protecting, helping and reassuring the communi ty invol ves 
another policing style identified by Wilson and that is, the 
service style, which involves frequent but informal 
interaction with the community. The researcher saw evidence 
of this style being adopted by security officers patrolling 
shopping centres. 
To suggest that the public police should relinquish what have 
long been their principle aims and concentrate on the pursuit 
of much informed and 
of criminals flies in the face 
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distinguished opinion and criminological 
research. Reiner 
(1985) maintains that "crime fighting is not d 
an could not be 
the prime activity of the police. To see "t " 1 as such IS part 
of a mythology of media images and cop culture h" h w lC presents 
a stumbling block to sensible discussion or pOll"CY making. 
The core mandate of policing historically and in terms of 
concrete demands placed upon the police is the more diffuse 
one of order maintenance." 
Reiner's contention reiterates the view of the Rt Hon Lord 
Justice Scarman (1986) who saw the primary duty of the police 
as co-operation with others in maintaining the normal state 
of society. Sir Robert Mark (1975) saw this ability of the 
police to offer not only a capacity to catch criminals but 
also to offer those services sold by private security and 
much more as the means of professional ising the police 
service, he maintained: 
"The police are abandoning their artisan status and 
are achieving by our ever increasing variety of 
services, our integri ty, our impartial i ty, our 
accountability and our dedication to the public good a 
status not less admirable than that of the most learned 
and distinguished professions." (p 42) 
It would seem that government is now "hell-bent" on forcing 
the police to jettison those services which Sir Robert Mark 
saw as improving the status of the police. The discussion 
document published in August 1994 by the Independent 
Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of 
the Police (Independent Committee 1994) suggested that in 
respect of the modern police service the fundamental 
questions have not been asked. The Independent Commi ttee 
recognised that the causes of crime are complex and deep 
rooted and that it is totally unrealistic to imagine its 
prevention might be tackled by the police alone (Newburn and 
Morgan 1994) thus acknowledging the crime prevention role of 
private security. 
Private pol i cing involves patroll ing, maintaining order, 
crime prevention and a generalised service function, for the 
public police to relinquish these and other non-coercive 
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functions to private enterprise may have t ' 
a cos Savlng effect 
in the short term but would be disastrous f th " 
or e prlnclple 
of pol icing by consent. The consent of ci tizens is more 
likely to be forthcoming if policing is perceived to be 
effective and if expectations are being met. Public 
participation is directly linked to effectl' 
veness and the 
majori ty of crimes are solved as a result of 'f ' ln ormatlon 
received from the public, not detective work (Burrows and 
Tarling 1982). 
Public participation will increase the more they identify 
with the police and the extent to which they identify is 
dependent on the image of the police and impressions of 
remoteness or closeness. This image is strongly affected by 
the performance of the service role (Benyon 1982). 
Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) tend to subscribe to this notion 
in acknowledging that there is some truth in the fact that 
the inadequate flow of information from public to police 
underpins and gives substance to police claims that they can 
do 1i ttle about most burglaries and street crimes. They 
recognise the claims of the judiciary and the police that 
even in the most serious offences and in situations where one 
might reasonably expect people to exhibit the most concern 
and come forward to help the police with their enquiries, 
they often do not. They see The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 and the increased use of surveillance and criminal 
intelligence gathering as coercive measures contributing to 
police-public alienation. To cast the police in a wholly 
coercive role will deny them the very co-operation needed to 
perform their crime detection task. It is suggested that a 
system of proper accountability would increase public 
willingness to yield information necessary to the solution of 
crime. Hoddinott (1994) identifies accountability as one of 
the key differentiating factors between public and private 
police. If the police need to be more accountable to 
increase crime detection then irrespective of administrative 
or technical machinery unregulated and unaccountable private 
security cannot be in a position to undertake detection of 
crime. 
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It is argued by Kinsey, Lea and Young th t th . 
a e POllce be 
allowed to do the job that they are paid for "the full and 
proper investigation of crime." However 1 . k 
, un 1 e the Home 
Secretary they do not see this as the absolute role of the 
police but argue it as the main thrust of minimal policing. 
Minimal policing rests on a series of interrelated 
propositions, namely maximum public initiation of police 
action and maximum access to the police and minimal police 
initiated action with minimum use of coercion. To jettison 
the service and order maintenance roles and concentrate on 
crime detection would deny the public maximum access to the 
police and would be most likely to result in increased police 
initiated action and increased coercion. Decreased contact 
with police on a daily non-coercive basis would lead to 
alienation of large sectors of the public and willing co-
operation where it sti 11 existed, would become grudging 
compliance and eventually hostility provoking further 
coercive measures. 
The non-participational observational study of private 
security tended to suggest that the security officers 
observed ini tiated Ii ttle action and used no coercion, 
however it is likely that publicly initiated action was 
minimal and corporate owner ini tiated action maximum. Whilst 
the public appeared to have maximum access to individual 
security officers it is debatable just how much access they 
had to the private policing machinery. Although the security 
officers studied appeared to practice an outward show of 
minimal policing, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) also argue 
that effective policing necessitates public support, and it 
is only a police force which positively pursues civil 
liberties wi thin the context of democratic accountabi 1 i ty 
that will ever gain that confidence. Minimal policing argues 
for a restriction of the role of the police and whilst 
" " an l"nevitable feature of social accepting that coerClon IS 
order it should be kept to a minimum. 
I " concentrating on crime control What the argument for po lce 
" that dl"sorder creates more disorder and appears to miss IS 
leads to increased crime. 
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By relentless patrolling security officers are not more 
likely to detect crime but are likely to maintain order and 
in maintaining order to prevent crime lb' 
, a e1 t only in the 
establishment they police. The fact that th e crime may be · 
displaced to areas policed by the public police is of no 
concern to the administrators of private security. 
Lord Parker in the case of Rice versus Connelly (1966) 
describing the duties of the police said: 
"It is part of the obligations and duties 
of a police constable to take all steps which 
appear to him to be necessary for keeping 
the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting 
property from criminal injury. There is no 
exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations 
of the police but they are at least these and 
they would further include the duty to detect 
crime and to bring offenders to justice" 
(Clayton and Tomlinson 1987 p 25.) 
There is very strong evidence to suggest that private 
securi ty is increasingly involved in order maintenance, crime 
prevention and property protection. Although this research 
study saw no evidence of a crime control role there is 
evidence to suggest that this is occurring. In the Arndale 
Centre in Manchester the researcher noticed Market 
Constables, wearing full police uniform, although not 
attested constables, and therefore not police in the 
strictest sense these officers would fall into the category 
Johnston (1993) describes as Municipal Police. These officers 
have powers under The Manchester Markets Act to enforce 
market bye-laws. Other pieces of legislation such as The 
Public Health (Amendment) Act 1907 and The Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation 
(Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967 empower local 
authori ties to swear in employees as constables for the 
purpose of securing local bye-laws. As stated earlier The 
Harbours Piers and Docks Clauses Act 1847 has already allowed 
the swearing of private security officers as constables. The 
use of such legislation by various bodies and organisations 
has a large influence on the attitudes of various police 
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administrations and is one of 
determining police co-operation and 
the major factors in 
interaction with private 
albeit slowly and in a disjointed security, thus co-operation 
manner is now occurring. 
4. Police, Private Security Co-operation 
The junior partner perspective still has a strong tendency to 
colour the views of many commentators in respect of the 
relationship existing between police and private security. 
A recent article about the private security industry in The 
Times maintained that: 
liThe pluralistic provisions of security services 
must not diminish the fundamental notion of 
law and order as a basic public good. Just as 
the idea of "no go" areas was unacceptable 
in the 1980's so the policy makers of the 
1990's must prevent the emergence of a two-tier 
system in which the police protect only those 
who cannot afford a better service. In this 
distinctive area of state responsibility, 
private firms should complement rather than 
supplement the established role of the public 
sector." (The Times March 15, 1994) 
This article addressed two key issues, that policing is a 
state responsibili ty and that private firms should complement 
the police. Senior police administrators would tend to see 
any active partnership such as described by Johnston (1994) 
being based on both these premises (Hoddinott 1994). The 
Review of the Core and Ancillary Tasks is an attempt by 
government to redefine policing in a manner that is most cost 
effective - at least in the short term - to government. This 
redefinition may weaken prescriptive arguments such as that 
put forward by The Times and certainly argues against the 
current approaches to policing. Clayton and Tomlinson (1987) 
identify a number of approaches to law and order: 
a) Conventional:- There is an unprecedented crime 
wave resulting from a breakdown of values 
in society. The police are a neutral social 
agency protecting the general interests of 
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society against actions of deviant elements, 
the solution is more effective POlicing. 
b) Radical:- The crime wave is exaggerated and 
not really a social problem at all. Crime 
derives from economic deprivation and the 
reaction of deprived groups to an unjust 
society. The police are seen as instruments 
of the "dominant class". Their role is not 
a technical one of solving crime but a 
directly political one of buttressing 
exploitation. The solution is not to improve 
policing but to bring the police under democratic 
control. 
c) Standard Police View:- Greater Police powers 
and resources are needed to combat the crime 
wave. The solution is substantial increase 
in police numbers and funding. 
d) Realistic:- Crime is an important social problem 
for working class and ethnic communities as 
well as the middle classes. Crime control is 
a serious duty with the emphasis on deterrence, 
the demarginalisation of criminals and 
minimal use of prison. The solution is for 
the police to provide a service to the 
community which is under clear democratic 
control and working with the close co-operation 
of the community. 
e) Current Government View:- The police are expected 
to take on tasks which are not strictly policing 
tasks. Solution shed "non-policing tasks" and 
concentrate on detection of crime. 
The point here is that by overtly redefining the task of the 
public police the government have also covertly defined the 
tasks undertaken by private security as being non-policing 
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tasks, therefore no regulation or government interference is 
necessary. 
How does the constant revision of what constitutes policing 
affect the police security relationship? As with all 
questions about the private security industry there is no 
clear answer. What became clear to the researcher is that 
there appear to be relationships at two levels, that between 
indi vidual officers of police and private securi ty 
organisations and that between organisations themselves. An 
examination of the possible reasons for this tends to suggest 
that private security is rapidly moving away from the junior 
partner role thereby forcing Chief Officers into 
relationships they would not otherwise have considered in 
order to protect the reputation of their own forces. 
The non-participatory observational study revealed no 
interaction between pol ice and private securi ty even when 
officers were in close proximi ty to each other. The 
researcher formed a strong perception that the relationship 
between individual officers of the police and private 
security at the sites studied appeared to be at the stage of 
grudging recognition that is that private security are 
engaged in mere property protection rather than "real 
policing". 
That such an attitude should prevail is not totally 
surprising if viewed from the perspective of organisational 
culture. Harrison (1972) classified organisational cultures 
or ideologies into four types: 
a) Club Culture:- The organisation is an extension 
of the personality of the head or founder, 
enjoys centralised power and short lines of 
communication and is best suited to small 
organisations (probably less than 20 people) 
b) Role Culture:- The underlying idea is that 
organisations are sets of roles joined 
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together in a logical and orderly fashion so 
that together they discharge the work of the 
organisation. Individuals are role Occupants 
with job descriptions that effectively lay 
down the requirements of the role and its 
boundaries. Communications are formalised 
as are systems and procedures. Procedures 
contained in rules and handbooks abound 
throughout the organisation. There are 
standards, quality controls and evaluation 
procedures. Role culture organisations 
thrive when they are doing a routine, stable 
and unchanging task and find it hard to cope 
with change and individualisation. 
Administrative organisations have to be role 
cultures to be efficient. People are trained 
to fit the role. 
c) Task Culture:- Group or team talents and 
resources are applied to a project problem or 
task with each task receiving the treatment 
it requires, it does not have to be 
standardised across the organisation (or 
the industry), groups can be changed 
disbanded or increased as the task changes. 
A culture built around co-operative groups 
of colleagues without much overt hierarchy. 
d) Person Culture:- Puts the individual first 
and makes the organisation the resource for the 
individual's talents. This type of culture 
usually supports doctors, barristers, architects, etc. 
The police by the very size of the organisation and by the 
force of increasing centralisation has to be oriented towards 
a role culture that often incorporates task cultures e.g. 
traffic, regional crime squads, drugs squads. The smaller 
private security firms are likely to be more oriented towards 
a club culture. Obviously no clear definition can be claimed 
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because the larger security firms by virtue 
will increasingly become role cultures. 
of their size 
Handy (1984) suggests that most organisations 
are a mixture 
mix at anyone time is influenced of all four cultures. The 
by the following factors: 
( i ) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Size:- Large size and role culture go together 
Work flow:- If the job is organised in 
separate units where a group or an individual 
can be responsible for the whole job, then 
club task or person cultures can exist. 
It is where work flow is sequential or 
interdependent, that more systems, rules and 
regulations are needed and the culture shifts 
towards a role culture. 
Environment:- If the environment does not 
give clear signals and the institution is 
a monopoly and can therefore set its own 
goals and standards then the organisation 
will tend to be a role culture. 
The idea of cultures influenced by the factors identified by 
Handy is important because different companies within the 
security industry will exhibit different cultures, this 
coupled with the competitive need for secrecy between 
companies will mean that little co-operation exists between 
companies. Individual police officers will identify 
individual security officers as members of differing culture 
groups which will have an inhibiting effect on co-operation. 
The attitude of the police organisation itself towards 
private security is also confused. The Association of Chief 
Police Officers has constantly called for regulation of the 
security industry and John Stevens, Chief Constable of 
Northumbria and chairman of the ACPO crime prevention sub-
committee raised police concerns about the industry in 1994 
demanding a central register for the 7,000 security companies 
believed to be operating in Britain and employing 162,000 
people (Gibbons 1994). 
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The administration of the police organisatl"o 
n, appears to be 
at the level of competition and open hostility and demand for 
control. There is however, evidence to 
suggest that 
individual members of that ad . " t mlnlS ration are actually 
involving their forces in active partnership, particularly in 
that very grey area that divides or links police and private 
security, according to one's perspective. 
Johnston (1993) maintains that day to day relations between 
municipal forces employed by London Boroughs to enforce bye-
laws and the Metropolitan Police are fairly good but that the 
organisational response is somewhat inconsistent. In 1989 
Hertsmere Borough Council sought Home Office advice about the 
powers of parks constables under The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. At this time the view was expressed that 
parks constables enjoyed all the powers of Home Office 
constables, within the jurisdictional confines of the park. 
The Metropolitan Police sought counsels advice on the 
decision, the central proposition of such advice being that 
a distinction should be drawn between police officers and 
bodies of constables which are not pol ice forces. This 
decision draws a distinction between those officers coming 
under the jurisdiction of The Police Act 1964 and constables 
sworn or unsworn who operate under the jurisdiction of other 
Acts. Further more it was said that a parks constable IS 
authority does not extend to the enforcement of general law 
but simply to bye-laws. 
Because of their concerns the Metropolitan Police train both 
Wandsworth and Holland Park Police on the grounds that not 
to do so would be counter productive since the force receives 
prisoners from both forces on a regular basis and that any 
negative publicity arising from untrained parks constables 
exceeding their powers would reflect on the Metropoli tan 
Police and on the service as a whole. To the average man in 
the street a police officer is a police officer and who pays 
his wages or who trains him, is of little importance. 
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In one location at least the police are . 
co-operatIng with 
private security because they call themselve 
s constables and 
wear police uniform. This would tend to suggest that the 
five stages of relationship identified by Stenning (1989) are 
not simply a time influenced phenomenon but also depend on 
the task that officers perform, how closely they resemble 
public police in dress and title and how public perceptions 
of those officers is likely to affect public perceptions of 
the police service as a whole. It should be noted that 
uniformed officers sworn for the enforcement of bye-laws are 
not simply confined to London. The researcher noted similar 
officers employed by Manchester City Council patrolling in 
the Arndale Centre and similar bodies of constables are 
employed by other major cities such as Birmingham. 
Johnston (1993) suggests that historically there was never a 
clear divide between private and publ ic ,pol icing and that 
from the inception of the public police the two have co-
existed. It is becoming increasingly apparent that there is 
still no clear point at which a distinction can be drawn 
between the two forms of policing, and that policing could be 
viewed as a network of institutions within which the police 
are but one element. Johnston (1996) argues that this is not 
the case in Britain today and that lack of principled 
analysis of the police role vis a vis other policing agencies 
can be traced to governmental resi stance to the genuine 
empowerment of local authori ties in matters of communi ty 
safety. Johnston sees the Posen deliberations as being based 
on the untested assertion that hiving off police tasks will 
be cheaper for the Exchequer. Rather than a network, 
policing in Britain is a patchwork made up of the most humble 
nightwatchmen, through the various private securi ty firms, to 
the municipal constable, through statutory but non Home 
Office forces to the public police. When viewed from such a 
standpoint it makes the notion of standardised regulation 
training and pattern of relationships a nonsense. 
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5. Jurisdiction 
It is not simply accountability that distl"ng " h " 
U1S es pollce 
from private security, but also legally defl" ned " "d" " Jurls lctlon. 
Since in law securi ty officers are considered to be no 
different than the ordinary ci tizen there is no need to 
legally define their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of 
officers of Home Department Police forces is determined by 
The Police Act 1964. The jurisdiction of statutory but non-
Home Department Forces is determined by various other 
statutes whi ch 1 imi t thei r powers when deal ing wi th the 
public in public space. These restrictions mean that when 
travell ing in publ ic space between si tes where they are 
allowed to exercise their powers officer of the Ministry of 
Defence Police, the British Transport Police and the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary are only 
authorised to react to an incident requiring police 
intervention as citizens. The situation occurs where a fully 
trained uniformed police officer in a fully equipped and 
readily identifiable police vehicle may be first on the scene 
but has to deal with the incident as a private citizen. The 
problem of misidentification raised by the Metropolitan 
Police in respect of parks constables looms much larger and 
trained officers are aware of this and of the impact on the 
police service that any refusal to deal wi th an incident 
would bring about. 
This problem has received political consideration and a group 
of MPs forming part of the Standing Committee in respect of 
the Police and Magistrates Courts Bill (Lords) tabled a 
series of amendments designed to resolve this problem and 
also seeking to place forces such as the Ministry of Defence 
Police, British Transport Police and United Kingdom Atomic 
t b 1 n a fl"rmer statutory basis. Energy Authority Cons a u ary 0 
The amendments additionally, were designed to ensure a more 
certain definition of what constituted a police officer and 
a police force, partly in response to the trend among London 
k IIpolice ll • Boroughs to establish their own par s It was 
proposed that a schedule "other police Forces ll be annexed 
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to the Bill to distinguish constabularies f th . rom ose po11ce-
type agencies which resemble them and to t bl· es a 1sh which 
forces were subject to the Police Complaints Authority. It 
was intended to more clearly define the jurisdiction of 
It was proposed that the Constables of other police forces. 
following subsection be inserted 
police Act 1964: 
into Section 19 of The 
"(5) A d~ly attested constable serving in a 
pollce force listed in Part 1 of Schedule 
(Other Police Officers) to the Police and 
Magistrates Courts Act 1994 shall have all 
the powers and privileges of a constable 
throughout England and Wales but only. 
(a) where no other constable is present and 
available to exercise his powers as 
a constable and he is satisfied 
that the circumstances require him 
~o exercise those powers or privileges; or 
(b) ln pursuance of a request for assistance 
from another police constable." 
These amendments were rejected on the grounds that local 
public accountability would be lacking (Defence Police 
Federation 1994). 
There is obviously no universal definition held by 
parliamentarians as to what constitutes a police officer, a 
police force or what jurisdiction the various statutory but 
non-Horne Department Forces should have. 
There is confusion as to the powers and roles of the 
increasing number of municipal forces. Whilst these 
problems have a bearing on the acti vi ties and need for 
regulation of private police forces the attention that is now 
being directed towards regulation of the securi ty industry as 
a whole would be more producti vely employed in resol ving 
these issues. 
6. Research into Private Security 
The object of this research was to obtain a snapshot of a 
small section of the British Private Security Industry in a 
small geographical area with a view to determining if the 
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problems identified by earlier American research applied to 
that particular section of the industry. 
(i) Vetting:- It would appear that although there 
is no standard procedure throughout the 
industry some firms do as much as they can 
to check prospective employees. Based on 
the security firms observed the vetting 
procedures adopted by a large proportion of 
the industry are adequate for the tasks that 
were observed. 
(ii) Supervision:- There is no set standard 
throughout the industry and this was 
significantly evidenced by the 
observational study which revealed 
regular and heavy supervision at some 
sites and no evidence of any supervision 
at others. 
(iii) Pay:- This is a sensitive question which 
firms are reluctant to discuss however, 
there is no standardisation of pay. 
However, it is known from surveys conducted 
by Trade Unions and the Low Pay Unit that 
pay is very low. 
(iv) Regulation:- This research revealed that 
corporate owners, business operators and 
members of the public are generally in 
favour of regulation. However, the 
study led the researcher to question 
just what it is that requires regulation. 
(v) Provision of a private justice system:-
Overall the perceptions of those polled 
suggest that this is not a problem, the 
observational study showed no evidence 
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(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
of this. However by its very nature it 
would not be readily observable. 
Interaction and Co-operation between public 
and private police:- The observational study 
revealed no interaction at all between private 
security and police although corporate owners 
and the few security officers spoken to, saw 
co-operation as good. Documentary evidence 
tends to suggest that co-operation is confused 
and diSjointed. 
Training:- There is a standardised training 
course available but not all companies use 
it. Training was not seen as a major problem 
by the participants in this survey. 
The precedence given to loss prevention:-
Participants in the survey did not perceive 
private security as concentrating on loss 
prevention to the detriment of crime 
prevention. 
The researcher concluded that the majority of participants in 
the research had insufficient knowledge about private 
securi ty to allow any meaningful conclusions to be drawn 
about any of the issue raised except regulation. Regulation 
of the industry is the one issue which has received a great 
deal of publicity yet a number of arguments have been put 
forward as to why any rush to introduce regulation would be 
inadvisable. 
This project like so much British research into the private 
security industry was guided by previous work carried out in 
the United States and Canada, as a result the formulation of 
the problem was guided by that research. Basically this 
project was seeking to identify if problems previously 
identified in the security industry of North America were 
relevant in Britain today. 
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The result of the research was that it was not possible to 
answer this question due to a universal lack of knowledge 
about the industry. The researcher learned from this that: 
"The formulation of a problem is often more 
essential than its solution, which may be 
merely a matter of mathematical or 
experimental skill. To raise new questions, 
new possibilities, to regard old questions 
from new angles, requires creative imagination 
and marks real advance in science" (Einstein 1938 p 92). 
The problem is a lack of knowledge about the industry and 
many of the questions that need to be asked the industry is 
reluctant to answer. As a prelude to statutory regulation a 
thorough investigative research of the industry needs to be 
conducted and the researching body needs to have the full 
authority of government to demand answers to the relevant 
questions. The researcher has posed some of the questions 
that the industry needs to answer and sees the formulation of 
such questions as the most important feature of this 
research. 
"The function of thinking is not just solving 
actual problems but discovering, envisaging, 
going into deeper questions. Often in great 
discoveries the most important thing is that 
a certain question is found. Envisaging, putting 
the productive question is often a more im~ortant, 
often a greater achievement than the Solutlon 
of a set question" (Wertheimer 1945 p 123). 
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( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
NOTES 
At the time of the research The Police Foundation 
and Policy Studies Institute Independent Committee 
of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibility of the 
Police were conducting their research. The 
findings of that research had not been published at 
submission of this study. However, reference is 
made to the work being carried out by the 
Independent Committee, see page 53 (ref. Newburn 
and Morgan 1994), page 171 (ref. Reiner 1994) and 
page 181 (ref. Johnston 1996) 
For a detailed account of B85750 see pa~e 22, this 
study. 
203 
REFERENCES 
Allen T 1995 
Ajzen I 
Fishbein M 1980 
Association of Chief Police 
Officers 1988 
Arnold J 
Robertson I T 1991 
Ascher K 1987 
Ascoli D 1987 
Ashworth I 1986 
Bacon R 1972 
Banton M 1964 
Benyon J 1982 
Burrows J 
Tarling R 1982 
Bradburn N M 1982 
204 
"They're in the front 
line" in 
Focus 73, (July, p 13) 
Understanding Attitudes 
and Predicting Social 
Behaviour 
(Englewood Cliffs NJ: 
Prentice Hall) 
A Review of the Private 
Security Sector 
(North Wales Police) 
Works Psychology 
(London:Pitman) 
The Politics 
Privatisation 
(London:Macmillan) 
of 
The Queen's Peace 
(London:Hamish Hamilton) 
"The Right Man for the 
Right Job" in 
Security and Protection 
(Feb 86, pp 16-18) 
"Manned Security" in 
The Security Industry in 
the U.K. 
(eds) F M McClintock, 
C Wiles (Cambridge 
Institute of 
Criminology) (pp 39-44) 
The Policeman in the 
Community 
(London:Tavistock) 
Pol icing in the Limel ight 
(oxford:Pergammon Press) 
Clearing up Crime 
(London:HMSO Research 
Study 73) 
"Question Wording Effects 
in Surveys" in 
Question Framing 
Response Consistency 
(ed) R M Hogarth. 
(Chicago:Univers1ty 
Chicago) 
& 
of 
Bright J A 1969 
Brown R J 
Turner J C 1985 
Burgess R 1984 
Casey C 1994 
Chuva1a J 
Gilmere J A 1992 
Clayton R 
Tomlinson H 1987 
Coatman J 1959 
Critchley T A 1979 
Cunningham W C 
Strauchs J J 
Van Meter C W 1990 
Cunningham W C 
Taylor T H 1985 
Defence Police Federation 1994 
205 
The Beat Patrol 
Experiment 
(London:Home Office) 
"Interpersonal and 
Intergroup Behaviour" in 
Intergroup Behaviour 
(ed) H Gillies 
(Oxford:Basil Blackwell) 
In the Field an 
Introduction to Field 
Research 
(London:Unwin Hyman) 
"Chief warns conference of 
pri vate securi ty ri sks" in 
Police Review 
(8 April, p 80) 
"Negligent Hiring 
Supervising and Retention 
of Employees in Private 
Security" 
in 
Security Journal 
(3(2) pp 83-87) 
Civil Actions against the 
Police 
(London:Sweet & Maxwell) 
Police 
(London:OxfordUniversity 
Press) 
A History of Pol ice in 
England and Wales 
(London:Constable) 
Pri vate Securi ty Trends 
1970-2000 
The Hallcrest Report II 
(London:Butterworth -
Heinemann) 
Private Security and 
Police in America 
The Hallcrest Report 
(Portland Or. Chancellor 
Press) 
Annual Report of the 
Management Committee 
(London:DPF) 
Draper H 1978 
Einstein A 
Infe1d H 1938 
Eiser J R 
Van der P1igt J 1993 
Elliot J F 1973 
E1msley C 1987 
Ericson R V 
Shearing C D 1986 
Finch J 1984 
Freedman D J 
Stenning P C 1977 
Foucault M 1977 
George B 1984 
Gibbon S 1994 
206 
Private Police 
Harmondsworth:PengUin) 
The Evolution of Physics 
(New York:Simon & 
Schuster) 
Attitude & Decisions 
(London:Routledge) 
Interception Patrol 
(Springfield Illinois: 
Charles Thomas) 
Crime & Society in England 
1755-1900 
(London: Longman) 
"The Scienti f ication of 
Work:The Impact of 
Scientific Knowledge on 
Social Structures" in 
Sociology of the Sciences 
Year Book 10 
(eds) G Bohme and N Stehr 
(Dordrecht:Riedel 1986) 
" I ts Great to have Someone 
to talk to: The Ethics & 
Politics of Interviewing 
Women" in 
Social 
Politics, 
Practice 
Researching 
Problems 
Pri vate Securi ty & the Law 
in Canada 
(Toronto:University of 
Toronto) 
Discipline & Punish 
(London:Allen Lane) 
"The Case for Public 
Control" in 
Guarding against Low Pay 
(eds) D Williams B George 
E Maclennan 
(London:Sage) 
"Forces asked to provided 
"cowboy" Evidence on 
firms" in 
Police Review 
(10 Sept 1994, p 7) 
Griffiths B 1984 
Handy C 1984 
Hannon T 
Murphy L 1992 
Harrison R 1972 
Hay D 
Snyder F 1989 
Hayman A 1994 
Henry S 1983 
Hertig C A 1989 
Hoddinott 1994 
Hollander E P 1981 
207 
"One Tier Policing" in 
Scarman and After 
(ed) J Benyon 
(Oxford:Pergammon Press) 
(pp 120-128) 
"Taken for Granted" in 
Understanding Schools as 
Organisations 
(York:Longman) 
Intermediate Report of the 
Working Party on Mini stry 
of Defence Police 
Promotion 
Examinations (Unpublished) 
"How to describe your 
Organisation" in 
Havard Busines Review 
(Sept-Oct 1972) 
"USing the Criminal Law 
1750-1850" in 
Policing & Private 
Prosecution in Britain 
(eds) D Hay and F Snyder 
(Oxford:Clarendon Press) 
Working alongside the 
Private Security Industry" 
in 
Focus (Home Office Police 
Research Group) 
(5 Dec 1994, pp 56-57) 
Law Society & Industrial 
Justice 
(New York:Russell Sage 
Foundation) 
"A Solid Foundation in 
Academia" in 
Security Management 
(Feb 1989, pp 87-90) 
"Publ ic Safety and Pri vate 
Security" in 
policing 
(10(3) pp 158-165) 
Principles & Methods of 
Psychology 
(Oxford:OxfordUniversity 
Press) 
Home Office 1979 
Hooke T A 1994 
Hussein A 1978 
Hyman H 1967 
Independent Committee of 
Inquiry into the Roles and 
Responsibilities of Police 1994 
Inspectorate of the Security 
Industry 1992 
Inspectorate of the Security 
Industry 
Johnston L 1992 
Johnston L 1993 
Johnston L 1992 
Johnston L 1994 
208 
The Private Security 
Industry: 
A Discussion Paper 
(London HMSO) 
I1Police Accountabilityl1 in 
The Police Journal 
(July 1994, pp 229-232) 
I1Extended Review of 
Displine and Punish by 
Michael Foucault 11 in 
Sociological Review 
November 1978 
Survey Design and Analysis 
(London:Collier Macmillan) 
Discussion Document 
(London:Police Foundation/ 
Policy Studies Insti tute) 
BS5750 Assessed Companies 
Scheme 
(Worcester:ISI) Document 
No. 114-004/1 
Putting the Industry First 
(Worcester lSI) Document 
No. 114-005 
The Rebirth of Private 
Policing 
(London:Routledge) 
I1Privatisation & 
Protection:Spatial & 
Sectoral Ideologies 
in British policing & 
Crime Prevention l1 in 
The Modern Law Review 
(56(6) pp 771-792) 
I1Regu1ating 
Securityl1 
in 
Private 
International Journal of 
the Sociology of Law 
(20 pp 1-16) 
I1Privatisation Threat or 
Opportunity" in 
policing (10(1) pp 14-22) 
Johnston L 1996 
Jones D 1982 
Jordan Surveys 1992 
Jung H 1990 
Kaka1ik J S 
Wi1dhorn S 1971 
King J 1988 
Kinsey R 
Lea J 
Young J 1986 
Krech D 
Crutchfield R S 
Ballachey E L 1962 
Lane R 1967 
Layne S 1988 
209 
"Policing Diversity:The 
Impact of the Public-
Private Complex in 
Policing" in 
Core Issues in Policing 
(eds) FLeishman , 
B Loveday, S P Savage 
(London: Longman) 
(pp 54-70) 
Crime Community & Police 
in 19th Century England 
(London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul) 
Britain's Security 
Industry 
(Bristol:Jordan & Sons 
Ltd) 
"Introductory Report: 
Privatisation of Crime 
Control" in 
Collected Studies of 
Criminological Research 
vol xxvii 
(Strasbourg:Council of 
Europe) 
The Rand Report 
(Santa Monica:The Rand 
Corporation) 
"The Raw Material" in 
Security Gazette (June 
pp 16-17) 
Losing The Fight 
Against Crime 
(Oxford:Basil Blackwell) 
The Individual in Society 
(London:McGraw Hill) 
policing the city:Boston 
1812-55 
(Cambridge Mass:Havard 
University Press) 
"No Excuses" in 
Security Management 
(June pp 91-97) 
Levy R 
ocquetau S 1987 
Lidstone K W 
Hogg R 
Sutcliffe F 1980 
Loy J W 1969 
Mark R 1977 
Marsh H L 1991 
Mason D 1991 
McCarthy J 1992 
McClintock F M 
Wiles P 1972 
210 
"Police Performance & the 
Fear of Crime: The 
Experience of the Left 
in France between 1981-
1986" in 
International Journal of 
the Sociology of Law 
(15 pp 259-280) 
Prosecution by Private 
Individuals & Non-police 
Agencies 
(Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure) 
(London:HMSO Research 
Study 
No. 10) 
"Social Psychological 
Characteristics of 
Innovations" in 
American Sociological 
Review 
(34 pp 73-81) 
"Liberty without 
Responsibility" in 
Policing a Perplexed 
Society 
(London:Allen and Unwin) 
"Corporate/University 
Co-operation in Security 
Education Programmes: 
A model for 
Professionalisation of 
Security Personnel ll in 
Security Journal 
(3 July 1991, pp 180-181) 
Private and Public 
Policing:Improving the 
Service to the Public 
through Co-operation 
(Exeter:Brookfield 
Paper 6 
Exeter University) 
Police Review 
(29 Nov 92) 
The Security Industry in 
the United Kingdom 
(Cambridge:Cambridge 
Insti tute of Criminology) 
McNeil M 1990 
Mill J S 1987 
Moser C A 
Kalton G 1971 
Newburn T 
Morgan R 1994 
Newman K 1984 
Oxford K 1985 
Pelfrey W V 1992 
Philips D 1989 
Pilkington E 1989 
Plutchik R 1974 
Rabbitts P J W 
211 
Research Methods 
(London:Routledge) 
Utilitarianism, on Liberty 
and Considerations of 
RepresentativeGovernment 
(London:Everymans Library) 
Survey Methods in Social 
Investigation 
(London:Heinemann) 
"A new Agenda for the Old 
Bill" in 
Policing 
(10(3) pp 143-159) 
Report of the Commi ssioner 
of Police for the 
Metropolis 
(London:Home Office) 
Policing by Consent: 
Scarman and After 
(Oxford:Pergamon Press) 
"Convergence of Crime 
Prevention, New Policing 
Approaches and Private 
Security:Crime Ana1ysis" 
in 
Security Journal 
(3(4) pp 215-219) 
"Good Men to Associate and 
Bad Men to Conspire" in 
policing and Prosecution 
in Britain 
(eds) D Hay and F Snyder 
(oxford:Clarendon Press) 
(pp 113-151) 
"Private Bobbies, Public 
Beats" in 
The Guardian 
(8 March) 
Foundations of 
Experimental Research 
(LOndon:Routledge) 
An Interview 
(See Appendix A) 
Radzinowicz L 1972 
Reiner R 1982 
Reiner R 1985 
Reiner R 1994 
Reiss J 1987 
Reith C 1952 
Richardson J F 1970 
Ricks T A 
Tillet B G 
Van Meter C W 1994 
Rock P 1983 
Scarman 1981 
212 
The Security Industry in 
the United Kingdom 
(Cambridge:Cambridge 
Insti tute of Criminology) 
"Who are the police" in 
The Policing Quarterly 
(53(2)) 
The Politics of the Police 
(Sussex:Wheatsheaf) 
"What should the Pol ice be 
Doing" in 
Policing 
(10(3) pp 151-156) 
"The Legitimacy of 
Intrusion into Private 
Space" in 
Private Policing 
(eds) C Shearing and 
P Stenning 
(London:Sage) 
The Blind Eye of History 
(London:Faber and Faber) 
The New York 
Police:Colonial Times to 
1901 
(New York:Oxford) 
Principles of Security 
(Cincinnati:Anderson) 
"Law Order and Power in 
late 17th Century and 
early 18th Century 
England" in 
Social Control and the 
State 
(eds) S Cohen and A Scull 
(oxford:MartinRobertson) 
The Brixton Disorders 
10-12 April 1981 
(London:HMSO) 
Schubert A 1981 
Scott S 1984 
Security Industry 
Lead Body 1992 
Security Industry Training 
Organisation 
Se1znick P 1969 
Sheehy P 1993 
Shearing C D 
Stenning P C 
Addario S M 1985 
Shearing C D 
Stenning P C 1981 
Shearing C D 
Stenning P C 1987 
Silver A 1967 
213 
IIp . 
rlvate Initiative in 
Law Enforcement: 
Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons 
1744-1856" in 
Policing and Punishment 
in 19th Century Britain 
(ed) V Bailey 
(London-Longman) 
"The Personable and the 
Powerful:Gender and Status 
in Sociological Research" 
in 
Social Researching 
Politics, Problems, 
Practice 
(eds) C Bell and H Roberts 
Update NVQ and the U.K. 
Security Industry 
(Leeds:SILB) 
Training Calendar 1992/3 
(Worcester:SITO) 
Form No. 241 
Law Society and Industrial 
Justice 
(New York:Russell Sage 
Foundation) 
Inquiring into Police 
Responsibilities and 
Rewards 
(London:HMSO) C 2280.1 
"Corporate Perceptions of 
Private Security" in 
Canadian Police Journal 
(9(4) pp 367-390) 
"Modern Pri vate Securi ty: 
Its Growth and 
Implications" in 
Crime and Justice Vol.3 
(eds) M Tonry and N Morris 
(Chicago:University of 
Chicago) 
Private policing 
(London:Sage) 
"The Demand for Order and 
Civil Society" in 
The police 
(ed) D Bordua 
(New York:Wiley) 
Smith J 1994 
South N 1987 
South N 1988 
South N 1989 
Stenning P 1989 
Storch R D 1981 
Storch R D 1989 
Task Force on Private 
Security 1977 
214 
"Reviewing the police -
Have the Government got it 
right" in 
Policing Today 
(1(1) pp 4-8) 
"Law Profit & the Private 
Person" in 
Private Policing 
(eds) C D Shearing and 
P C Stenning 
(London:Sage) 
Policing for Profit 
(London:Sage) 
"ReconstructingPolicing: 
Differentiation and 
Contraction in Post War 
Private and Public 
Policing" 
in 
Privatising Criminal 
Justice 
(ed) R Matthews 
(London:Sage) 
"Private Police and Public 
Police:Towards a 
redefini tion of the Pol ice 
role" in 
Future Issues in Policing 
(ed) Loree D J 
Montreal:Canadian Police 
College) 
"The Plague of the Blue 
Locusts:Police and Popular 
Resistance in Northern 
England 1840-1857" in 
Crime and Society 
(eds) M Fitzgerald, 
G McLennan, J Pawson 
(London::Routledge, 
Kegan Paul) pp86-116 
"Policing Rural Southern 
England before the Pol ice" 
in 
policing and Prosecution 
in Britain 1750-1850 
(eds) D Hay and F Snyder 
(oxford:Clarendon Press) 
Report of the Task Force 
on Private Security 
(Washington:U.S. Govt. 
Printing Office) 
Taylor I 
Walton P 
Young J 1973 
Tiffin J 
McCormick E J 1970 
Toffelmire J 
Duncan K 
Gale S 1992 
Turk A T 1987 
Vardalis J J 1992 
Waddington P A J 1993 
Walters T C 
O'Connell M A 1985 
Weatheritt M 1985 
Wertheimer M 1945 
Wilson J Q 1968 
Zweig F 1948 
Zweig F 1952 
215 
The New Criminology 
(London:Routledge, Kegan 
Paul) 
Industrial Psychology 
(London: George Allen & 
Unwin) 
"The ASIS Foundation 
Benchmark Survey Study" in 
Security Journal 
(3(1) pp 45-56) 
"Popular Justice and the 
Politics of Information" 
Private Policing 
(eds) C D Shearing and 
P C Stenning 
(London:Sage) 
"Privatisation of Public 
Police:Houston, Texas" in 
Security Journal 
(3(4) pp 45-57) 
Calling the Police 
(Aldershot:Avebury) 
A Guide to the Police & 
Criminal Evidence Act 
(London:Financial Training 
Publications) 
"Policing Research and 
Policing Policy" in 
Policing (1(2) pp 11-21) 
Productive Thinking 
(New York: Harper and Row) 
Varieties 
Behaviour 
Cambridge 
University 
of Police 
Mass:Havard 
Press) 
Labour Life and Poverty 
(London;Victor Golanez) 
The British Worker 
(Harmondsworth:Penguin) 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW WITH P \V RABBITS 
APPENDIX A 
AN INTERVIEW WITH MR. P W RABBITS (INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY) 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION 
In this interview Q refers to words spoken by the Researcher 
and A to words spoken by the Respondent. 
Q: Do you see a difference in the relationships between the 
general public and the public police and the general 
public and private police or private security? 
A: Between the public and the private security industry and 
the public and the police, well obviously over the years 
the pol ice have had a standing i rrespecti ve of what has 
been happening recently really of any member of the 
public having confidence in them, because they were a 
body which had power and could protect them and do 
things on thei r behal f . Now the pri vate securi ty 
industry is a new industry and there was very little 
before the last war and to a certain extent you do not 
have confidence between the public and the industry 
mainly due to bad publicity. Equally, having said that 
if you put a man in uniform and put him on duty 
somewhere, whatever colour the uniform the public look 
at the uniformed person as someone in authority or some 
one they can turn to. This is one of the dangers, that 
they are turning to the pri vate securi ty man and he 
cannot answer things for them because some of them are 
not trained and this is one of the difficulties. 
Q: Is the industry addressing this problem? 
A: It is and it isn't. We have the vocational 
qualification which at the lowest level is registered at 
level two because anyone in private security has a job 
of responsibility and having said that we waited for two 
and half years before it was registered. 
It has been registered -for over a year now, fifteen 
months. It is disappointing to see that it is not being 
taken up by the contract side of the industry. Obviously 
you know the background, you have the contract side that 
sells their services and you have the in-house. The in-
house side are already interested in this because the 
in-house look for continuous training. They look for 
annual training for their staff. The contract side are 
already saying, we do not want to train to this level of 
the under pinning knowledge of the vocational 
qualification and this is absolutely crazy because they 
all sat round the table with us. The guarding side and 
the contract side sat there and agreed that was the 
lowest standard and now they go away because they are 
used to paying lip services to training. It specifies 
wi thin the vocational qualification and the Bri tish 
Standard which :is now in existence that there should be 
a form of induction training, two days minimum and to 
get them to do that two days minimum, they think that 
minimum is the maximum, so you still have a long way to 
go and I cannot see it coming wi thout legislation, I 
just cannot see it. 
Q: What do think is the root cause of that reluctance to 
train? 
A: Yes it is profit of the company. Managing Directors of 
some of the largest companies have told me, yes if we 
have to do all this it comes off our profit and that 
really is the bottom line. I might say. 
Q: There tends to be a body of opinion that only the police 
" t rl" ght to use force. Would the have a legitlma e 
security industry hold that opinion particularly in the 
light of the increasing number of assaults on security 
officers? 
A: The thing is what is-allqwed, the private security man 
has no more powers than the ordinary civilian but in 
doing his job he can use reasonable force and he has to 
be so careful because the moment he touches somebody if 
it happens to be questionable whether he should have 
touched them he is sued for assault. Now you don't get 
this wi th the pol ice. I know you get complaints you 
read of the police now almost daily which is terrible 
the number of complaints. The thing is, you see, this 
is what is difficult with a private security force, if 
he hasn't the powers to do it he is sticking his neck 
out. If he finds somebody on premises where he has 
broken into then that is straight forward and easy, he 
can hold them there until the police arrive. But then 
if it is something else, where he is questioning 
somebody and the person attempts to go away, run away 
. for instance, now unless he is sure in his mind and he 
grabs him and pulls him down or something like this, so 
easily it leads to litigation. 
Q: So the industry's view is that only the police have the 
right to use force? 
A: Only really that power in any strength and this really 
is the crux of the whole thing. The police have powers 
the security industry have no powers. 
Q: 
A: 
How many private security companies in the U.K. 
currently submit to any form of registration or control? 
There are only two bodies that are really involved in 
this that is the BSIA, now here I think about 80 or 82 
and we have somewhere in the region of 340 companies, 
last count. Now when you say that, if odd (IPSA) at the 
500 that meet certain criteria you can you say there are 
say that there are at least another 1000 there, if not 
more, who do not meet any. 
We do not know, there is no central 
statistical body, 
without legislation yo d 't 
u on know how many companies 
there are. In Lond t 
on, a the last count through the 
yellow pages there were something like 400 
companies in 
London alone. Now of t k 1 you a e that around the country, 
think of Manchester, Birmingham and all the main areas 
you have to be heading to up to 1,500 to 2,000 but that 
is quessology pure quessology. 
Q: So you could not put a percentage on it then? 
A: No. 
Q: A lot of these companies are not accountable to anybody. 
A: No one at all and I must say some of them are very good 
companies. They don't want to be accountable to 
anybody. 
Q: And again is that simply because of money or some other 
reason? 
A: No, for example you have got some companies that are 
extremely good. If you are heading up security for a 
major company and you have been doing for a number of 
years, you are made redundant as is a colleague of yours 
and the two of you get together and employ a few more 
friends and what not and you are doing a super-duper 
Rolls Royce job. You think I don't want to join 
anything why should I. We know we are doing the best, 
we don't advertise, we work on recommendations, I can 
sympathise with them. 
But equally you have got to say that there are a lot of 
companies and this is the weakness of the big company in 
the country. I mean they put out their glossy and sit 
in the big boardroom in London and say we will work to 
this standard but by the time it waters down to the 
branch standing in Penzance, or West Wales it is a 
completely di fferent--picture and to a cert . 
_ a1n extent I 
feel sorry for the large companies beca th use ey are too 
large, large is not necessarily beautiful and you cannot 
control it, where if you take the company that employs 
a 100 men 50 to 25 and the Managing Director or the 
proprietor is the man that works amongst them, he knows 
exactly what is going on and at what level, he has that 
personal interest. 
Q: This is probably something that happens in the police 
shifting of the management point of view, in that the 
management point of view is not necessarily identical to 
that of the man on the ground. 
A: Absolutely right, it is emphasised more in the police 
force because once they get behind the desk in the 
police force they never move from it and what happens at 
the sharp end, they haven't got a clue, they just 
haven't got a clue. 
Q: The bulk of research in the United States and Canada 
suggests that the background of the street operatives of 
the police and private security is very similar. Would 
you agree that people who join the police are very 
similar to people who join security? 
A: That is a very difficul t one because I think the 
majority of people that join the police force join it 
for a career. The majority of operatives at the lower 
end of the security industry and that is where the 
majority are employed are there, 
a) because they cannot get a job doing anything else and 
b) it is earning money, enough to exist on. 
They have no interest in their career whatsoever. There 
is always the exception but back down at the basic level 
of a guard working for a guarding company he has very 
little interest in his job hence the turnover of a 
minimum of 80% a year in the big companies who are 
delighted to say it is reduced to 80% a year turnover of 
staff. 
Q: This conflicts with findings in America where someone 
might join a securi ty company as a substi tute for a 
police career or to mark time until he is accepted by a 
police force. 
A: Here that is the minority, the absolute minority. I 
deal a lot with ex-servicemen who come out and go into 
the security industry and they all look to go in-house 
if they can because in-house you work 37 hours a week, 
you are well paid, but I always tell them we are a 
strange country where if you are already employed people 
would invite you for a second job, if you haven't got a 
job interviews seem to dry up and there is a large 
number of people who attend courses where I go every 6 
weeks who have in fact gone to the contract side with a 
job as a guard. They are smart, they are enthusiastic, 
they want to push forward and I have seen within two 
months they are branch managers and within six months 
divisional managers but that is the exception. I don't 
know if you have done anything outside the U.K. have 
you? In Eire, I was over there for four days recently, 
they have a different approach there. People especially 
young people 19-25 go into the private security industry 
and get their professional qualifications waiting to go 
into the Garda because if they get the professional 
qualifications it puts them well on the top of the list 
of hundreds waiting to go in. 
Q: Could this be because the police training in Eire 
follows the American lines with a strong emphasis on 
education? 
A: I wouldn't comment on that because I think the general 
education of people in Eire is far higher than that of 
people in this country, far higher. They are hungry for 
education, they love to study. 
Q: Because of the inc~easi_ng incidence of assaults on 
security officers do security personnel ever use, if not 
violent, at least coercive measures to achieve an 
effect? 
A: I suppose there is always an unscrupulous one who does, 
but not very many, not very many. 
Q: Not as a matter of policy then? 
A: No, definitely no. 
Q: What do you think the general public expects from 
private security? 
A: I think it has changed somewhat because they cannot get 
the service they want from the police force because they 
cannot see the policeman on the beat and to the average 
member of the public that is. " We don't see a 
policeman, we don't get patrols of our estate as we used 
to years ago" and they may well be right and therefore 
in lots of places you see private security have stepped 
into this role and I think where it has gone very 
successful they have made true comparisons on this. You 
see, I think it is very difficult with their 
expectations of a private security person because they 
don't understand the industry, this is the difficulty, 
they understand the police, they know that if there is 
a problem they dial 999 and the policeman will arrive at 
sometime or other and all being well will resolve the 
problem they have got, they don't know about the 
security industry and I have to go back and say that 
there are two things that let the industry down. When 
you read in the press, I won't say daily but you read 
far more incidents of security staff going wrong than 
you do with the policeman but secondly their image when 
they go to a big shopping mall or complex and security 
are on duty and some of them stand there like a sack of 
potatoes, almost in dirty uniform, all due respect to 
policemen and I am one of the older ones that doesn't 
like to see a pol iceman wi th I h· ong al r but on the 
average a policeman gives a presence there and it is 
these sort of things that the company that employs these 
sort of men, it is this that lets them down , it does. 
Q: So it is the company that sets the standards? 
A: It is the company that sets the standards of 
presentation of the guard and it is the company that 
sets the standards of the training of the guard. But you 
see you are in a strange si tuation, you have people 
running companies who have never done the job, who have 
purely set up a company to make money. 
Q: But does that argument not apply equally to some senior 
management of securi ty companies who are ex-pol ice 
officers or ex-military who although they may have done 
a similar job have not actually done that job. 
A: I would say first of all when you look at certain 
companies and I am talking about the contract side I 
would say that the ex-service men and the ex-policemen, 
companies which are run by them. There are some 
companies who will only employ servicemen and excellent 
companies. I wouldn't say that about policemen at all, 
because a policeman hasn't got the experience ever of 
industrial security. You talk to them about industrial 
relations tribunals, Health and Safety at Work Act, you 
talk to them about fire prevention and fire control they 
have not got a clue. The serviceman has had to be 
diplomatic where ever he has been serving in the world. 
He is looked at in far different light. O.K. he hasn't 
had some of this expertise but when you put him on a 
job, the serviceman if you say to him walk from here to 
down there and keep doing it, a lot of them will do it 
for ever more until you stop them. 
A policeman the first thing he says is how can I short 
circuit this. 
Because the first thing they say to me' th 
.. _ IS at I know 
everything about security and I throw 2 3 q t' 
- ues 10ns at 
them and they say "no I mean security" Secur't ' 
. 1 Y IS not 
pure security, security embraces all those subjects, it 
has got to. Because you are in a different environment 
you are away from pol iCing you are into commercial 
industrial domestic situations. 
Q: It sounds to me as if you are making a big distinction 
between security and policing. 
A: Yes, absolutely, absolutely there is. 
If we had for example like the Netherlands, I have just 
got back from Brussels only yesterday, but if we did 
have something well trained and well presented then you 
can safely say that the security industry would corne up 
to here with regard to the police. But if you look at 
the industry as a whole the police are up here and the 
security industry is down there. 
Q: Would you say then that the term private police in 
relation to the security industry is a misnomer? 
A: I don't like the word, there is no such thing as private 
policing. They are not policing, not policing at all. 
I mean the private security person goes on an assignment 
wi th certain instructions if he is looking after a 
factory he has to patrol that factory and this is part 
of the big difference between in-house and contract. If 
you have got an in-house, your own staff and the 
accountants are the cause of this no doubt. Accountants 
are ruining the industry as they are ruining so much of 
the country. In-house security staff are trained 
initially, they go on courses all throughout the year, 
they know, you have a continuity there because they know 
the buildings, the staff, they know the lot and they are 
in a position where they do their shift they make a 
report. 
Now O.K. it won't -happ~n every time but out of 10 
assignments there would be 7 or 8 reports of something 
which was amiss because they look at it more with the 
eyes of a policemen, they have to look at it in the 
light of the problems which could be caused. Somebody 
in an office has left a fire on, for example or 
something switched on and burning somewhere, they went 
by where acid was dripping out and they take the 
appropriate action and then you talk to the contract 
side. When I talk to the managers and what not, do you 
carry a police note book? No, well how do you make a 
report? Well at the end we just pick up the phone to 
the supervisor and tell them there was nothing there. 
Now what I don't understand if, I was running a contract 
company, I would expect my staff to have something to 
report because by Jove that would put my company I trust 
much higher in the eyes of the Managing Directors of the 
client when he gets a report to say, they may only be 
minor things, but you see we are back to what we said 
earlier they are not treating it as a career. One major 
company in the country said to me, not long ago, all 
that we want is to put bodies in uniforms and, that is 
just terrible. 
Q: It is certainly not policing. 
A: No. You see they will tell you that a security officer 
on duty in the contract side if anything goes wrong he 
picks up the phone or uses his radio, he has found an 
intruder. Now in our eyes and in this association's 
eyes everybody should be trained at a level where they 
1 d I say, J·ust a moment the telephones are professiona an 
are out of order and you have dropped 
is broken. What do you do? Well I 
your radio and it 
don't know. And 
that's it in a nut shell, they don't' know. 
not trained. 
They are 
Q: Is the public attitude ~owards the security industry 
likely to be affected by social class because obviously 
company di rectors wi 11 have some not ions about the 
security industry and people who live in better class 
apartments will probably have some form of security on 
the building, if they are having a constant contact with 
private security, will social class have any effect? 
A: Yes, I suppose you are right. If you live in a council 
block of flats somewhere and all you get is trouble all 
the time and the police rush in all the time every 24 
hours or what not, you have no contact wi th pri vate 
security really and because the only place it is really 
seen is in the work place you don't see here like you do 
for instance in Dublin or Belfast where every shop has 
a securi ty person at the door you just don't see it 
here. You will see it in London with a number of shops 
but if you go into Torquay or even here, the number of 
security staff employed in departmental stores is next 
to nothing. So they don't have contact wi th it the 
public as a whole, don't. It is only perhaps the ones 
who meet it in their work place who have any idea. We 
get the questions, who are you? what do you do? people 
in security, who are people in the security industry? 
Q: Do you think it is possible that the majority of people 
in Britain are just not aware of the security industry, 
it exists but they are just not aware of it? 
A: I think that they are aware of it because of what they 
read in the press. That's all they are aware of. Look 
at all the publicity over Group 4 recently. I would 
imagine that every person in the country that looks at 
television would know that Group 4 are in security. It 
is only things like that unfortunately that you hear 
about. Then there is the security guard who was injured 
at Bishop's Gate. They will see that, but if you ask 
t d think that fellow them if you say to them wha 0 you 
. Bishop's Gate they don't know 
was doing in security In 
anything about it._ He might have only been on the 
reception desk but I guess that he had bigger 
responsibili ties than that and the other thing of course 
having seen all the side of the private security 
industry with the people in uniform then you have got 
the other side of the private securi ty industry, the 
people who are not in uniform, investigators, people who 
deal wi th product contamination, counterfei ting all this 
sort of side. There is quite a small army of peopl~ out 
there just walking around like you and I. 
Q: Do you think that in much the same way as the 
Metropolitan police have quite recently brought public 
relations people in to improve their image there is 
perhaps a need for the private security industry if not 
to improve their image at least to present the true 
image to the public?: 
A: Well I would 1 ike to know the answer. How can you 
produce the true image of what you are seeing. I know 
it is perhaps negative you are seeing the pitfalls of it 
but how do you go about showing them something for which 
there are no standards. As a service industry like ours 
I think it is very difficult to project the image. 
Individual companies may try to improve their image but 
we don't see much of that happening. 
Q: I think this is the argument that many police officers 
are putting forward to the government saying how do you 
measure standards of service when it is an immeasurable 
quantity? 
A: Exactly, you can't. 
Q: My next question relates to the self image of private 
o of they are not looking at the industry police offIcers, 1 
as a career, do they see themselves as a police officer 
or how do they see themselves? 
I think you have get th~ dangerous element vlho think 
they are police and that is dangerous, very dangerous 
indeed. And they tend to be slightly fanatical people, 
just a sprinkling you get them throughout the industry. 
When they get into the private security industry they 
feel they are the cat's whiskers. Unfortunately, they 
are so often not trained to any level and they try to 
overcome it with this bold front. I think the side of 
the industry that causes problems as well is the bouncer 
or doorman which really is causing a similar thing. 
have people who are put up and I have never 
You 
seen 
anything more crazy in all my born days, you see it in 
a lot of places, they put them in a dinner jacket and 
stand them out like a penguin. Out on the front door 
and lads and what not who have had a few drinks think, 
lets knock the penguin down and that's not the whole 
idea of the job of security and the better places have 
staff wearing a blazer wi th a little badge saying 
"security" and they don't stand out on the doorway they 
mingle, they find out things. I talked to somebody in 
security to do with a club and said "are your security 
staff trained in fire precautions?" They replied "they 
are not trained in anything". There are certain things 
going on throughout the country, Westminster Council in 
London have a form of licensing for these people. There 
are people that ring me up almost everyday saying " I am 
a karate expert" and what not and I say "I wouldn't 
employ you because you have the wrong approach." 
Securi ty is nothing I ike that. So you have got the 
element, currently there is a terrific following of 
h it young people wanting to become body guards. Now ow 
has come about I don't know, but we get contacted every 
day of the week. It is people who think the image of a 
body guard is wonderful, when you start saying training, 
what training have you had? "I am looking for a job, I 
have not had any training", this is the whole thing 
throughout the industry. "I have had no training but I 
want to do this" then you say, "predominantly these jobs 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
are given to ex-military_people who have been doing all 
this in embassies allover the world". 
Are you referring to KMS and this type or organisation? 
Yes and they say "well we see adverts for companies who 
offer this training and you go off and pay your £1,000", 
but there is no wage to earn at the end of it, no salary 
only a fee because it looks glamorous, it looks 
exciting. They say "I am 6ft tall, I am 15 stones", 
this sort of thing. 
But to come back to the use of force the body guard or 
the bouncer side of the industry surely the attraction 
is the possibility of using violence? 
A: Yes! but they will tell you, "no, they are karate 
people, they don't like using violence". It is! They 
think it is something where they can use their muscles 
but they don't realise that muscle is not used. The 
muscle that has been used I think quite rightly in the 
police force which I regret now they can't use it, the 
Q: 
police can't even shout at a person now. You can be 
reported for shouting at someone, we are living in a 
crazy world but the thing was if somebody was determined 
to go through somewhere you could put 3 pol icemen 
together and they just wouldn't go through. There is a 
deterrent if you put a 6ft 6" pol iceman out on the 
street and when you put a Sft 8" policeman there is a 
big difference. 
Wouldn't you agree in the light of 
policing moving 
towards a service approach it is 
not height but the 
officer's approach that matters in 
the way he controls 
the situation? 
A: Well true, but with any of us, if you go somewhere and 
you see someone there looking the part you tend to go to 
him, than you would to, someone who doesn't look the 
part. You cannot generalise because you are talking 
about something special and it always amazes me when you 
see in London in the MET little dwarf men literally 
walking around when at one time they were all 6ft but 
they couldn't get that height so they brought the height 
down and down. 
Q: If you take into consideration ethnic minorities where 
in some cases Sft 8" is more than the average height and 
you want ethnic officers in police forces then surely 
there is no option but to reduce the height limit. On 
this particular aspect, is there, do you think a higher 
proportion of ethnic officers in the security industry? 
A: I would say definitely yes! definitely yes. Especially 
in the London area where you have all types of ethnics 
right across the board, but a lot of them are there 
purely because they cannot get any other work. 
Q: So not because of any leaning towards the law or because 
they want to be police officers? 
A: No, no. When you consider if you are working for a 
large company in this country and this is the big thing, 
when you come to rates of pay. In London for instance 
you would be lucky if you were earning £3.00 an hour and 
some companies would pay £2.00 an hour but in the 
contract side you work a minimum of 60 hours a week but 
you could be doing 90 or 100 hours a week but you see a 
lot of these people especially those coming from 
overseas, if they can put a roof over their head and 
have enough to eat that's what they are looking for, and 
some of them possibly go off and work at another job 
when they have finished at this one, and this is the 
problem you have generally in this industry because of 
the low pay people go off and work somewhere else. 
Q: What would you think is the attitude of th e general 
public towards the rack of accountability of the 
security industry? 
A: The majority of the public haven't got a clue. There is 
no legislation at all in this country for our industry 
we stick out like a sore thumb in the western world and 
in the EC there are only two other countries which have 
no legislation that's Greece and Eire, all the rest have 
some form of legislation. 
Q: But surely there is an EC directive that the industry 
must be legislated for or there must be some provision 
for some form of self regulation? 
A: There is no directive really as such because there is 
nothing within the EC and this is the amazing thing, we 
I 
all talk about the EC:and when we get there and find 
that there is no such ,thing because all the countries 
are doing their own :thing. 
I 
In securi ty France has 
certain ideas Germany, Italy, Spain they are all doing 
it differently but they all get to the same goal in the 
end and that is having, I would say, reasonably well 
trained staff who meet the requirements and when you 
look at the Netherlands you have very well trained staff 
who meet the requirements 
a) they are vetted before they can work in the industry 
and 
b) they are trained, 
and if you took those two things and I am a little bit 
old fashioned I would put training before vetting to a 
certain extent because if somebody went wrong 10 years 
ago or something like this and they have been good for 
10 years I don't think you can hold it against them 
today. There is a problem when you look at levels of 
vetting because what do you say is above the line and 
what do you say is below the line it is very very 
difficult. 
There is no directi~e as such because 1.·n 1990, I think 
may be in 1991, I went over personally to launch a 
charter for the private ·t· securl. y l.ndustry in Brussels 
and that's grinding its way through and that's why I 
have been there this week. 
Q: How do you think the service that t~e security industry 
renders affects publ ic atti tudes to pol iCing in general? 
A: I think we must forget this policing in general, it is 
two separate worlds. I think no matter what goes wrong 
or how you see the private security industry I don't 
think they compare wi th the pol ice at all. I mean 
people see the private security industry or the service 
and they can only comment on it if they have had the 
service and of course a lot of people would have the 
electronic hardware, such as having an alarm fi tted 
which is completely different, completely different to 
the guarding side. They would only measure the quality 
of the service if they had contact, but I don't think 
they would say Itoh heavens it was a lousy securi ty 
officer that's terrible the police are similar". I 
don't think that would ever happen. 
Q: What I was trying to say with that question was, if you 
have a si tuation where a securi ty officer arrested 
somebody for whatever reason and he is holding this 
person until the police arrive, at the end of the legal 
process the whole experience of that incident is going 
to affect that person's attitude towards the police. If 
the initial part of the experience was not handled as 
well as it might have been, irrespective of what the 
police officer has later done it's the whole experience 
that's imprinted in the person's mind. 
A: If you have a well trained security officer, then he 
would have been trained in the police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, so he would know and lets face it, you are 
talking the majority of those arrests as such are 1n the 
retail side of the trade. He would know whether the 
-
person is allowed to sit down or whether he should make 
them a cup of coffee or whatever and to keep everything 
alright. Only you don't want a terrific uproar because 
they are going to be saying "I am not guilty it wasn~t 
me, that wasn't in my bag", so it requires special 
training, extra training for those working in the retail 
trade and that is so important and the other thing there 
I think you will find there are more trained staff in 
the retail side because if you put a foot wrong you will 
be sued tomorrow. 
Q: So in that particular case the cost of training is 
preferable to the cost of litigation? 
A: Yes, yes the majority of store detectives are of course 
employed by that company. Very few of them are supplied 
from the contract side of the industry. The security 
man who stands in the store, if they have one, he is 
hardly ever likely to make an arrest, he is put there 
like a dummy just warning people that there is security. 
Q: So we are talking about crime prevention. 
A: Yes, yes 
Q: Are there standardised policies for selecting recruits 
for the security industry? 
A: There aren't really, I mean one would have to look for 
the normal thing of somebody with reasonable 
The b ig thing is that he has to be able intelligence. 
to read and write. Then again the Managing Director of 
one of the largest companies in the country said to me 
"I can't guarantee that all my staff 
not so long ago, 
can read and wr i te" . 
If you are recruiting people you just can't say that. 
Now the other thing that I questioned and very few 
companies do it I said "do you test them f 
_ or colour 
blindness?", they say "why" y 
. ou put them on duty you 
have taken a contract for a block of flats or f a actory 
or whatever it may be it is not just security you could 
have a batch of coloured lights and if the heating goes 
to a lower level it affects these lights. 
Q: So they are not medically testing them at all? 
A: Exactly. 
Q: So there is no standard intelligence test? 
A: No. 
Q: It is pretty much down to each company who they select. 
A: Well it is and I have to come back again and say in your 
medi urn size company, if I owned a company and Fred 
Bloggs does something wrong is it going to affect me? 
People are going to point at me and you know whereas if 
I am just the manager of a company, it is different. 
Q: In America there is qui te a substantial interchange 
between the personnel of pri vate securi ty and pol ice 
would you say that people join private security in 
Britain to mark time until they join the police? 
A: I could say that you could almost measure it as nil. 
Q: Would you say that what interchange there is tends to be 
at the higher level then? 
A: No, not moving from the private security industry to the 
police, no! but retired police officers coming out is 
less and less because they don't seem to ret i re so 
early. They have in the past predominantly gone to in-
house and that job so often has been got on the golf 
course prior to coming out because the ordinary police 
constable doesn't tend to look for it at all. It is the 
-
senior ones and what I am saying to you is what they 
tell me and probably 50% of our individual members are 
retired police officers, ex-policemen. They say that 
they were shocked when they carne out, they knew nothing, 
they thought they knew everything, but they knew nothing 
and this is where we do a lot of training for them so 
they can get their professional qualifications because 
of all these other subjects which they have got to 
understand. Whereas, to them in the past they could 
pass it on to somebody else, but now they are there they 
are going to be a quantity and this is where a lot of 
policemen when they are going into the industry within 
a month or six weeks they are thrown out. It doesn't 
matter what rank, they could have been commanders but 
they just don't realise you have to keep the wheels of 
industry turning. They have been thinking of feeling 
collars and when they take a look now the first thing 
is, "good afternoon", ring up and say "look I have taken 
this job with so and so, any tips" and the first thing 
I ask is "what is the company's policy on security" and 
they have no idea and I say be prepared because most 
companies say we don't prosecute for any theft under 
£100. They say "what?" and I say no, you are a 
manufacturing company, you can imagine you feel 
somebody's collar that means the shop steward comes 
along he says right we are stopping for half an hour, 
they don't measure that in a £100 or a £1,000 or £10,000 
it may have cost the company a £100,000 that half hour, 
the people that run that business are on the ball, they 
can't stop the wheels because they know how much it is 
going to cost them. What they want you to do is to 
produce everything for evidence against him so you can 
take him up to Personnel and he is sacked. Plus for a 
" h "t comes into a new field policeman and this IS were 1 
for you in three months there is going to be a tribunal 
hearing and I say "you have to produce all your 
"that's alright" but I say 
statements" and they say 
ff t f rms of statements 
"just a moment they are di eren 0 
because you can use __ hearsay evidence" d 
- , an I say "YOU 
submi t all you statements up to th Ch· 
e al rman of the 
company and he reads them through and says that there is 
no case to answer". I say "i t wi 11 
never go any 
is so much you have got to do in further" I say "there 
that respect and it is 
turning" . 
all to do with keeping the wheels 
Q: It sounds as if the main aim of the security industry is 
to minimise loss. 
A: Yes absolutely. 
Q: Does minimising loss take precedence over enforcing the 
law? 
A: Yes, yes the policy of the company comes' above the law 
of the land it does internally. It has got to, lets be 
realistic. It's no good taking somebody to Court for 
stealing a pencil out of the office and losing 
production. The other thing is, whoever he is, is he 
going to be sacked? Somebody in senior management will 
say to us, how long has been with us, 35 years been a 
wonderful servant and he's going to turn round and say 
just a moment, is this the first time he has put a foot 
wrong as far as we know. 
Q: So we are talking about anything less than a £ 100 
because even the CPS take into consideration the value 
of stolen property. 
A: Yes but if the company wants to it can pursue its own 
private prosecution, if necessary. 
Q: Do you think that the police are specialised perhaps 
even over specialised whereas the security industry 
embraces a far wider range of functions? 
A: You are right. We .. all say that policemen are 
blinkered because their job is very blinkered. 
very 
They 
don't take everything round them 1· nto consideration 
which you have got to, you just have got to. When you 
are working in an industrial or commercial environment 
even odd things about searching, you can't stop and 
search anybody. You can have it built into their 
contract of employment that they will be stopped and 
searched and most reasonable companies have done that 
and thi s was questioned some whi Ie ago when I was 
sitting on a committee: for the health service and they 
said you can't stop the doctors and consultants coming 
out and open the boot of thei r cars. You ask the 
Managing Director of any company if his car is not 
stopped he wants to know why, immediately up go the 
shutters but people lare 
approach them properly~ 
I 
I 
I 
reasonable enough if you 
Q: A police constable has: a certain amount of discretion 
but it seems to me t~at you are saying a securi ty 
officer has even more discretion because as you said the 
policy of the company is above the law of the land and 
he is choosing, if not to ignore the offence at least 
not to process it through legal channels which at the 
end of the day a police officer can't do. 
A: 
Q: 
Yes. This is true because at the end of the day it is 
not the police officer's own property, is it? It is 
somebody else's, a third party's property but it is 
important. Yes you are right he has more choice the 
security man but remember a lot of other things would 
come under failing to meet company policy and therefore 
we go up to personnel and that would be dealt with later 
based on their history within the company. 
Considering the level of training and motivation of the 
basic grade officer is that not an awful lot of 
.b·l1·ty for that man to accept? 
respons1 1 
A: I would say with trainin~ and I have spent many years in 
the industry myself, everybody and in every department 
has a veneer put on their head of various things and one 
of them is training. There it is in the budget you have 
x amount of money for training your staff. Now you talk 
to the contract side of the industry and ask them what 
training do you do. Oh yes they all get trained, I have 
them in and talk to them, and ask what training you do 
annually. They reply II oh no we only do one lot of 
training even if they have been with us 10 years they 
only get one lot of training when they start". This 
other thing of course on the job training which is also 
a dangerous thing where they are taught by people who 
are doing the job and they learn all the bad habits. It 
is almost worlds apart and as I said earl ier ex-
policemen, soon realise it is two different worlds it is 
a vast job compared to what they were doing. 
a much broader one. 
In a way 
Q: While we are talking about training and to go back to my 
earlier question on assaults on security officers, is 
any training given in response to the increasing number 
of attacks, particularly in the retai 1 side of the 
industry for instance are they being gi ven any sel f 
defence training? 
A: I would say not normally self defence. 
. . ? Q: What about social skills traInIng. 
A: 
Q: 
No, I could quote you that the College in Dublin where 
th e g iven self defence they do a two year course, ey ar 
training there and that is of particular benefit to the 
quite large number of ladies they have going through 
that course. 
when you think of people 1 ike store Yes!, I suppose . 
who are more likely to arrest people thIS detectives 
would be a benefit. 
A: Yes I think you could find again a store detective, the 
in-house can almost cho~se what training they receive 
and on something like this most companies would back 
them but it is not part of the standard training of a 
security guard. 
Q: Are there any plans to introduce it? 
A: No I don't know of anything at all. 
Q: But about social skills training, the way securi ty 
guards approach people. 
A: Yes this is where our courses differ a great deal you 
see some courses around are package courses where they 
are given a book and a tape and told to go away and then 
corne back in a fortnight's time and will have a number 
of pieces of paper with tick boxes on, you know, what do 
you do first when you go on duty. Plug the kettle in, 
this sort of thing, absolute waste of time. We do a lot 
of role playing and that's vital when you are doing the 
training and if that is going on it has got to be a good 
branch, because this approach initially gives you the 
answer to many things. 
Q: Is there an increasing trend towards the facilitive 
style of training? 
A: At the moment no. No, there isn't because the training 
for the contract side it is at such a low level. They 
don't even talk in terms of training they may say it 
adds up to days but we would say that a minimum training 
should be a two day course. 
Q: This highlights the difference between Britain and the 
United States because in the States they are looking at 
uni versi ty degrees for the basic guard and masters 
degrees for the management side. 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
They might be, but we have to put the USA t 
~ 0 one side 
because when anyone from here goes 
. over there they greet 
them wlth open arms in the industry b 
ecause for example 
that College in Dublin, a lot of Irl'sh people, 
youngsters go off to America and t· . lme and tlme again 
they say and they have shown them the syllabus and the 
things they do well of course the people are streets 
behind over there, they just don't do l't, th ey are great 
ones of having this where everyone finishes their 
education with a degree more or less, in America. 
Which begs questions about the quality of the degree. 
Yes, yes. 
Now I believe that there is a joint initiative between 
your own organisation and the BSIA. Could you tell me 
a little about this. 
this jOint initiative? 
Is the Inspectorate a result of 
A: Yes. It was conceived last October very much under the 
guide lines of the Home Office who I would now say to 
you here made a terrific blunder by pushing it too fast. 
It is to be set up and going, it isn't going now this 
day. In fact I had a parcel right this morning, I hope 
it is the first application forms to apply to the lSI to 
have their inspections. The whole idea was that it 
would be an independent Inspectorate, that's fine, 
that's fine covering the whole of the industry. One of 
the first meetings I went to when this was first talked 
about, we are an association and I always say whenever 
I can, now look lets think about people who are not 
members of any association. The companies out there 
because that's the companies we want to bring up and 
bring into the fold and the Horne Office agreed. Now it 
looks to me that the levels that have been set will not 
be achievable by the little companies outside and I will 
say this with guarded words it worries me if everything 
is going to be manoeuvred towards only large companies 
being in the industry b~cause this would be terrible. 
Good oak trees start from acorns, unless you have small 
operations an amount of small companies corning through, 
you are never going to help things at the other end. 
But what I don't like to see at the moment is what is 
happening out there. I sit on the management board but 
I do feel that some of these things will preclude the 
smaller companies from getting registered. What worries 
me as well is when they look at training they are not 
looking at the underpinning knowledge of the V.Q. They 
are looking only at training, it is the training the BSI 
used to do, well they call it training but it proves, 
that somebody can read and tick a box that's all it 
proves and that is no good. The whole idea is to lift 
everything up and I have never known such a strange 
industry and I have been in it a lot of years now. In 
most industries the large names are outfront like the 
leI, Marks and Spencers who set the standard which 
everybody el se tries to live up to, but the 1 arge 
companies in our industry don't. 
They do it in their glossies but the actual service they 
give is very often the poorest in the country and they 
don't want to lift it. 
Q:: Because if they did it would eat money from the profits. 
A: Well, that's 
thing and I 
legislation. 
it exactly and this is the frightening 
can't see any change until we get 
Yet if they had waited 6 months and given 
themsel ves time to prepare, it would have gone far 
There are going to be three levels of better. 
t · the enroled level which will be registered inspec lon, 
who se t fairly high standards, 
it's the 
for companies 
few sections removed only a few, then at BS7499 with a 
have got to apply for the 
100% BS7499. Now 
the end of that year they 
inspected level and that is purely a 
b t ·t ·s a British Standard 7499 is a British standard u 1 1 
of practice which 
a British is a big difference to 
Standard but you have I t a 0 of anomalies in 
wording. There is nothing clear I 
it in the 
mean if you have got 
a British Standard which it either shows black or white 
you know where you a b t h re u t ere are so many grey areas 
in there. In fact I am si tting on one of the sub-
corruni ttees of lSI, I think h we ave got something between 
20-30 anomal ies in their one clarification from the 
Bri tish Standard. I h t ave go to say to you, I don't 
think we should get it. Now what happens then, do lSI 
put their interpretation on it perhaps that's the wrong 
word I don't think British Standards would say you can 
interpret anything they print, I don't know the thing is 
you can't if you make such a general statement, it is no 
good, you can't inspect to that, you have got to inspect 
to something which is fairly tangible to the inspector. 
Q: Something that can be evaluated. 
A: Yes, all the way through and then you have got the top 
level which will be BS5750 incorporating 7499 now more 
and more people and I have thought it for a long while 
B85750 isn't worth the paper it is written on. 
Everybody is screaming this is a wonderful standard when 
the country is going to thrive on it, it may be in the 
manufacturing side it may be in big business but in the 
service industry it is not because the little old 
company round the corner doing a shocking job, it can be 
producing cracked china dogs, but if you keep producing 
cracked china dogs you can still get your BS5750. It 
would be terrible for this industry. People are going 
for 5750 to satisfy clients and one major client said I 
don't care you get your 5750 if it is cheapest in the 
country this will satisfy us but we are saying it must 
be linked in with 7499. Now if you link the two 
together you have got something that really matters. I 
mean for example with 5750 if you have got a company 
with four branches, you only have to inspect one so you 
Q: 
only go through everything in one branch. 
have to do everyone, th~t is important. 
With 7499 you 
That one branch, if you were· t· lnspec lng one branch , 
would that be chosen at random? 
A: Yes. 
Q: It wouldn't be for the company to say, this is the 
branch to have a look at? 
A: Well you know, you are thinking the same as I think, so 
often these things do happen but officially it won't be 
that way. On that subject I feel very, very sorry for 
the large companies. If you have got 40 branches if you 
go for the whole of 5750 and that little branch up in 
Scotland lets you down you loose your 5750 for 
everything. Now some companies are going for zones or 
regions and they may have perhaps 7 or 8 branches per 
region and there you would only loose that region. Now 
there was a very good wri te up in "The Times" on it. 
Group 4 have gone for every branch to be individually 
assessed for 5750 which is a heck of a cost but it is an 
insurance policy. In fact if one branch lets them down 
only that branch fails. 
Q: So is it the company that bears the cost of the 
inspection then? 
, 
A: Yes, yes on 5750 initially to set up 5750 is anything 
between, and this will be each segment in a company who 
4, anything between £5,000 is going for it like Group 
and £20,000 to do each one. 
to do. Anyway back to lSI I 
It is a very costly thing 
and then there wi 11 be 
The thing is it has got to attract 
annual inspections. 
companies not sort of grab them round the throat. In 
other words, the client is not saying look you have got 
It has got to be so 
to be inspected by lSI or else. 
tl'ng to corne and be inspected. that people are wan 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
But wi 11 there sti 1). be an awful 1 t f 
o 0 companies out 
there carrying on as 
now, with no inspections and no 
accountability? 
Exactly, and it is no d 
. goo saying that the cl ient 
governs lt, he can do as much as h 
e can but there is so 
much work out there where the client couldn't 
care less 
He is just saying I want a security service and he PiCk~ 
up the yellow pages and picks a security service. 
Could the insurance companies not exert more influence 
on the securi ty industry to become registered to be 
inspected? 
No. They never have had any influence on the manned 
guarding side, no influence at all on the manned 
guarding. Now they do on the alarm installing side. 
Q: This is what I am thinking, if they can do it on the 
alarm side why can't they do it on the manned guarding 
side? 
A: Well you see, they don't get involved, for one thing you 
don't have a series of companies claiming from them. 
They are not particularly interested. They would be 
very loath at the moment because they are having 
terrible trouble with the alarm side because in fact the 
body there which looks after that side is NACOS and they 
have fallen foul of 5750 last year,when they gave all 
their members until the 1st of January. This year to 
become 5750, and only a handful have become 5750 and 
they are having to throw out all the others. I don't 
know what happens there because in fact NACOS is 
financed by the major insurance companies and I sat on 
a meeting called by the Office of Fair Trading, looking 
at this and we are waiting for the deliberation from 
that. Because I think there is going to be a major 
enquiry and you can't have the insurance company owning 
the inspectorate and then saying to people who are 
installing alarms, saying to I" c lents, you can only use 
these member companies. That' h swat they have been 
doing. It is interest ing to see what 1" s gOing to 
happen. , 
Q: My next question is what new initiatives, if any, have 
been introduced into training. As a result of the jOint 
initiative between yourselves and the BSIA. Are there 
likely to be any changes in training? 
A: I would say no.When I say that, that's purely on the 
inspectorate. Thei r views on training and ours are 
poles apart, poles apart. 
Q: Can you ever foresee a national standard of training? 
A: I can when legislation comes, not before. 
I 
Q: Who wi 11 set the standards, the government or the 
industry? 
A: Self regulation does not work. Look at the financial 
world and the ci ty. You see what happens there it 
doesn't work. The BSIA and John Wheeler were against 
any form of legislation until two years ago and then he 
rang me up to say, well we are now backing you. 
Q: Do you think that it will come? 
A: The only chance I can see of it corning, it nearly came 
at the last election, is just according to how quickly 
our people in Brussels move. The Home Office knows what 
is happening over there and you know we could be talking 
another year or two years but I think if we can get 
something really coming out of Brussels to the 
government saying look this is what is happening in the 
other countries, what we are working towards is saying 
look this is the best format of it. 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Do you think that 
_.we will then follow the model in 
Northern Ireland? 
No, no the legislation in Northern Ireland is 
like that. 
nothing 
Is that because l't l' . 1 s ma1n y to eliminate terrorist 
groups from the security industry? 
That was one, yes because I sat with Nicholas Scott who 
was the Minister for Law and Order at that time, we sat 
in London on this and well I will tell you the full 
story of it. He had the draft and eventually we tied up 
various bi ts. In that actual legislation it says a 
securi ty guard, it doesn 1 t sayan employee of any 
company offering a securi ty service but a securi ty 
guard, and I said, you are going to have trouble with 
this. They looked at it and said, II no II that it will be 
fine and of course it went through and it has been going 
on for 2 1/2 years. 
I was invited out to luncheon in July because we were 
the only organization in the country who would help them 
wi th this. The BSIA said no to government, we don't 
believe in any form of legislation we are not going to 
speak with you on this and I was quite surprised when we 
got down there wi th the chairman of our region in 
Northern Ireland, we went to luncheon and there were 
only 10 of us there, I think, and who should be sat 
there at the table but David Fletcher of BSIA and Mr 
Pike one of the Directors of Securicor Northern Ireland 
and it was launched and in the speech it was said, well 
they opened the speech by saying well, I know what we 
are doing today the launching day doesn't satisfy me or 
IPSA because you are looking for full legislation but 
this is for the purpose just as you say blah, blah, blah 
and explained that every company had to register by the 
31st December or they would have to cease trading and 
there was no appeal. 
I thought that was mo_st interesting and that went 
through, and five companies didn't register and went out 
of business it was qui te interesting. It went on to 
explain that all staff details had to be submitted to 
stormont, date of birth, place of birth and all this and 
the list would be sent back to the company as to who 
could continue in employment and who had to be got rid 
of and now he said turning to me, now that's right for 
security guards and by the way he said if anybody wants 
to stop me anywhere in this please if you are not sure 
of anything, so Mr: Pike put his hand up, he would like 
to ask a question he said "our cash in transit staff are 
not called security guards so I assume they are exempt 
from this". "No", he said "there is no one exempt from 
it". 
staff. 
On we go again then he came to recrui t ing new 
"You recruit" he said and "you have to allow 14 
days before you c~n take them on and we have those 14 
days to do the necessary checking". 
What happens when very often on a Friday we get a new 
contract we recruit over the weekend and put them in a 
uniform on Monday morning. David Fletcher could have 
fallen through the floor because we know, we know it 
goes on. He said it makes no difference 14 days you 
cannot employ them beforehand but that was the system 
and that's what they did. The outcome of it all and I 
have been back over a couple of times because they had 
a review of it and it is very disappointing because you 
see when they check on Marcel Brain and they find, this 
is the RUe, are saying, oh dear they sent the form back 
saying he is clear, he is fine, he is not connected with 
any terrorism but he has got burglary, he has got this 
and he has got that and the employer doesn't know and 
there they are sort of laughing behind the scenes. You 
know sort of saying you are employing him? why?, and it 
is very difficult but whether you are in Northern 
Ireland or not and you are an employer and you don't 
know the facts and they are sat there with the facts 
knowing what the man has been up to, so it served the 
purpose for which they wanted it. 
It has left a lot of~~hings out, I understand now at the 
moment they are so slow in doing the checking it's 
unbelievable. 
Q: What is the level of co-operation in mainland Britain 
between the police and the security industry, do they 
work together? 
A: It I S variable. There is not a standard at all of 
commi tment, I mean we invi te pol icemen, senior 
policemen, chief constables and what not to our events. 
If you can get them nail them down and talk to them show 
them what's going on. Most of them really don't want to 
know. All they know are the bad facts which they have 
had to deal wi th and they don't really know what's 
involved but I mean we have got a very good relationship 
overall with them. In fact we produced a brochure for 
re-training policemen who want to come into the industry 
and things like this but it is completely different when 
you go to somewhere like Southern Ireland, I mean when 
you are walking along the road with somebody and he says 
by the way come over here, hello this is our Minister of 
Justice come and have a word and you go into the nearest 
pub wi th the Minister of Justice and you talk over 
things. The Home Office there is a very good 
relationships the~e. F3 is the department that looks 
after our side of the industry but again of course they 
will be civil servants and I often wonder, I think they 
have their minds made up before you can talk to them. 
Q: Thank you very much Mr Rabbi ts, that has been very 
helpful. 
APPENDIX B 
LE'I"IERS FROM SECURITY COMPANIES 
~~BSIA 
IE BRITISH SECURITY 
DUSTRY ASSOCIATION 
F/RJN 
rd Apri 1 1993 
Hannon, Esq. 
,OA Mitchell Circle 
IP Wethersfi e 1 d 
:AINTREE, Essex 
17 4AZ 
~ar Mr. Hannon, 
The British Securi tv 
Industry Associati~n Ltd 
Securitv House 
Barbou'me Road 
Worcester \\'Rl iRS 
Telephone 0905 2UG"; 
Fax 0905 61362:; 
lank you for your letter of 4th April, enquiring about information of your 
1.0 studies. Answering your questions in the order you raise them, I have 
Ie following comments ;-
Approx i mate ly fi fty compani es are current 1y subject to inspect i on by 
the Inspectorate of the Security Industry (151). These are all the 
large .companies who are members of this Association. They employ 
approxlmately 55,000 guards. 
The creation of lSI was supported by the Home Office. 
Guarding companies are inspected against BS 7499 :' Part 1. Companies 
are also encouraged to move from Inspected Companies status to BS 5750 
Assessed status. 
1. Different companies look for different qualities in their recruits, 
ranging from the'cowboy'company who normally seeks a hot, warm body, to 
the quality companies who have very high standards. This of course is 
also reinforced in the rates of pay. 
Securicor Guarding Limited have carried out some excellent \'lork on 
psychometric testing of their guards with the result that they have 
substantially reduced labour turnover. 
2. Many security companies recruit from the Services or from amongst 
retired Police. 
4. I enclose a brochure relating to the creation of 151. This is a direct 
successor to the Manned Services Inspectorate (MSI), establ ished by 
BSIA in 1982 but became totally independent in 1992 vlhen the Inter-
national Professional Security Association (IPSA) became an addiLional 
shareholder. 
Contd. . .. 
- 2 -
Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) is the independent 
training organisation recognised by the Department of Employment as ~he 
Industry Training Organisation for the security industry. It has made 
considerable progress in developing training for the manned services 
industry, and in particular :-
* basic training for all new recruits supported by on-the-job training 
covering the first threemQnths; 
* Professional Guard 1 - a SITO/City and Guilds qualification that has 
now been achieved by 13,000 guards. This will shortly be followed by 
Professional Guard 2; and also 
* the introduction of the first National Vocational Qualification last 
year. The NVQ Level 2 is likely to be adopted very rapidly 
throughout the industry during the coming years. 
)u also ask about pri vate pol i ci ng of shoppi ng centres and I suggest you 
)ntact one or more of the following 
nkerton Security Services Limited 
sinore Way, 205 Lower Richmond Road, Richmond, Surrey, TN9 4LN 
~curi ty Express Guards ~stbourne Manor, Westbourne Road, Edbaston, Birmingham,.B15 3TR 
:erling Granada Security Services Limited 
)5-307 Chiswick High Road, London, W4 4HH 
)Urs sincerely, 
.5. FLETCHER 
li ef Execut i ve 
-:s 
PUTNEY 
LONDON 
SW152EX 
TELEPHONE 081-780 2666 
FACSIMILE 081-7802731 
7 July 1993 
Mr T Hannon 
460A Mitchell Circle 
MDP Wethersfield 
Braintree 
Essex 
CM74AZ 
Dear Thomas, 
Many thanks for your letter dated 21 June 1993 concemino information 
reqUIred as part of your Ph.D. b 
I will. try and offer .what in.sight I c~ into the r~cruitment processes th~t ~mkerto~ Secunty ServIces apply 10 the selectlOn, recruitment and 
trammg prOVI?ed to appli~ant~ wishing to be employed as security 
offic.ers. WhIlst. I do ma1OtaI~ the company policy and procedure 
relat:ng to selectIOn and .r~c.rU1t~ent I do not personally interview 
apphcants. That responsIbIlIty IS delegated to regional recruitment 
officers who are operational staff who have received recruitment 
training. 
It is easy to over simplify the situation but in practice each customer 
who uses Pinkerton Security Services will have differing criteria 
concerning the individual characteristics they believe are important. 
Hence our personal profile will differ, even though the job 
specification and job description will be the same. . 
Our recruitment teams are provided with training to assist applicants 
with our tailor made application form. Screening commences with the 
initial interview and candidates are made aware of the company's 
process of checking information. 
We adhere strictly to the guide-lines issued by the British Security 
Industry Association and candidates who are successful in compl~t~ng 
the initial interview must than attend a two day (16 hour) tra10mg 
course and must also be fully screened to account for all periods of 
employment and unemployment in the past 5 years. 
It is only after the company are satisfied that they have been trained 
and successfully tested, have a work h~sto.ry that has been verified and 
have provided documentary proof to mdicate t~ey are. who th~y say 
they are, that employment can cOf!lf!lence. Dunng theIr probatlOnary 
period of employment furthe! tr~mmg a~d assessmen~ occurs. The 
process of checking and vet.tmg mfor,matlOn also contmues and may 
cover up to a 20 year period If appropnate. 
By now you will have gained an im~res~ion of a complicate? P,roc~s: 
that has as many variations and combmatlOns as you can pOSSIbly thmk 
of. 
!cont. 
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It is not possible to go into any depth in this short explanation but I do 
hope it may have provided you with a brief overview of the process of 
recruitment amongst the professionally based security services 
organisations. 
Yours sincerely, 
~L\4~ ~ 
~--
:::----
. -ard Gray . 
General Manager Personnel ServIces 
IIItl!IIIW 
STERLING GRANADA 
Sterling Granada Security Services 
12-1-4 Sterling Industrial Estate, Rainham Road S h D out, agenham, Essex R.\ll0 8TA 
Telephone 081-98-4 8020 Facsimile 081-98-41618 
r/tlk 
1993 
.snnon 
itcrlell Ci re1e 
t.her'sfi e ld 
RE E 
7 
.-
t- H,.Jnn()n 
you for YOur lelJN "j ,I .1'1'"'' Iq(H wl,;el, I",,' b",", [) ,·.,.>il 
fo t" 2;C t ion -
urpr;sed that the f'SIA hac. ,efp"Pri 'lOll to II,. ·"i,'·'" o,Jl 
S 8 1 e c t ion pro c e d u res ;) n' rI; eta t" d b y B 5 J A '"" n u 1., t i (} n s. a II <i 
. e 1 V foIl 0 '.' t h p; r r e ~ 11; ,. e fll e n t $. 2' n d \. h 0 5 " '" fer 1t ish 
,rd 749 9 . Mav J S ugg 8 ,.t yOLl con t.jct. BS I A. fo r con i "5 oi 
as they '.t>Ji 11 Cli ve YOU U18 rn·;:l:>:'irnurn i nf'l!'rn::,t ion. 
sincerely. 
A Tay}or' 
JNEL IVIANAGEF~ 
I, (.1,\11.1,1"(',,,,11,1,( ',I"'" I.ill''''-.! 
., '., "'-t'I""it~\I.,!:IZ."I'! I""d.·:t\\: 11111 
~tCUKiTY EXPRESS GUARDS 
A Secunty Service of Mayne Nickless (UK) Limited m 
lur Ref: JOB/TJW 
nd July, 1993. 
1r. T. Hannon, 
60A Mitchell Circle, 
1DP Wethersfield, 
rain tree, 
ssex. 
M74AZ. 
)ear Mr. Hannon, 
West~~urne Manor, 17 Westbourne Road 
Edgbaston,-Birmingham B15 3TR ' 
Tel: 021-4544342 Fax: 021-455 8862 
'hank you for your letter of 21st June 1993, regarding assistance in your research. 
{iefly, the selection, screening and training of applicants to this Company is at least 
) BS7499 and BSIA minimum standards and I am ass,uming that you are familiar 
lith these. 
his is developed in the enclosed photocopies of the relevant procedures which I 
lould ask you to keep confidential. 
'lease let me know if I can be of any further assistance. 
'ours sincerely, 
lvV 
/ 
O. Beck 
rational Personnel & Training Manager 
~--
cBastiffo 
.lE INVESTIGATION SERVICES 
rillE PLACE, 44-48 MAGDALEN STREET NORWICH 
)ne: (0603) 6300401761415 Fax: (0603)'763530 NR31JU, 
.J september 1993 Your Ref: Our Ref: S P / R F / G E \ 
IVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 
T Hannon 
0_; :litchell Circle 
IP \\'ethers fie Id 
'aintree 
:se~ 
[7 .JAZ 
~ar :lr Hannon 
lrther to our letter dated 6th J'll~~ 1993 l11 t '- anSher 0 your 
lquiry dated 21st June 1993. 
a) I can confirm that \,'e emplo\- nine personnel ,,-i thin our 
company. 
b) An application form is filled in and ernplo~-rnent history 
is required co\'ering the pre\-ious seven years, Ref erenct:':;:, 
are taken up hith all previous employers and thO personal 
referees are telephoned and \-."ri tten to. . Fe also us>:' a 
per son s d ire eta c c e sst 0 the p" C "h i c h the " are a 11 0\' e d 
under the Data Protection Act I hi th oursel\-es paying the £10 
search fee. HOhever he require the original copy of their 
reply. 
cl Training is given to guarding personnel in accordance 
"ith the particular assignment "hich that person has been 
recruited for. 
dl Our Company is registered "ith IPS" and the Proprietor 
is a member of the Institute of professional Investigators, 
hope that this information is sufficient, but if ,'ou ha\'e ar,,' 
rther enquiries, perhaps you hill telephone me. 
rincipal 
t", \C'T',I=-, fo:' s of Ihe 
Ins' 1\.."2 of 
Professionol 
In. t"iI,g.J~or5 
I/KSA 
July 1993 
. T. Hannon 
OA Mitchell Circle 
)P Wethersfield 
aintree 
isex 
Vl74AZ 
~ar Mr Hannon 
securlcor 
Securicor Security Services Limited 
Sutton Park House 15 Carshalton Road 
Sutton Surrey SM1 4lD 
Te~phone081 7707000 
Fax 081 64.3 1059 
Jrther to Mr Cowden's letter of 24 June 1993 I am writing to provide you with 
formation regarding the selection, screening and training of security guards within 
~curicor, as requested in your letter10f 21 June 1993. 
ECRUITMENT & SELECTION 
. 
nee 1988 recruitment of operational staff has involved the use of psychometric 
Jestionnaires (referred to within the Company as Biodata questionnaires) which have 
~en developed by occupational psychologists specifically for Securicor. The 
troduction of these questionnaires sought primarily to reduce the length of time it 
ok to make a final selection decision. Prior to the introduction of the new 
'ocedure, it took an average of 43 days to process an application, from an 
dividual's initial contact with the organisation to making an offer of employment. 
lis was due to the BSIA's requirement to complete five years screening prior to 
aking any offer of employment. The result was that Securicor was losing the higher 
Jality candidates to employers who could make a selection decision within a shorter 
~rjod of time. The use of the questionnaires enables offers of employment to be 
ade prior to any references being taken up. Candidates cannot commence 
nployment, however, until telephone references covering the last five years have 
~en obtained. 
he selection process 
Ie Biodata questionnaires are only part, albeit a crucial part, of the selection process. 
,,+ m~ .. ),w'y·S s.:,"\!l(jJ'u ~::::rt.!I~"':; l~! ( .... 'f·t·.)('( t("{ svcn ~""'.('~':> i.~t.! .jC\:Ci co. ..... ,,·., .' ... ~ ,.' 
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age 1 
1e ,candidate is asked to com~lete a~ application form which is designed to identify 
>pllcants wh~ do no~ mee,t basl,c, easily measurable criteria, Having completed this 
rm, the candidate will be interviewed by a suitably trained administrator who will also 
ovide inform~tion ab,out the ,relevant position, The interview is straightforward, 
lsed on the Information provided on the form, The administrator will make the 
3cision to reject the candidate or put him/her forward to the next stage. 
tage 2 
1e Biodata questionnaires, of which there are two, are administered by qualified 
ecruitment Officers with portable computers, The candidate is presented with 
ultiple-choice answers to a series of questions about job history, education, financial 
tuation, spare-time interest, attitudes to work and everyday events etc. Each 
lswer is given a numerical value and scores are grouped according to personal 
1aracteristics known to be important with respect to job success. The questionnaires 
'e completed concurrently, The computer generates a personal profile which the 
ecruitment Officer uses to conduct a structured interview, exploring in depth the 
mdidate's profile - this involves some quite intense detailed questioning, A high 
'oportion of applicants are rejected at this stage, 
tage 3 
the candidate is successful at the previous stage he/she will be asked to complete 
1e or more computerised ability tests, dependi~~ on ~he nature of th: job. Three 
~sts are in use: numerical, verbal and administrative; the latter IS used most 
equently, The results are given against Securicor norms, 
tage 4 
efore a final selection decision is made credit references are obtained. 
tage 5 
m 10 ment can be offered at this stage, The candidat~ is ask~d to complet~ a 
p dY I' t' f m wh'lch provides all the necessary information for screening ~con app Ica Ion or 
Jrposes, 
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:REENING 
Ice an. offer of employment has been made telephone references are obtained for 
: last five years~. The ?ffer is then confirmed and employment can commence. 
IS employment IS probationary until such time as the full screening is completed. 
II screening involves obtaining written references from previous employers going 
ck 10 years*. 
fhe exceptions to this are security guards employed for high risk assignments. 
lephone references must be obtained for a 10 year period and full screening 
;olves going back 20 years. In addition, the employee is 'positively vetted ' ie. 
erviewed by Company security personnel. 
tAINING 
I security guards attend a 3 day induction training course at one of 3 company 
lining centres before they start work on an assignment. The content of the course 
~Iude basic security guard duties, such as patrolling, dealing with the emergency 
!rvices, dealing with customers; use of radios and telephones; dealing with major 
~idents; civil and criminal law including recording evidence and powers of arrest; 
~alth and safety. There is also an introduction to the Company. On reporting to 
s/her first assignment a security guard receives assignment familiarisation training 
)m the supervisor. Specialist training, such as First Aid, is given as required and 
usually off-the-job. 
lope this information is of value to you. If you ~ish to di~cuss. anything in more 
~tail or would like a demonstration of the computerised questionnaires please do not 
~sitate to contact me on 081 722 2275. 
)urs sincerely 
RIIT MAZZON (MRS) 
ersonnel Manager 
- DR 1M E _____________ PRIMEGUARDS 
~ SECURITY SERVICES ---
Security House 
.J U A R D S 162 Coggeshall Road 
Braintree 
T Hannon 
lA Mitchell Circle 
) wethers field 
lintree 
iex 
, 4AZ 
lr Inspector Hannon 
JlliSEARCH 
Essex CM7 6ER 
Telephone: (0376) 550232 
Facsimile: (0376) 344444 
2 August 1993 
THE BRITISH_SECURITI INDUSTRY 
...:.....--=-::-::,; . 
Thank you for your letter requesting information on 
?loyment criteria for manned guarding which has now been brought 
-my attention. 
In response to the specific queries, I regret that it would 
misleading to make a statement on the number of employees but 
lId instead say that we are a small company having a permanent 
lrd base of under 35 full time staff. A more precise measure of 
npany size is generally given in Contract Hours. This is a 
)sely guarded secret with almost all security companies. 
The selection and screening criteria follow the BSIA standard 
respect of vetting previous history. Being in the position of 
ling a great number of applicants then any queries concerning 
3ubstantiated breaks in employment are generally grounds for 
jection rather than further investigation which is time 
1suming and may prove inconclusive. 
Selection of staff is based on two separate approaches. The 
cst is personal recommendation by existing staff. The applicant 
subjected to the full vetting procedure and a discussion of 
~ir merits takes place with the nominating employee before or 
:er the· formal interview. We have found this to be a highly 
:isfactory system - personal bonds leading to a greater level of 
un-work. 
The second approach is the standard application f~rm in 
lponse to enquiry and is subjected to the usual vettlng 
)cedure. 
The citeria we specify are that the candidate must have a 
.1 command of the English language, be a good communicat~r~ not 
have a conviction (exceptions are made ~n respect of drlvlng 
:ences unless driving is part of the dutles), to have a mature 
l confident presence. A good standard of tidiness, personal 
riene and general grooming is likewise included. 
Tattoos, pierced ears and hair length are covered under 
iform regulations. 
We pre~er a reasonable standard of education - to '0' level 
ade.C equlvalent or above. This is aimed at moving the image of 
c~rlty.sta~f a~ay from the educationally-challenged person of 
~l~ed ~aglnatlon towards the motivated professional with the 
lll~y to learn and to grow with the company. The nature of 
curlty today demands a much higher degree of technical 
derstanding than ten years ago. 
In work histories, we look for a serious career effort in a 
fferent industry, so that the guardbase has a diverse array of 
.dustry-specific knowledge. 
References are requested that give the usual information and 
lclude the question of whether they would re-employ the candidate 
lich has been identified as the most informative to ask. 
!rsonal references are expected to be well presented by literate 
!ople. They are to cover a minimum of two years acquaintance by 
Imeone other than a relative or co-habitant and are compared to 
le initial letter for similarities in paper, handwriting and 
lraseology . 
Candidates are expected to be of a standard of health and 
.tness suited to the job. If the health declaration is not 
:lean', then reference can be made initially to the company co-
:dinator who is a former medical underwriter and finally to a 
~dical examiner selected by the company who would complete and 
~turn the examination form with his opinion for-evaluation. 
Interviews for guarding duties are usually.condu~te~ by a . 
. ngle member of the management team with exper7ence 7n lntervlew ~chnique. For higher positions, two or three lntervlewers may be 
:esent in order to cover all the ground and to gauge the 
lndidates reaction to three personalities and question streams. 
Unlike some companies, we do not offer introducing staff a 
)nus or payment for their work. This avoids the del~ge of . 
!sponses or nominations that have beset other companles followlng 
lat approach. 
,Tra~ning of staff ac~epted for employment is carried out by a 
IDlnatlon of classroom lntroductory and assignment specific 
lining courses. The training team is composed of the nominated 
lining officer and the mobile inspectorate, the latter training 
-site. If it is felt at the end of the classroom module that 
~ candidate has insufficient grasp of or interest in the 
lining, then employment will be terminated. 
We are currently in the process of revising our training 
lual to include developments since it was first published and 
3 new format is loose-leaf so that the recipient can organise it 
the order they want. New subjects are being issued currently 
the rate of one per fortnight. 
The training syllabus includes :-
Law (relevant acts and how they are applied) 
Report writing 
Patrolling duties 
Overview of physical security (locks,fences etc) 
Uniform and equipment 
Searching 
Arrest 
Record Keeping 
Dealing with the public 
Accidents and emergencies (includes 1974 Act) 
Professional standards 
Company regulations 
Bomb threats 
Fire 
'1' d rses being prepared such as ere are additional specla lze cou 
R - Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. 
not members of the BSIA or IPSA. It is my personal We are . 1 ~Rn'~ ~cr h h rl' es h~"(~o rp-eat votcn~la as ..... - -J ~ .J... -
ew thAt although t .. sse ..;.JO~l .!.-'" '-::I.... ,!: • h h . 11 . cal 
" - 1 k of legislation comblned Wlt tel Ogl 
.e lndustry, the ac . f' t 'on on the part of many clients has 
.sistence on BS5750 ~ertl lcla 1 t as specifiers of standards. 
tigated against thelr deve opmen . 
k th h e done in developing standards, however, lS 
.e wor ey av , 1 d' g by us dely used within the industry - lnc u ln ' 
We are currently investigating BS5750. Also under 
~ination is BS7499. I am sure that this will be of great 
:erest to you. 
In conclusion, I hope that the information is suited to your 
~ds. As this area of information is one which most companies 
~l falls into the realms of commercial confidentiality, perhaps 
would be of greater benefit to visit us and discuss your needs 
a personal level. In the meantime, on behalf of the directors, 
vould like to wish you success with your Ph.D and remain 
lrs sincerely 
) Sessions 
-Ordinator 
lMEGUARDS SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED 
APPENDIX C 
ATTIITUDESTATEMENTS-LlliERTSCALE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTION SHEET 
The attached questionnaire aim to examine the attitudes of 
the general public, business operators in shopping malls and 
employers of private security services. 
The attitude statements included in this questionnaire are 
based on comments taken from the literature in private 
security. 
1. Please read each statement and then circle the 
response which most closely matches your own 
attitude towards that statement. 
2. Please circle only one response for each statement. 
Thank you for your assistance in this research. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTION SHEET 
The attached questionnaire aim to examine the attitudes of 
the general public, business operators in shopping malls and 
employers of private security services. 
The attitude statements included in this questionnaire are 
based on comments taken from the literature in private 
security. 
1. Please read each statement and then circle the 
response which most closely matches your own 
attitude towards that statement. 
2. Please circle only one response for each statement. 
Thank you for your assistance in this research. 
PUBLIC AND BUSINESS OPERATORS ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
SECuRITY OFFICERS 
ATTITUDE SCALE 
1. I believe that the pre-employment checks carried out on 
security officers working in shopping malls are 
satisfactory. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
2. I believe that security officers working in shopping 
malls are well supervised. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
3. I believe that security officers working in shopping 
malls are well paid. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
4. Security officers working in shopping malls should 
receive the same pay as police officers. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
5. I do not bel ieve that the government should licence 
firms providing security officers. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
6. I do not believe that security officers should have a 
code of conduct similar to the Police Discipline 
7 . 
Regulations. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree 
I do not believe that security officers in shopping 
malls are only there to serve those who pay them. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree 
8. I believe security officers in shOpping malls are there 
to prevent crime ana assist the public. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
9. I do not believe security officers in shopping malls are 
just one more way that the government controls the 
public. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
10. I believe that security officers in shopping malls work 
well with the police. 
Strongly Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
11. I believe security officers in shopping malls seldom 
work with the police. 
Strongly Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
12. I believe that security officers in shopping malls are 
well trained for what they do. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 'Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
13. I believe that security officers in shopping malls are 
not well trained for the job that they do. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
APPENDIX D 
FIELD STUDY 
TIME INTERVAL CHARTS 
CA'I'EroRY 
INI'ERACTION WITH POLICE 
CDNVERSATION 
PHYSICAL ASSISTANCE 
INI'ERAl,"TION WITH 
SHOPPERS 
POS IT IVE CXJrCXlv1E 
NEGATIVE CXJrCXlv1E 
INTERACTION WITH 
TRADERS 
POS IT IVE CXJrCXlv1E 
NEGATIVE CXJrCXlv1E 
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY 
VIOLENCE 
VERBAL ABUSE 
OTHER 
CRIJv1E PRF.VDITION 
NmE .. ST 
J '1 JW:U IT 
I LOSS PRlc VlcNl' I UN 
PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 PERIOD 5 PERIOD 6 PERIOD 7 
DATE DATE DATE DATE DATE T)ATE DATE 
:. , '11,f 
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